Scamming in the MoD: The Problems of Expensive Patriotism: Part One:
Tehlka still continues to reverberate in the minds of the people and journalists involved in this exposure still facing trial in courts. And several “Kargil purchases”, including “unnecessary procurement” of missiles for the Kargil operations, have now come under the scrutiny of the Public accounts committee of the Parliament besides an investigation into deal for upgradation of MIG-21 aircrafts and delay in LCA project is going on. Defence Ministry under ‘able leadership’ of George Fernandes has come up with one more scam where jammers for military were purchased unnecessarily and most of them are now lying as junk due to bad quality and lack of after-sales services as the foreign company involved in this sale has declared itself bankrupt even before the jammers could be installed and used properly, hence safely escaped from its responsibility of after sales maintenance and service. Although Indian scientists and some public sector corporations are well equipped with the technical know-how and necessary infrastructure to manufacture these devices within the country, the British firm swindled huge sum of money, amounting to crores, by supplying only 13 jammers. In fact, these electronic equipments that render gadgets like remote control inactive by jamming transmitted radio frequencies, are now being manufactured and supplied to the army by public sector undertaking Bharat Leectronics Limited (BEL). As yet BEL has satisfactorily supplied more than 60 jammers to forces. Ironically, the British firm was chosen on the pretext that such high-tech jammers can not be manufactured in India, now it is the BEL that has been entrusted the task of repairing of those non-functional jammers.
As internal reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General abound with discrepancies and shortages aplenty, painting a rather sorry picture of organisational efficiency and a worrying one as to defence preparedness:
Infantry troops along the LoC would suffer horrendous casualties, as they are still short of almost 2,50,000 bulletproof jackets - standard issue in any modern army that cares for soldiers' lives. The ammunition and ordnance that they would use would be of dubious quality, stored as they are in unsafe facilities, which have recorded 13 major accidents over the last decade. Units in Jammu and Kashmir would be harried by insurgents, whose communications they would be unable to disrupt as 10 of the 13 signal-jamming units, bought from a now-defunct British company, no longer work.
Indian troops would also suffer the consequences of inadequate armour support. Crisis in the Arjun Main Battle Tank programme and the slow induction of the modern T-90 tanks mean that India will fight with ageing and technologically inferior armour. In an emergency, this tank-fleet would have to make do with defective shells, which on at least one occasion have blown up during exercises, killing a tank driver and critically injuring a commander and a gunner. The Army would go to war short of 16,000 officers, while the Air Force would be making do with pilots who have not had the benefit of training on an Advanced Jet Trainer.
And one more unbelievable fact: More than 37,000 soldiers could go into the battle protected by bullet-proof vests if the Ministry of Defence (MoD) chose to collect and effectively utilise the dues of a single upmarket Chennai Club operating from publicly owned defence land.
The reaction of our top brass is predictably depressing:
In a March 10 article, former Army chief General V.P. Malik blamed the problem on media and political criticism of corruption in defence procurements. "Thanks to our scams, suspected scams and prolonged acrimonious debates in Parliament and the media," he wrote, "no civil or military official is willing to give any decision and expedite purchase of overdue weapons and equipment." At least two points are significant about the argument. First, the armed forces and the MoD have done nothing to restore their credibility; the Tehelka arms scandal notably ended in the elimination of the courageous investigative website, not the career of Defence Minister George Fernandes. Equally important is the fact that the problem clearly predates the Tehelka reports.
and the bureaucrats in the MoD fall in the same rut:
TALK about these problems to senior officials in the MoD, and three responses are trotted out. First, the problem is not anywhere as widespread as outsiders imagine, and that corruption and incompetence in the armed forces are still considerably lower than in civilian institutions. That line of argument has now been debunked by the reports of the Standing Committee and the CAG.
The second is that Pakistan, India's principal military rival, has its own share of problems and suffers at least as much from military corruption. While the proposition might be true, there is also evidence to suggest that Pakistan's modernisation programme has been considerably more focussed than that of India, since the military has a greater say in decision-making. Independent studies have suggested that the operational edge of the Indian armed forces as compared with Pakistan has declined steadily since 1971, from an estimated 1.75:1 then to just over 1.2:1 today. Most important, however, comparing the Indian armed forces with those of Pakistan is in itself absurd, given their considerably greater size and assets.
And that leaves the third argument, advocated by Malik that interfering politicians and journalists have made decision-making impossible. In fairness to the General, it is true that the MoD sometimes gets rough treatment. The post-Kargil review of defence expenditure by the CAG attacked the MoD for purchases either contracted or effected after the end of hostilities. "Nearly all the supplies," the report noted, "were either received or contracted and received well after cessation of hostilities and therefore in no way supported the operation. Supplies valued at Rs.2,150 crores were received after the cessation of hostilities in July 1999... [and] supplies valued at Rs.1,606.26 crores were contracted after the cessation of hostilities." This, Malik pointed out, was not ground for censure. "Did these purchases," he argued, "become unnecessary or fruitless during the Kargil war or as soon as it was over? Did the intelligence agencies, the government and the rest of the nation give an assurance to the armed forces that there would be no threat on our borders after July 26, 1999?"
The first two are completely spurious and can be boiled down to: (i) there is a problem of corruption and mismanagement but it isn't as bad as everyone thinks it is and when this doesn't hold water, (ii) things are pretty bad but look on the bright side, at least they are better than in Pakistan. It is this kind of shoddy approach and one-upmanship that leads to serious policy disasters and security gaffes. Only Malik's third point has some credibility, though the Army and the MoD share their responsibility for it as they did nothing to prevent things from reaching such state of affairs and have done nothing much since to restore credibility. The sinking of the probe into the Tehelka affair, hardly smacks of an institution that is trying to clear the air and improve transparency in its dealings. the inquiry resulted in the termination of the Tehelka organisation and the journalists' careers who undertook the investigation, as well as a political light-weight casualty in the form of the BJP party president Bangaru Laxman. George Fernandes, notably did not face a resignation scenario despite his overall responsibility as Minister of Defence.
It also raises some serious questions, as to whether any expeditionary stabilisation force could properly be equipped and supplied if dispatched to Iraq; unfortunately for our saffronist hyper-nationalists, waging a campaign involves a lot more than just waving off troops to deal with the enemy. Rigorous logistical and supply-side planning is required and this does not seem a forte of the current NDA administrations notwithstanding - despite its desire to project itself as 'strong on defence' it seems to be repeating old lapses in policy as well as creating new demands and pressures.
The DM better pull his finger out, it will need more than some hyped up trips on a MiG-21 to solve these problems.
