:: Saturday, July 19, 2003 ::

Prisoner Release from Guatanamo Bay:

In a bit of a turnaround, given the widely perceived stubbornness shown over the detainees held as “illegal combatants” at Guantanamo Bay by the US after the Afghan campaign; the US has released 11 Pakistani detainees :

It was the second group of Pakistan prisoners released from Guantanamo Bay and followed discussions on the prisoner issue between President Pervez Musharraf and Bush administration officials during a recent visit to Washington. Five prisoners were released earlier this year with no charges pressed against them. One sent a legal notice to US authorities demanding compensation for wrongful confinement.

US authorities had told their Pakistan counterparts 13 prisoners would be released but only 11 arrived overnight aboard a special plane, an interior ministry official said.

"We are not yet aware of the reasons for releasing two less than the indicated number," ministry spokesman Brigadier Javed Cheema said.

But wait, I thought these were all bad men……



:: Conrad Barwa 6:06 PM [Permanent Link] :: ::
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The Politics of Aid: Beggars, Givers and Choosers:

The International Federation of the Red Cross in its latest World Disaster Report released earlier this week criticised developed countries for their double standards on humanitarian aid since the “War on Terror” began, saying:

…scarce resources are being shifted towards high-profile aid efforts in politically strategic conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan, while millions of people suffering in chronic emergencies - such as Aids, famine and conflict in Africa - are neglected.

Some discrepancies are understandable such as the US Defence Department’s decision to provide $1.7 billion of relief and reconstruction aid for Iraq at a time when when the World Food Programme faced a $1 billion shortfall in funds to avert starvation amongst those countries in Southern Africa affected by the most recent famine; the former clearly plays into security needs and will stabilise the situation in the region. What is perhaps less excusable is the attempt to push GM foods as part of the food aid packages offered to African countries and the bloated farm subsidies recently augmented by the White House to bail out American farmers which have an adverse impact on LDC farming communities, especially those in Africa. Others reflect simply the exigencies of changing international politics:

In Afghanistan humanitarian assistance jumped three-fold after the attacks on the US on September 11 2001, though the needs were no greater than before.

Having said this, the contention that aid might be a zero-sum game, is only partially true:

Jonathan Walter, editor of the report, said while this increase was welcome for Afghans, "There's a limited amount of money in the aid pot. So, if one country gets more money it means other countries get less, and millions of people suffering outside the political spotlight aren't helped."

This probably only holds in the short to medium run; as aid flows are somewhat more responsive in the long run to changes in demand. The problem is that both bilateral and multilateral aid are often dwarfed by private capital flows and the ability of LDC governments to raise funds in the international credit market. The confidence of foreign investors and credit rating of individual governments therefore have a powerful influence on their ability to raise funds for development and to cope with disasters. When such capability is reduced, aid usually increases but is too small to compensate for the outflow of private capital and the decline in creditworthiness. On the other hand sometimes policy shifts by LDC countries also plays a role, as the recent Indian decision to:

As a first step in its efforts to be seen as a rising world power, New Delhi has decided to prune its dependence on foreign money and only accept government-to-government aid from a club of six donor countries.

Emboldened by a treasury chest holding $82bn (€71bn, £49bn) in foreign currency, India said it planned to stop receiving "small aid packages", as part of a wider plan to become an aid donor rather than aid recipient. India is already a significant donor to several sub-Saharan African countries and has given $100m to the new government in Afghanistan. But a month after India's decision to cut 22 countries from the list of donors, some foreign governments are searching for reasons why some were dropped.

Given India’s large share of foreign aid this will have some impact, though will be mitigated by the fact that the lion’s share of aid is routed through multilateral agencies (about 60%). What makes this development more intriguing is that the decision to forgo aid is based on primarily political reasons, rather than economic or developmental ones:

"It has nothing to do with money," said one aid official. "It's about foreign policy." This may indicate why diplomatically significant countries such as the US, Britain and Russia are included in the club of six.

Mr Andersson offered a broader explanation. "India wants to see itself as an emerging regional power with the ambition of having a permanent seat on the [United Nations] Security Council," he said.

However, this may not be a wise course, given that it is precisely small absolute aid givers, but ones who give a significantly relatively such as the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries that frequently are more experienced and provide a higher quality of bilateral assistance as well as demanding less by way of reciprocal tied-aid concessions. Of course, Prem Shankar Jha feels that there is another motive behind the change in aid donors:

But Mr Jha suspects that there are deeper ideological motives that explain why some donors were dropped. Last year, European countries condemned India's government after the massacres of up to 2,000 people in the western state of Gujarat. "What's really happening is that some European Union countries decided quietly that they would not fund projects in Gujarat under the [Hindu nationalist] Modi state government," Mr Jha said. "This is the payback."