The Army has decided to respond to the attack on its installations by 'relocating them to more secure areas', a euphemism one suspects for pulling them well back out of any area that is suspected of militant activity. This may not be the best response as the one place, which should be secure, even in the case of a surprise assault, is an army base. Needless to say one can only pull back so far, withdrawing to internal borders with other states may be more attractive but will hardly improve counter-insurgency operations. If even these installations can only deal with attacks when they are forewarned, then what chance does the civilian sector have of availing of military protection under the same circumstances. Meanwhile the dance to shuffle blame along and find out who exactly was responsible for the fiasco of Tuesday continues with contrary to the Defence Minister's assurances yesterday that "there was no security lapse":
Sources said prima facie non-compliance with SOPs was responsible for the heavy toll in Tuesday's attack on the Army camp. Units that adhered to SOPs, such as the air force base at Avantipora in Srinagar, were more successful in repelling surprise attacks. (Read More)
The attack on what used to be regarded as a `safe' military camp in Tanda near the border town of Akhnoor in the Jammu district of Jammu & Kashmir constitutes a major provocation and will hardly help the cause of Indo=Pak negotiations over the territory. Politically India has shown considerable maturity in making it clear, at the level of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Defence Minister, that it will not allow the détente process to be held hostage by terrorists. But the Government now needs to engage with the difficult question of just how to keep the peace process going amid escalating violence. In important ways, the attack on the Tanda camp and the escalating violence that preceded it is a wholly predictable consequence of ongoing efforts to bring about an India-Pakistan dialogue. Vajpayee's Ramzan Ceasefire of 2000-2001 provoked terrorist groups to unleash exceptionally high levels of violence — violence that eventually undermined the initiative itself. Nor was it a coincidence that terrorists carried out mass killings around the time of Vajpayee's bus journey to Lahore, in 1999. From the standpoint of the terrorist groups, such actions make perfect sense; raising the level of violence is the best hope of their voice being acknowledged in the course of a future India-Pakistan dialogue. After all, the likes of the Lashkar-e-Taiba's Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed have openly boasted that India is talking to Pakistan about Jammu and Kashmir because of the jihad waged by terrorist groups. Matters have hardly been heldped by the fact that the Defence Minsiter still under a cloud due to the Tehelka tapes, is under boycott from the Opposition, which walked out of the chamber when he rose to address parliament on the attack and have refused to recognise him as Defence Minister. His own antics continue unabated, with his most recent acceptance of the tongue in cheek challenge by the National Conference leader, that he fly in a MiG-21 to prove its safety record (three MiGs, in service with the IAF have crashed already in the past year). One can't help feeling that the airforce will obviously see to it that no harm comes to the Minister during his little aerial jaunt (no service arm would want to be the first to lose a minister under its care) but this will not address the serious problems that face regular IAF pilots when flying these aircraft. Fernandes would serve his responsibilities more by staying put on the ground but making sure that future IAF losses are kept to a minimum. Such a course would make less 'good copy' and make redundant a chance to indulge in extroverted bravado but would be far more effecitve in improving defence perfomance.
Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment has a complex position on this argument. On the one hand, the military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, is under intense international pressure to twist the arm of jihadi organisations so that they de-escalate armed operations against India. On the other hand, the violence serves the Pakistan establishment's interests, by giving `muscle' to its political posture on Jammu and Kashmir. Moreover, influential elements within this establishment seem to believe that Pakistan loses nothing by allowing jihadi groups to continue their operations. As Pakistan's former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Asad Durrani, has pointed out, India no longer retains the option of going to war as retaliation against major terrorist outrages. This ambiguity has found expression in recent official Pakistani conduct. No action was taken, for example, against the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin chief, Mohammad Yusuf Shah — an Indian national resident in Pakistan — after he recently threatened to escalate fidayeen attacks in Jammu and Kashmir. Notwithstanding Fernandes' certification, General Musharraf seems unwilling or unable to take on the Islamist far Right, which is influential among the officer corps of the Pakistan Army. While the visit of the prominent MMA leader Fazlur Rehman and his moderate public pronouncements on reaching a compromise solution on Kashmir were favourably received in India; on his return to Pakistan, while reiterating the need to find a peaceful solution to Kashmir, he also warned that "We will not give guns to the Kashmiris forever"
Er...yes, such indeed are the words of a man of peace. What is more galling is that obviously in his own eyes and the constituency that he represents, Rehman's position was taken to be a progressive and moderate one. Unsurprisingly after having accorded him a meeting with leading BJP party functionaries and the Prime Minister himself, the NDA government was largely silent. Such is the stern stuff of which saffron nationalists are made.
The problem now remains as to how India can respond without jeopardising any chance for talks. Perhaps the answer lies in the realisation that defence management and dialogue are not mutually exclusive; it can even be argued that the first is a precondition for the second. First, notwithstanding Fernandes' denial of any "security lapse," the basic deficiencies in security management highlighted by the Tanda attack need to be urgently addressed. Secondly, offensive operations against terrorists, which have been in disarray for the past several months, need to be revitalised and one can hope that we will see no more public relations exercises such as the much touted but completely hollow "Sarp Vinash". Thirdly, some serious thought needs to be given to the strategic objectives of counter-terrorism and the means needed to realise them. Most importantly, political India needs to realise that peace making cannot be an on-again, off-again, episodic activity. The Vajpayee Government must frame a set of well-defined policy objectives based on an institutional and political consensus to ensure that this peace initiative does not go the way of its predecessors. It is profoundly in the interest of the peoples of India and Pakistan that the present peace initiative succeeds — many innocent (and some not so innocent) lives ride on its success and the cost of failure will be high.
Militants in Kashmir attacked an army camp in Tanda resulting in the death of at least seven jawans ; in itself this is unfortunately not a rare occurrence, what marks this episode out was the fact that several high ranking officers, including the Commander of the Northern Sector (which includes Kashmir) were injured in the attack. Predicatebly the Defense Minister George Fernandes insists that "there was no security lapse" and both the Chief Minister of the State and Deputy Prime Minsiter have fallen back on formulaic responses blaming elements that want to subvert any thaw in relations with Pakistan over the disputed territory. Who will punish the terrorists, a new species of whom has crawled out to claim credit for the Tanda attack. They call themselves Al Shuhda. Kashmir has been bloodied by Al Something or the Other for a long time now. India cannot root out all terrorists and Pakistan now says that it does not control all of them. The fact is, though, most terrorists have a Pakistani operational base and were Islamabad to shut each and every one of them down, there will be a massive and positive impact on Kashmir violence. New Delhi is keeping its patience for now — there have been 13 major terrorist strikes since the Prime Minister made his hand of friendship speech in Srinagar on 18 April — and so it should. Still something is obviously not working; dual action is needed to seriously bring Pakistan to the negotiating table and rein in the militants over which it has influence and a proper implementation of counter-insurgency operations in the state which have of late been more prone towards PR stunts rather than the actually dirty business of rooting out and combating the separatists.
There seems to be some progress towards this with BJP minister going out of their way not to fall into the usual trap of instantly blaming Pakistan :
India charged on Tuesday that attacks by suspected Kashmiri fighters on an army base and a Hindu shrine which left 17 people dead in occupied Kashmir were aimed at derailing a fledgling peace process with Pakistan, AFP adds from Jammu.
In a major departure from its usual response to such attacks, New Delhi for once did not point the finger at Pakistan but rather at those it said were out to sabotage peace efforts.
"Normally we consider these terrorist strikes as part of the continuing proxy war but these incidents are an attempt to disturb the normalcy in Jammu and Kashmir," Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani told parliament.
Junior Home Minister Swami Chinmayanand carefully avoided blaming Islamabad. "It is still not known who is behind these attacks but one thing is clear: that militants are trying to derail the peace process between India and Pakistan and disrupt normalcy in Kashmir," the minister said.
But neither can Pakistan assume the role of innocent bystander in all this and the NDA government may have gone too far in its attempt to keep dialogue open. It remains to be seen how succeesful diplomatic negotiations, effective policing of the valley and Mufit''s 'healing touch' will be.
"If the Congress supports us on the Ram mandir issue, the VHP can support it in the coming elections," the VHP international general secretary, Praveen Togadia, told reporters here. "Our plank is the Ram mandir and if any party supports it we will naturally go with it. If the Congress supports us we shall support it in the polls and if the BJP supports our cause, we shall support it."
Asked to comment on the three possible ways to solve the vexed Ayodhya issue — through courts, negotiations or legislation — he said ``Hindus are seeking only three temples — Ayodhya, Kashi and Mathura — and if Muslims give them back to us, it will create a good atmosphere in the country''
Ah, so the old 30,000 temples claim that were supposedly demolished by past Muslim invaders now seems to have quietly receded into the background (to be activated when needed, of course). One can be pardoned for being wary of taking anything the secretary-general of the VHP has to say too seriously, as thisis the man who gave us gems such as :
"We will make a laboratory of the whole country. This is our promise and our resolve. If madrassas, the jihadi laboratory, are allowed to educate to kill non–Muslims, why can’t we have our own laboratory?" VHP leader Praveen Bhai Togadia said in a press conference here on Sunday.
"I cannot waste even two days in building the laboratory. Rajasthan has already become the laboratory of Hindutva," he said. The VHP leader said that Gujarat would be repeated in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and other states.
"The people of Gujarat have paid their tributes to the Ram Bhaktas of Godhra. Gujarat has become the graveyard of secular ideology and we will extend it to Delhi via Jaipur."
"All Hindutva opponents will get the death sentence and we will leave it to the people to carry this out,’’ he said.
"Abhimanyu is not yet dead’’, Mr. Togadia said. "The Mahabharat will be fought in Delhi’’,
Somebody should tell Togadia, that Abhimanyu died in defeat and that the climax of Kurushektra was no victory of Good over Evil but rather defeat for all involved. Still if the Saffronists want another Kurushektra, no doubt one will occur, as it is unlikely that Secularists will roll over and play dead this time. Meanwhile, the VHP has found a new pet cause to get hot under the collar about , luckily this time around it doesn't involve a mideveal temple demolished by Muslim marauders. Of course, this can nothing to do with the recent communal riots in Marad and the attempts of the BJP to make inroads into a state that traditionally has not been receptive to saffronism..... until now
As Vikash posts below, there seems some negative fall-out will ensue as a result of India’s decision not to send troops to Iraq. Clearly the Vajpayee government’s decision-making process has been even at the best of times ad hoc, slapdash, usually painfully slow and at times astonishingly fast, indeed precipitate. Nothing has changed in this particular process. The veteran journalist, Inder Malhotra, maps out the staged response of Delhi :
When the request was first received, the collective reaction of the Government was to "seize the opportunity", rush the troops and to win the "rewards" that prompt compliance with the wishes of the sole superpower mired in difficulty would entail.
Of course surmounting the lack of any pan-party consensus, the resolution of Parliament criticising the war and the obstacle of domestic public opinion had to be overcome:
That is when brisk consultations began both in New Delhi and Washington. Those who say that there was no American pressure for Indian military participation in "stabilising" Iraq are being economical with the truth. Accounts of the Deputy Prime Minister, L. K. Advani's unscheduled meeting with the U.S. President, George W. Bush, are more telling than either side has cared to admit so far. Remarkably, the pertinent questions raised by this country were not adequately answered by the American side, as became evident during the vital visit to Washington of the Foreign Secretary, Kanwal Sisal. Meanwhile, the second phase of the search to find a way to help the U.S. had begun. Indian public opinion, strongly opposed to sending Indian soldiers to Iraq from the word go, had grown vastly more hostile to the idea for reasons for which the Americans must accept the bulk of the blame.
Once the refusal of Congress to sanction the move and the intense hostility became too apparent even to the wishful-thinkers in the administration, the back-pedalling and soft-soaping began:
when the Government realised that it could in no way say "yes" to the U.S. For, it was becoming obvious that "stabilisation" of Iraq was turning into pacification. And yet New Delhi did not want to say a blunt "no" to America either. But then a wishy-washy approach could not last indefinitely. The clear-cut decision to say "no" was therefore clinched well before the formality of Monday's meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security. In the available space only one more point can be made. During the three-month interval between the initial impulse to take the plunge and the eventual decision to stay out of the mess the U.S. has made in Iraq, several in the higher echelons of the Government, most prominently Mr. Advani, have changed their stand 180-degrees. In Washington he had publicly declared that those back home who opposed the despatch of troops to Basra were ignorant of "all the facts". Once back in Delhi, he became aware not only of Mr. Vajpayee's position but also of the domestic dimension of the issue. What would happen to the BJP and its allies if the Iraqis started looking upon Indian soldiers in Iraq as an "appendage" to the American forces and shooting at them as well? And, that too, in an election year? Nothing concentrates the mind so effectively as an oncoming election.
Nothing indeed; like their American counterparts, such sensitive issues of policy are frequently decided by the nature of the electoral cycle; a comfortable majority in the Lok Sabha and early on in the term, who knows, the BJP response might have been quite different. Still one has to worry when even hardcore Saffronist organisations such as the RSS voice their reluctance to countenance such a move :
Panchjanya, a Hindi news weekly viewed as the mouthpiece of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, has questioned the wisdom of sending Indian troops to Iraq in a strongly worded editorial in its edition dated July 13 which appeared on the newsstands today.