This unfortunately makes more sense, particularly given the persistent criticism by foreign media and aid agencies about the partisan way aid was being distributed in Gujarat after the Godhra riots and the reluctance of the state government to keep the relief camps open for a necessary length of time. As Jha, wryly observes, such moves are misguided as even if the aid stops the lectures will not. Of more concern is the potential gap that may be left open by the holes created if this funding is not re-routed:

India has now told the 22 government donors to channel funds directly to non-governmental organizations or through UN agencies. But with much bilateral money funding water sanitation and education schemes, one aid diplomat asked: "Who is going to fill the gap with these projects? Not the central government." Aid officials of the 22 countries are now negotiating with India's government on how to wind up or divert their programs.

Channeling funds through NGOs, is not as beneficial as it sounds, given the proliferation of corrupt NGOs in India at the moment and the fact that recipients of funds need administrative clearance from the Home Ministry and co-operation of the local authorities for their aid programmes, it could also be a method of making sure that funds are disbursed only to those NGOs that are willing to fall in line with the central governments policies and which are sympathetic to its politics . A slew of saffronist NGOs is not what is needed. Both Central and State governments have demonstrated themselves to be poor at delivering the health and educational infrastructure to those reliant on public systems in the past and there is little reason to believe that simply having a hefty surplus of foreign exchange will suddenly change matters in this regard. In this sense those who suffer from cuts in such funded programmes are the one who will really be paying the costs of India’s desire to have some of the “symbols of world power status”.



:: Conrad Barwa 9:29 PM [Permanent Link] :: ::
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Pre-Poll Manouvering before the Assembly Elections:


Talk about the pot calling the kettle black, the BJP accuses Ajit Jogi , the Congress Chief Minister of Chattisgarh of “hijacking its Hindutva agenda”; and playing the communal card to wean away Hindu voters. The BJP had better worry since without its sole marker of distinction there is virtually nothing to distinguish it from any other mainstream party at the national level such as the Congress; it is certainly as corrupt, inefficient and incompetent; without stoking up religious passions it stand very little chance in the polls. Voters may well prefer the soft saffronism of Congress to the hard variety of that peddled by the BJP and its allies.

On the other hand the Congress seems to be getting its act together and realising that power in Delhi will not be possible outside a coalition government; the party has paid heavily for its refusal to realise that the days of automatic single-party governments at the Centre are a thing of the past and we are now in the era of coalition governments. The prevarication of the Pachmarhi resolution now seems a thing of the past and Congress President Sonia Gandhi has decided to make a pro-secular stance and anti-Communal one the basis for forming political alliances with regional and ethnic partners. The BJP has predictably criticised the Congress , saying that the latter had ridiculed coalition government in the past but had now come around to the idea. It has good cause to worry given the Congress’s national reach it could potentially displace the BJP as a dominant party with which smaller regional and caste based parties cluster around with to form a new government in the aftermath of another general election. Its smugness also seems less warranted by the fact that though the BJP has been much more willing to accommodate coalition partners in order to enter government it has also been virtually the only political formation to have the ignominy of being rebuffed in its first attempts leading to the spectacle of a 13-day government at the federal level . It final ability to forge a coalition owed much more to the internal failures of Third Front politics and the stubbornness of the Congress, rather than its own intrinsic attractiveness as a coalition partner. Now that the former two obstacles have been removed, and the aura of being the rising new force that would reinvigorate Indian politics much diminished, the BJP can no longer rely on the stumbling of its political opponents and the anti-incumbency factor to do it any favours with the electorate.


:: Conrad Barwa 7:38 PM [Permanent Link] :: ::
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The Best Bakery Case: A Case of Justice Denied:


In a dramatic roundabout involving the Best Bakery case, the first prosecution brought against the perpetrators of the Godhra riots, one of the main prosecution witnesses has done a turnabout, Zahira Habibullah Shaikh, the 19-year-old girl who survived the night of March 1, 2003, when a mob attacked and killed 14 persons in Best Bakery, Vadodara in Gujarat, said to journalists on the 9th of July that: "What I said in court was not true. I said it after pressure was put on me. In fact, I recognise all those who attacked us that night". Asked why she changed her testimony now, she replied that rumours that she and her famly had been bribed into silence had angered her and she felt compelled to speak out about the intimidation that occured as the trial approached, to change her account of events:

....ever since she received the summons from the Special Court, she had been threatened on her mobile phone and told that if she testified, her family would be killed and she would be killed on her way to court. She said that a BJP MLA was behind her when she entered the courtroom and alleged that he too had threatened her.