"Why should Indian troops be sent to Iraq to clean up the American garbage (Amriki kachra saaf karne ke liye hamen kyon bheja ja raha hai),'' the editorial asks and then suggests that we should understand and analyse what important benefits India would derive by "poking our noses (tang phansa kar)'' in American problems.
It seems quite clear that the excuse of a UN mandate is really a fig-leaf to allow the NDA government to “say no, without actually saying no” even under such a mandate it is unlikely that Indian troops would be regarded as anything other than an appendage of the American force. After the US with its 146,000 troops and the British contingent of 14,000; the proposed Indian force of 12,000-17,000 would have been the third largest force in the country as while Poland, Italy, Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, El Salvador and Honduras are the other countries that have a token presence in Iraq or have made firm commitments to send troops. All these countries are military and political allies of the U.S. However, the total number of troops they have pledged does exceed more than 3,000. Much of the excuses given like consulting neighbouring countries also seem like largely a show of formality:
The Indian government has also said that it will gauge the opinion of Iraq's neighbours as well as Iraqi public opinion. A letter that bears the signature of Saddam Hussein, which was distributed in the Arab media, has warned that all foreign troops on Iraqi soil will be treated as enemies. Diplomats belonging to some of the major countries bordering Iraq have said that the Indian government has not yet sought the opinion of their governments about Indian military participation.
Diplomats from West Asia say that it will be suicidal for India to get sucked into the Iraqi maelstrom. Arab and Muslim public opinion, which is vehemently opposed to the Americans, will be disappointed if India yields to U.S. pressure. Many people in the region and elsewhere are convinced that the Bush administration is implementing the Israeli agenda for West Asia. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was among the earliest backers of the military action against Iraq, and it was Sharon who first gave the call for a regime change in Iran. The diplomats also point out that New Delhi should be more concerned about what is happening in Afghanistan. Militarily, the U.S. is in a more precarious situation there. A Taliban comeback would be a serious setback for India. Russia, India and Iran were the major backers of the Northern Alliance, which today has the lion's share of power in Kabul.
One would be wise to wonder why Iraq should suddenly assume importance at the expense of Afghanistan, as the latter are closer to Indian security concerns, vis-à-vis Kashmir and cross-border-terrorism, even ‘national security’ justifications look somewhat weak. As to US officials claim that UN resolution 1483 gave enough sanction to support the sending of troops, to Lalit Mannsingh the Indian ambassador to the USA; UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan made it clear that in his opinion, it would be “improper for Indian troops to act as peace-keepers in a war that did not have the approval of the UN or the international community” (Frontline, News Service Quote). Some US anger is forthcoming as officials in New Delhi quoting diplomatic sources say that the US had been trying to entice other countries into contributing troops by telling them that Indian military participation is a foregone conclusion. Islamabad, which is even more susceptible to U.S. pressure than New Delhi, has indicated that it would send troops to Iraq only under United Nations or Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) cover. President Pervez Musharraf has also indicated that Pakistan will take a decision only after an interim Iraqi civilian administration is in place in Baghdad. The fact that the Bush administration has not been able to find a figure to head a civilian administration is an indicator of the unviable situation it is in.
The Asian Times story contains some other surprising elements such as the putative carrots of “defense nuclear, biological and chemical equipment” as well as special forces gear and P3 Orion Maritime Patrol aircraft. As to the former, proliferation of nuclear technology and bio/chemical weaponry is hardly a far-sighted policy in a hotpsot such as South Asia and strangely at odds with the Bush administrations’ claim of controlling the spread of WMD. While the tactical defence equipment is really a minor sop given that the bulk of Indian equipment comes from Russian and European sources and third way transfers such as the sale of the Israeli Phalcon AWACS system have already been approved. In the end as the past three Indo-Pak wars have shown, India has not suffered from technological inferiority; its weaknesses lie elsewhere and in any potential confrontation with China, such a technological edge will not be enough to guarantee it victory.
Blackwill’s other public utterances leave some puzzlement as to the claim that the Bush adminsitration’s view of India had improved from that of “nuclear renegade, whose policies threatened the entire non-proliferation regime” sounds a little bit fantastic given that whatever else one can accuse the Indian nuclear programme of, nuclear proliferation is hardly one of them – ironically the same cannot be said of Pakistan the US client state in the region. This shows just how far the Bush admin’s perception of the region is from reality, and suggests a potentially dangerous level of disconnection. Some of the rhetoric is galling:
“Yours is a BJP government (meaning and adventurist Hindu fundamentalist government), you took the risk in 1998 (with PokhranII nuclear tests), take the imitative now as well. We know you may ask for UN cover or cite domestic concerns. We can get a UN cover but if you send troops right away, that will strengthen our friendship.”
I can only describe this kind of reasoning as Faustian bargaining; it seems to combine an implicit acceptance of Saffronist military expansionism, and nuclearised policy together with a spectacular disregard for the democratic political constraints that another government has to operate under. India, unlike Pakistan, has to take into account domestic public opinion very seriously and given that Indian politics is at the moment in an era of coalition alignments, small differences can decide who does and who does not form the government in Delhi. Miscalculations as to the perceived benefits from risky foreign policy entanglements can backfire with severe consequences for the loser. Concretely apart from the “trinity issues” nothing much is offered except for the offer to pick up the $300 million costs of troop deployment, while this is an important guarantee, it hardly costs the US much given the much higher expense of supporting and deploying US troops and will not go down well within India, if Indian troops are seen as cheap mercenaries and the bait of recovering lost investments in Iraq and a slice of the reconstruction pie are unlikely to amount to enough to warrant taking such a step in the first place. Rather tellingly a real quid pro quo over Kashmir and Pakistan was not forthcoming.
The BJP despite its banging of the militarist drum is not as competent on defence matters as it claims to be, as the 19th Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence report shows. It is extraordinary that supposedly the most militaristic of Governments is presiding over the lowest level of Defence expenditure in recent Indian history. Defence expenditure as a percentage of Central Government expenditure declined from a high of 18.39 per cent in the late 1980s to 13.86 per cent in 2002-2003. It is at its lowest level since the 1970s at 2.28 per cent of the GDP. There is much to the argument that India does not need, and can ill-afford, enhanced Defence expenditures. More expenditure does not necessarily buy you greater security. Even so, the fact that the present Government has continued lower levels of Defence spending comes as a surprise. Take some other parameters. According to the report, about 30 per cent of the total capital expenditure earmarked for Defence for 2002-2003 remains unutilised, weakening the modernisation of the forces. The Committee notes with the "gravest and utmost concern that the Tenth Defence Plan has still not been finalised along with indications of rough financial commitment, even though two years of the projected Plan are already over. This is indicative of the ad hocism and non-serious approach which still seems to prevail, notwithstanding the trauma of Kargil and other assaults on national security". So much for commitment to Defence planning and procurement.
The Government imposed two taxes on Indian taxpayers in the name of national security in 2002-2003: a five per cent surcharge on taxpayers in general and a 10 per cent surcharge on taxpayers earning more than Rs. 8.5 lakhs per annum. The Committee says that it is "surprised to observe that the funds collected for the specific purpose of national security have become part of the general revenues of the Government". Even funds earmarked for security purposes are being siphoned off elsewhere. Reading any of the Parliamentary Committee Reports available on Parliament's website and will reveal one dismal finding after the other. The Army is still short of 16,000 officers: perhaps, there is an inverse relationship between militarism and the rush to join the military. Many of the problems — slow pace of research, difficulty in procurement, and the cumbersome administrative structure that make policy implementation tawdry, predate the BJP Government. Even so, the extent of inattention to Defence matters portrayed in these reports comes as a shock.
Take other incidental facts. Most glaringly, we are losing more aircraft and pilots to accidents than we did in wars. In any other country, this would be a scandal of overwhelming proportions. In India, the Ministry of Defence seems to deal with it as if it were just another routine omission — a product of so many bureaucratic slips we are used to. This is supposedly a Government that revels in the rituals of militarism. Yet, all the plans proposed for war memorials remain on paper. In short, whatever the rhetoric of the Government, it is actually quite weak on the nuts and bolts of Defence. Its attention is focussed on the big gimmicks: nuclear explosions, casual war talk, etc., and not on the administrative, organisational and technological sinews that make a modern Defence force. Much of the militarism that the subcontinent is subject to is needless and dangerous. It is undoubtedly a good thing that we are a society and Government not keyed up to genuine militarism. Even then, the fact that Defence has done so dismally under a BJP Government calls for some reflection.
The most obvious lesson is that no Government can transcend serious fiscal constraints. Our runaway budget deficits are a real constraint on Defence expenditure, and even a Government ideologically committed to undue militarism will soon be caught in a fiscal trap. Second, no state can transcend the general limitations imposed by the weakness of its organisational structure, even in matters of Defence. We are under an illusion if we think that the Defence department will remain immune from the pathologies of the Indian state: lack of long-term planning, inefficient use of resources and so forth.
Third, even the BJP's militarism is more bark than bite. The three indicators of genuine militarism, a society's willingness to mobilise resources, to join the armed services, and to genuinely honour its war dead, are sorely absent even in this Government. Fourth, in purely strategic terms, the public probably overestimates our military capabilities. An Air Force that cannot save its own pilots from accidents and an Army that cannot keep order and prevent deaths in its own recruitment exercises are probably in no position to undertake complicated strategic operations. This is not a reflection on the abilities of our soldiers who serve with honour and under hardship. But it is an indictment of the Government and people in whose name they act. Finally, George Fernandes is perhaps too preoccupied with the politics of a coalition government to be able to initiate real change in his Ministry.
For all of our security bluster, we actually pay little attention to genuine military matters. If there was one issue which ought to have brought Parliament to a standstill, it is the deaths of our airmen in accidents. Those deaths are so symptomatic of our weaknesses: our inability to genuinely care for those who serve the nation, our inattention to serious matters, and the organisational disrepair of our Defence. That even the Opposition is so hesitant to make a political issue of a genuine security matter speaks volumes about our interest in Defence, if not the limited political imagination of our political class. And the fact that the Air Force has not made an even greater fuss about it suggests perhaps that even our military establishment, at its very top, has internalised the society's indifference to organisational details, and the needless death of our servicemen. Shortages in the officer cadre now appear less puzzling.
There are good arguments for resisting the militarisation of Indian society, but if it is only inefficiency that is preventing it we at least ought to own up to it. It is important to recognise that this Government's "strong-on-Defence" argument in its own favour is mostly bluster, unsubstantiated by any real application. For all its claim of having instituted a paradigm shift in security matters, we are still subject to old sloppiness in Defence thinking. In Defence matters, the BJP is not as different as it claims to be or as we, supporters and detractors alike, would like to think it is. The US demands may impose a strain that the Indian military machine in its current condition cannot easily meet.
Still as Vikash, has pointed out, the main reason for not joining in the US in this latter-day crusade, is that it will not be an efficient, wise or rewarding use of force from India’s point of view. IK Gujral sums it up best when he said that “…there is something un-Indian and undignified in becoming a subcontractor to the Pentagon in order to become a sub-contractor to American multinationals. Our decision must never smack of mercernaryism.” In the final analysis, the Bush administration will only last for another term at the most, any involvement in Iraq will last for at least 30 months and would be far more damaging to Indian's interests in the region and abroad.
Kar Sevaks in Babri Masjid Demolition Case Threatened: Party-time over for the Saffronists?
Things get murky as two Kar Sevaks in the CBI case instigated into bringing the accused ringleaders of the Babri Masjid demolition to prosecution, have now said that they have recieved death threats after naming LK Advani as one the main leaders:
Two kar sevaks who publicly accused deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani of instigating the Babri Masjid demolition have said their lives are under threat. Santosh Dubey and Vinod Vatsa, among the five kar sevaks who made the accusation on June 7, yesterday told the CBI special court in Lucknow that they have been receiving threatening calls since. “At the behest of Advani and (Murli Manohar) Joshi, senior BJP and VHP leaders are after our lives and we seek the court’s protection,” the complaint said. In his order, special judge Seth Shailendra Nath Tandon directed the police chiefs of Uttar Pradesh and Haryana to provide special security to the duo.
The Congress finally seems to have decided that playing the soft saffronist card will not carry them back into power are going to make an issue of the CBI attempts to evade prosecuting senior BJP leaders:
The CBI’s decision to quietly drop the conspiracy charges against Advani, Joshi and six other accused will be on top of the agenda, Congress spokesperson Jaipal Reddy said. The charges were listed in the original joint chargesheet against all the Babri accused filed in September 1997 but were omitted from a supplementary chargesheet filed against Advani and seven other Sangh parivar leaders on May 31 this year.
Uedifying as they are the current Opposition will do less damage to the communal stability of the country that the BJP-led coalition. Looks like there will be another run of "Vote for the Crooks, not the (proto)Fascists" to oust the BJP at al from power.