Ms. Shaikh said she had asked a number of local lawyers to help her but all of them demanded money, some as much as Rs. 4 lakhs. "No one was supporting us. In Gujarat, everyone is theirs, they want to suppress our case, they are all with them," she said, referring to the people she has accused.

As her account had already been heard by several human rights organisations visiting the state and even the Chief Election Commissioner JM Lyndogh; her later refusal to testify comes as a major reversal to say the least. The attitude of the Gujarat state government is clear in their choice of Public Prosecutor for the 950 off cases pending with respect to the violence meted out to the Muslim community during the riots; as the candidate chosen for this sensitive and crucial post is Chetan Singh a known VHP supporter who moreover had procured bail for many those accused of carrying out the violence; in a sick twist of events Shah, who had secured the freedom of many of the accused, is now expected to lead the prosecution against the same people. In his capacity as the chief public prosecutor, Shah would decide which prosecutor handles the cases against persons who were earlier his clients and he is not the only public prosecutor owing allegiance to the BJP and its allied outfits; as, the prosecutor in the Best Bakery case, Raghuvir Pandya, had contested the Vadodara municipal elections with the support of the BJP. This is only the tip of the iceberg as many other prosecutors and lawyers involved in the cases have shown their sympathy with the Modi government.

As most seasoned observers of Communal violence in India know, the two basic reasons for the guilty going unpunished are, obviously, dishonest police investigations and the political clout mobsters enjoy. By and large, mob violence takes place in collusion with the police and politicians; an ugly phenomenon that has been repeatedly shown by past history. The NHRC which had been critical of the Modi’s government hadling of the riots has itself come in for criticism over its soft and hesitant approach to the case:

Last year, the NHRC won praise inside the country and internationally for its timely and forthright intervention in Gujarat. The commission criticised the Modi government for its complicity in the anti-Muslim violence and called for the most heinous crimes — Godhra, Best Bakery, Naroda Patiya and Gulberg Society — to be investigated by the CBI. As long as Gujarat simmered, the NHRC maintained its interest. But when it came to shaming the government for its inaction, the commission got cold feet. To be sure, the NHRC now plans to look into the Best Bakery acquittals but its expression of interest is too little, too late.

In large measure, the malaise at the NHRC — its timorousness and lethargy — is a product of the general rot affecting all Indian institutions. In addition, the commission is hampered by the restric-ted nature of its mandate. It can, for example, summon witnesses but cannot enforce its demands. It can look at crimes committed by the police but not the army. In the case of high-profile crimes by the paramilitary forces, the commission ultimately backs off, as happened over the Bijbehara massacre in Kashmir by the BSF. The case for amending the Protection of Human Rights Act (PHRA) is a compelling one, but what law can ensure that the NHRC’s members have an overriding passion for human rights? Like other sinecures for retired judges and bureaucrats, the NHRC has come to be seen as a comfortable post- retirement job. Some of its members have even gone on to become governors. A better mandate, and a better selection procedure, may yet salvage the NHRC. But in the absence of change, the commission might as well as pack up its bags and go home.

The response of the NHRC has been less than hopeful:

Various NGOs, including the PUCL have urged the NHRC to reopen the case although the prospect for this looks grim as the Talking to presspersons, the NHRC registrar and team leader, Ajit Bharihoke, said the team had come to Gujarat to collect "facts" and that it would submit its report "within a week".

A terse "no comment" was his reply to a question whether he favoured re-opening the case or why the NHRC did not intervene when witnesses were turning hostile during the trial in the fast track court

The whole episode has clear signs of manipulation and political meddling as all the accused in the case have now “disappeared” and more suspiciously those accused of initimidating the witnesses are falling back on the usual antic of plying the aggrieved innocent victim:

Some local Muslim leaders also submitted a memorandum to the team demanding the immediate arrest of Madhu Srivastava, BJP MLA from neighbouring Waghodia, and his brother and Congress member of the Vadodara municipal corporation, Chandrakant Srivastava, and the owner of a garage opposite the bakery, Lal Mohammad — who was also a key witness but like Zahira he turned hostile, and some others.

Both the Srivastava brothers, whose respective constituencies include the Hanuman Tekri locality, however, have denied the charges against them. Claiming that he had no role in the case and that did not "escort" Zahira Sheikh the day she was give her testimony in the fast track court, Mr. Madhu Srivastava said he was being "unnecessarily maligned" and promised to move the Supreme Court to clear his name.

Mr. Chandrakant Srivastava, accused of providing "shelter" to the "now underground accused", claimed that instead of helping the accused, he was trying to ensure justice to the victims. He claimed that he was the first to report the fire in the bakery to the police and helped many of the members of the minority community escape. The BJP State Government, which has taken a dim view of the NHRC fact-finding mission, is yet to make up its mind on appealing to the higher court against the fast track court's judgment.