Meanwhile, there will be little love lost for Advani in kar sevak reunions, one can only assume that he will not be planning another (domestic) rath yatra anytime soon.
Manipuri housewife, Irom Chanu Sharmila deserves to win. She has been on a fast unto death since 7 November 2000, demanding withdrawal of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958 , in force in the state since September 1979. The immediate provocation was the killing of 10 civilians by the Assam Rifles the previous day. Arrested, freed and rearrested, she is unwavering in her endurance; her lone crusade a record of sorts. Presently confined to a special hospital ward with armed guards posted outside, she shows no lack of tenacity. She has seen two chief ministers come and go, and the present incumbent, Okram Ibobi Singh, is in a dilemma whether to seek the Act’s withdrawal or to let Sharmila continue her protest. His indecision has cost him dearly. He told the Assembly that the government had so far spent Rs 2,39,425 to forcefully feed her through the nose. No persuasion has worked and Opposition parties suggest defence minister George Fernandes intervene immediately.
The continuation of the draconian law has in no way helped tackle insurgency; its prolongation has only alienated people. The army’s presence may be a deterrent but the government cannot continue to depend on troops to contain insurgency. In any case, the Act has lost much of its teeth following the Supreme Court’s restrictions on Army functioning. The Centre’s decision to entrust the CRPF with the task of looking after security of the entire North-east by 2005 is plausible but maintenance of law and order is the state’s primary responsibility. Insurgent groups say they are prepared to sit across the table if the Centre withdraws the Act. Perhaps this deserves as much attention as Sharmila.
On day one of Parliament’s monsoon session there were indications of a storm brewing with the Opposition taking objection to the CBI’s decision to drop charges of criminal conspiracy against Mr LK Advani, Mr MM Joshi and others in the Babari Masjid demolition case. While the government defended the CBI, a determined Opposition forced adjournment in the Lok Sabha and hinted that its protests would continue. The Opposition demanded dismissal of the two ministers and a discussion on the subject as an adjournment motion. The House was adjourned for the day on the Speaker’s refusal to admit the motion as the government had not conceded the ground. The Opposition alleged that there was prima facie evidence of the Prime Minister trying to influence the CBI into dropping of the charges of criminal conspiracy under Sec. 120B IPC against Mr Advani and Mr Joshi. The charges had figured in the 1996 CBI chargesheet.
Law minister Mr Arun Jaitley, who was prevented by the Opposition from intervening, forwarded a letter to Speaker Mr Manohar Joshi. The Speaker read out the letter amid protests from Opposition members, who had by then trooped into the Well. Mr Jaitley’s letter said: “Besides dealing with the subject matter, which is sub judice, the CBI has not diluted any case, dropped any charge against any accused person. Section 120B was never a charge in the Rae Bareilly chargesheet, and the question of dropping it does not arise”.
But the Opposition rejected the claim. Mr Jaitley also made similar remarks to journalists. The entire Opposition acted jointly and looked determined to stall the proceedings. Mr PR Das Munshi (Congress), who wanted the Question Hour to be suspended, quoted from documents to prove that charges under 120B were in the chargesheet when the case was taken up on 9 September 1997. Mr JP Srivastava, designated judge, had taken cognizance of the chargesheet, he said.Mr Jaipal Reddy (Congress) said: “The CBI filed two chargesheets, in 1993 and 1997, on the basis of which the judge framed the charges. The 1993 chargesheet didn’t contain ‘criminal conspiracy’, but a supplementary chargesheet in 1996 made these charges.” Mr Vajpayee was present in the House but neither Mr Advani nor Mr Joshi could be seen.
The BJP is lucky the Opposition itself is such a joke and to put it mildy would find it difficult on a good day to organise a drinking party in a brewery, otherwise it would be in real trouble; however the Babri Masjid case won't go away and it is dawning on lower functionaries and the small fish that the whole episode was primarily a political stunt and that the BJP leadership has no intention of sacrificing power for rebuilding the temple , and more gallingly that they will throw those considered more expendable to the judicial watchdogs (now that they have arisen from their slumber).
Still the PM will need to do something more than composing a few poems to bail the Saffronists this time around.
Part of an email sent to me earlier by a colleague in Pakistan, in April/May. It is interesting to see how some of the developments, particularly with reference to Afghanistan have an echo now:
The Taliban was not rooted out of Afghanistan; it has simply migrated. The fundamentalist Muttahida Majlis e Amal (MMA), which dominates the legislative assembly of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), has introduced mandatory prayer calls five times a day for government employees, prohibited shirts and trousers in school uniform, and banned male doctors from treating women. The assembly has also voted unanimously for the adoption of sharia law, and authorized the creation of a Prevention of Vice and Protection of Virtue Department, modelled on the Taliban’s infamous religious police. It is noteworthy that MMA leaders, like the Taliban, are followers of the Deobandi school of theology, which enjoins an intolerant and sectarian interpretation of Islam; also that there has been a surge of Taliban-inspired anti-government attacks in neighbouring Afghanistan since the MMA came to power in the provincial assembly with a nod and a wink from the Musharraf establishment.
The salient question is, how long can Pakistan nurture jehadi militancy as well as US troops on its soil? The two are bound to come into collision, and even a recalcitrant and somnolent Washington will have to take notice and rap General Musharraf at some point. Musharraf has removed two top officials in the NWFP administration, but that doesn’t look like a decisive move likely to rein in the MMA, especially as he curried favour with them in the past hoping to marginalize the secular and democratic opposition to military rule. Whether or not the MMA is allowed a free run in NWFP will have repercussions on national politics. The MMA has been vocal in the national legislature demanding Musharraf take off his uniform if he wants to stay on as President. It is likely to intensify this demand, which already paralyses the legislature, in case Musharraf moves against it in NWFP. In that case Musharraf may have to cast off his democratic veneer and dissolve the Assembly. Alternatively, if he does a deal with the MMA, he would have to do a General Zia and accommodate its demand for an Islamization of the rest of Pakistan. Zia pulled it off because his mentors in Washington had at the time an interest in promoting jehad. That margin of tolerance doesn’t exist any more after 9/11, as the jehadi targets of choice won’t be Soviet troops on Afghan soil, but US troops on Pakistani soil.
Some of the predictions seem a bit off; the recent despoiling of the Pakistani embassy in Afghanistan seems to indicate some problems there, though the increase of incidents involving resurgent Taliban fighters shows that this phenomenon did not quite die away, the way it was meant to in the first phase of the WoT. On the other hand Musharraf has played his hand relatively well, sniping at MMA leaders where possible and remaining flexible on the LFO issue which is to come before Parliament in the next few weeks though he will still have to square the reluctance to rely on either Benazir Bhutto’s PPP or Sharif’s ML to endorse it. In the meantime it seems he is willing to deal on a limited basis with the religious parties. The Friday Times, though senses a potential shift in the traditional support of these parties for CBT in Kashmir (and by extension in Afghanistan) something which has worried the jehadi organisations:
THE VISIT TO INDIA BY A HIGH-POWERED delegation of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), led by the party’s chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman, has drawn much flak from the outlawed jihadi organisations who bitterly opposed it.
The visit will be reciprocated by a delegation of Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, the parent Deobandi organisation in the undivided subcontinent. Observers term the JUI (F) visit significant since the party since the days of the Taliban is considered very close to the hard-line Deobandi jihadi outfits like Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammad. The visit has also been squarely denounced by the Wahhabi jihadi outfit, Lashkar-i-Taiba which now calls itself Dawat ul Irshad. The Lashkar and other Jihadi outfits are also opposed to the thaw between India and Pakistan and consider these efforts at breaking the ice synonymous with sabotaging “jihad-e-Kashmir”. “For them the decision by the top leadership of the JUI (F) to visit India at this juncture came as a surprise. They fear the visit would give normalisation efforts the much-needed boost and show that the religious parties are on board such efforts,” says an analyst.
The Lashkar, in particular, arguably the most strident group on the issue, has publicly condemned last month’s Jama’at-i-Islami’s reception to visiting Indian parliamentarians. Both JUI (F) and JI are the leading component parties of the six-party religious alliance that was returned to Parliament with the largest majority in Pakistan’s history. "Jihad is the only solution to the Kashmir problem,” said Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, chief of Dawat ul Irshad, the parent party of LeT. Lashkar has shifted all its operations to Muzzaffarabad in Azad Kashmir since the group was banned by General Pervez Musharraf in January last year. “We were not concerned about what the government is doing since it is dancing to the tune of the United States. But it is difficult to understand why the religious parties, who understand the nature of this struggle, should fall victim to this great charade,” said Dawat leader and spokesperson Yahya Mujahid.
Interestingly, the JI backed Hizb-ul Mujahideen has remained silent on the issue. Sources said it appears that in a ‘tactical’ move the religious parties have decided to distance themselves from these groups that have increasingly come under pressure from the government as well as the United States. “These parties are basically political parties, though they use religion to keep themselves in the business. For them it is important to show flexibility in the face of changing circumstances. In any case, before the advent of the Taliban, the JUI (F) was most amenable to taking a rational line on relations with India,” says an observer. The chief of JUI, Maulana Fazlur Rehman and other leaders in the delegation like Hafiz Hussain Ahmed will meet Hindu and Sikh leaders, besides visiting religious seminaries including Sikhism’s holiest “Golden Temple”. It is not clear whether the JUI leaders will also meet Indian government officials, though some insiders have hinted at that possibility. Be that as it may, the visit itself will be the first by the leaders of a hard-line Islamist party to India and may pave the way for a dialogue between New Delhi and these parties and groups controlled by them.
“Since all JUI members in our delegation are also parliamentarians, we are most likely to meet Indian parliamentarians,” Fazlur Rehman said before embarking on the visit from Lahore’s Wagah border checkpoint. The invitation for the visit was extended by the chief of JUI-Hind Maulana Asad Madni to Maulana Fazlur Rehman. “Since Maulana Madni will be our host, he willdecide our programme and whom we can or will meet,” Rehman said. A few weeks ago, the JI hosted a reception in honour of the visiting delegation of Indian parliamentarians. The move was highly welcomed in India. It also evoked much interest since JI activists had protested very sharply when Indian prime minister A B Vajpayee visited Lahore in February 1999. The leader of the Indian delegation Kuldip Nayyar in one of his columns described the reception by the JI as the high watermark of the visit. The change of tone in the religious parties has also been welcomed by the liberal circles, who believe that this could go a long way in shaping up things.
“The JI reception to Indian parliamentarians will help Pakistan’s position before any formal dialogue,” a peace activist told TFT. Political observers believe that the religiousparties, which control the NWFP and form the coalition with the PML-Q in Balochistan, both provinces bordering Afghanistan, want to signal to the West that they are not backing the militant Islamist groups and are not averse to talking to India if New Delhi is prepared for a meaningful dialogue. The Frontier government has recently drawn much flak for its retrogressive actions and some donors have already cut off funds to it to punish it for pushing through a shariah bill. Sources said the message that the foreign governments were getting very nervous was passed by President Pervez Musharraf to Akram Durrani, the JUI chief minister of NWFP.
However, Musharraf is presently in no mood to take any action either against the NWFP or the Balochistan government. Talks on the Legal Framework Order havealso started between the government and the opposition after a hiatus and both sides have expressed confidence over a breakthrough this time round. "We know the religious parties have their own agenda as they are in power politics, but our aim is jihad and we don’t believe in any ifs or buts,” said the leader of a defunct Islamist group. Most observers think this could be the beginning of a split between religio-political parties and the militant groups that have no political presence.
On the surface it may be surprising to see Rahman, a man so eagerly implementing the Talibanisation of the NWFP, travelling to Delhi and meeting the PM to talk of peace - by all accounts the meeting was quite cordial as these tete a tete amongst religious fundamentalists from opposing sides oftern are - but a deeper logic may be at work here. From Rahman’s point of view the US in particular and Western principles in general would be anathema and he would see little good coming out of Western mediation. His call for bilateral negotiations does not necessarily herald a softer line; it may be just that he prefers dealing directly with India. While Rahman has emphasised that he does not represent an official position — he is, after all, leader of the Pakistani opposition — Prime Minister Jamali has made intriguingly similar noises of late, saying that India and Pakistan should draw up their own roadmap, and the “third party” is the Kashmiri people themselves. That marks a subtle shift in the Pakistani discourse where “third party” always meant US or UN mediation. Jamali, of course, doesn’t carry much authority and is proving to be a lame duck premier. But it is just possible that Islamabad may be getting a little more flexible on Kashmir and Musharraf is using Jamali to float some trial balloons.
It is too early to tell whether such a split is in play or not, and it may well be a tactical rather than strategic move; as the relationship between the BJP and the more violent militant parts of the Sangh Parivar demonstrate, for fundamentalist religious parties amorphous and hazy links are essential with the hardline elements, so that if democratic legitimacy is extended by the exigencies of electoral politics then close association with extra-parliamentary and paramilitary-style groups can be downplayed or denied as required. Something more serious will be needed to show signs of a definitive rift; but this raises the tantalizing prospect that as Musharraf is forced to deal with the religious parties, their gradual inclusion into government or formalized power-sharing could serve as an important moderating influence that can detach religious conservatives from the hardline fanatics and fundamentalists. This is, for obvious reasons, a dangerous path to go down.
Unfazed by the acquittal of all the accused in Vadodara's Best Bakery case, the witnesses in this city's post-Godhra massacre cases are determined to depose before the courts whenever trials begin. In fact, the imbroglio over Best Bakery case witness Zahira Sheikh's double volte face has only strengthened the resolve of those here. They are determined the accused will not go scot-free.
The mood at Naroda Patiya, where 86 people were killed on February 28 last year, is indicative. Though witnesses of the massacre are sure they will testify against the accused, community leaders admit the biggest concern is the accused roaming free on bail.
"After the acquittal in the Best Bakery case, we are trying to convince the witnesses to depose in court as truly as possible," said Siddique, a community worker whose shop was vandalised in the riots. Though witnesses in his area have not yet received any threats, he said there may be problems from the accused on bail.
But legal experts following the riot-related cases in the city say that the lack of threats here may be because trials are still a long way from beginning and because the accused are already free on bail.
It would be pleasant to be hopeful but the Nanavati Commission set up to inquire into the Godhra riots is already having difficulties in persuading witnesses to come forward and give evidence and even the witnesses who so far have come forward have given testimony along expected lines:
Two of them praised the "timely action" by police to prevent the spread of riots in the Satellite police station area, while Amrish Patel, a lawyer, accused the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the Bajrang Dal and other Sangh outfits for setting fire to a restaurant on the satellite road.
Muljibhai Solanki, who owned four restaurants in the locality, said his establishments were specifically targeted by the mob because his partner was a Muslim but did not name anyone in the mob.
Unless some serious action is taken to push the gujarat state government into taking its responsibility seriously this will go the way of earlier inquiries such as the Srikrishna Commission enquiring into the 1993 Bombay riots amongst others. but with an election coming up in the autumn and the Hindutva bandwagon flagging, the only state where communal polarisation has worked in the BJP's favour is in Gujarat, it seems unlikely that the high command in Delhi will risk jeopardising their saffron laboratory just yet.
Thinking about Development: the 2003 Humand Development Report:
In September 2000 at the UN Millennium Summit 189 countries adopted the Millennium Declaration committing themselves to pursue eight goals: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for development. Worldwide progress in achieving these goals encompassing as they do more than just economic development is the focus of the 2003 Human Development Report (HDR). The Millennium Goals translate into human development indices that the HDR has been documenting since its inception. Progress on these indicators has been uneven. Countries in east Asia and the Pacific led by China have posted the most remarkable progress in halving the number of people living in extreme poverty, expanding primary education and reducing under-five mortality. Sub-Saharan Africa has recorded a story of stagnation across the board. In Latin America and the Caribbean where some countries had human development indicators similar to those of developed countries, there has been a slowing down of economic growth over the 1990s. In central and eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States there has been a decline in life expectancy and rise in poverty levels since the 1980s. The Arab states show an uneven picture with some countries recording improvements while others such as Egypt have made significant progress on some indicators. More dismaying is that only four of the region’s 17 countries with the necessary data had multiparty political systems.
The HDR is not a report that is hastily put together. Over the years it has developed systems, sources and statistical methods to ensure to the best of its ability the validity of the data and the analysis based on them. That there are gaps in data and statistical systems is readily acknowledged and the document makes a case for investing in creating such data systems across the globe. Nonetheless the report’s analysis of the failures and the successes of various countries in achieving the Millennium Goals raises many questions. For example, that diminishing state investment in public health has negatively determined health status in many countries is hardly a new understanding. Poverty of resources – non-availability of drugs, insufficient primary care personnel – in the public health system creates a vicious circle. Because it is poorly resourced, people do not use the public health system; this leads to poor funding and aggravates the problem of poor resources. Adequate funding for health and expanding access have been perennial issues of the last two decades and the report offers no new insights.
Countries (or regions) with long periods of political instability or conflict expectedly record poor progress on the human development indicators. This is not only because resources are diverted to purposes such as defence, but also because conflict debilitates all systems and contributes not only to high mortality but also to sharply rising morbidity. The report notes that there have been 57 armed conflicts in 45 locations especially in the sub-Saharan countries and some 3.6 million lives have been recorded lost as a result. The report’s analysis of why so many countries have failed to make the grade in economic growth is textbook copy: decline in development assistance, rising debt burden and drop in primary commodity prices. While there is no disputing any of these factors, the report adds no new insights calculated to advance human welfare.
On some fronts the report offers recommendations that appear curious or even naïve. For instance, it identifies “geography’s affects on markets and trade” among the main reasons for poor progress in human development. Factors such as the location of the country, whether inland or on the coast, the extent of natural resources and the size of the market are listed as important. It prescribes six clusters of policies including raising agricultural productivity by using better technologies and building better infrastructure and appropriate industrial development policies to boost labour-intensive, export-oriented development. While technology is an issue that features across the report, it does not make an appearance in the context of industrial development. It is not clear whether and to what extent policies that expand labour-intensive and necessarily low productivity activities contribute to increasing income levels or welfare for that matter. Such a policy implies relatively high investment in labour welfare that poor/developing countries would be hard put to release. Without this the policy would hardly touch the welfare dimensions even if and when income levels were modestly raised.
The report recognises that a decisive factor in progress is the level of involvement of the people. There must be mobilisation of civil society so that sufficient pressure is put on government to move in the direction of the human development goals. Accountability, transparency and decentralisation are the prescriptions offered. But in every country social classes and other hierarchical divisions demand that inherent and nascent tensions be addressed and acknowledged in designing policy and implementation measures. In Bangladesh, for instance, a radical drug policy was adopted and fully implemented under an authoritarian regime, with little or no involvement of the people. Without a doubt it made an impact on people’s access to medicines and therefore to health situations. But nowhere else has it been possible to replicate this experiment. While this is generally regarded as an aberration, it also serves to highlight the complexities of implementing pro-people policies in societies with complex and subtly varying social and political systems.
The HDR is emphatic about the need for developed countries to keep their commitment to creatively fund and aid developing countries to improve social indices. But in the context of developed country stances in international fora – whether on trade issues or nuclear disarmament or the environment – this is wishful thinking. And this is arguably the missing weave in the tapestry of human development in the last decade. The reluctance to address the issue of social, economic and political divides, within countries and across them, seriously undermines the contribution of the report.