The NHRC as HS Phoolka points out , clearly has the power to intervene in this case:

The NHRC has the power to inquire into the role played by any police officer. If it finds that the police, in the course of a riot, favoured any one group, or colluded with rioters, it has the power to recommend to the government action against such officers.

If the government doesn’t take action, the NHRC has the power to approach the concerned high court or Supreme Court to direct the government to initiate action. It also has the power to inquire into the role played by political leaders in such violence.

In Gujarat, it is still not too late. The NHRC can even now appoint its own advocates in cases pending in various courts in Gujarat to ensure that the matter is properly handled. If its advocate had been involved in the Best Bakery case, it could at least have ensured that all the witnesses cited by the prosecution were examined. If the state government fails to file an appeal now, the NHRC should file one against the judgement given its overweighing public interest. If the state government does file an appeal, it should get its advocate to intervene before the high court and ensure that the judgement is set aside and the matter referred for further investigation. Since the crimes here were against society as a whole, the approach should be to secure justice for society, as well as victims. By approaching the case only in terms of ensuring justice for the victims, the police and courts are shifting the whole burden on the victim to prove the guilt of the accused. This, after all, is the duty of the state. The failure of the victim to identify the guilty is actually the failure of the police and the judicial system to punish the guilty. It is astonishing how, in this case, the police and politicians have abdicated their responsibility.

Yet the NHRC as not intervened in the case, despite the fact that the NHRC Chief Justice called the verdict “a miscarriage of justice”. Hardly surprising, say its detractors, since throughout its 10-year existence, the NHRC is yet to intervene in a single case anywhere in the court. This despite an express provision, Section 12(b) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, empowering the NHRC to ‘‘intervene in any proceedings involving any allegation of violation of human rights pending before a court with the approval of such court.’’ Had the NHRC thought of invoking this statutory function in the Best Bakery case, the Vadodara court would have had to admit it as an intervener and that could well have changed the course of the trial. ‘‘This should have come naturally to the NHRC,’’ says human rights advocate H. Yadruchud. ‘‘In any mass killing, it’s the commission’s job to step in and ensure that victims get justice especially when the system is stacked against them.’’

Instead, what the commission has done so far is to make strident noises that have gone largely unheard. In March 2002 when then chairman Justice J S Verma led a team to Gujarat. Not one of his key recommendations was taken seriously—evident in the court’s strictures on the police in the Best Bakery case. It was the riot-tainted police who handled the matter despite the NHRC’s repeated suggestion that the CBI be brought in. And despite the fact that the NHRC recorded widespread allegations that ‘‘FIRs had been poorly or wrongly recorded and that investigations had been influenced by extraneous considerations.’’ In less than a fortnight, the Modi Government rejected this suggestion by arguing that a probe by its police ‘‘cannot be put into disrepute...merely on the basis of hostile propaganda.’’ Two months later, the NHRC again raised the issue—only to be rejected again.

As Human Rights Watch India, notes in its report on the riots and their aftermath :

More than one hundred Muslims have been charged under India's much-criticized Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) for their alleged involvement in the train massacre in Godhra. No Hindus have been charged under POTA in connection with the violence against Muslims, which the government continues to dismiss as spontaneous and unorganized.

Although the Indian government initially boasted of thousands of arrests following the attacks, most of those arrested have since been acquitted, released on bail with no further action taken, or simply let go. Police regularly downgrade serious charges to lesser crimes - from murder or rape to rioting, for example - and alter victims' statements to delete the names of the accused.

It is clear that under Modi’s government there will be one rule for Muslims suspected of attacking Hindus and another for Hindus who are suspected of having done the same to Muslims. Equal treatment before the law in criminal matters, a key part of the ability of the state to provide a fair judicial system is thereby openly and cynically flouted. The treatment extended callously towards refugees from the violence:

Living conditions for more than 100,000 people displaced by the violence continue to be grossly inadequate. For months they resided in makeshift relief camps with little support from the state. By the end of October 2002, the government had closed most of the camps, forcing some families back into neighborhoods where their attackers still live and where their security is continuously threatened. Most people interviewed by Human Rights Watch received negligible amounts to compensate for the destruction of their homes, ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand rupees, or less than one hundred dollars.

The public retraction of the court testimony squares with the earlier accounts of the witnesses before the National Human Rights Commission and the Commission of Inquiry appointed by the Government. Zahira Sheikh had also voluntarily recounted before the Concerned Citizens Tribunal and the national media her ordeal on March 1, 2002, when a mob burnt down her father's bakery, killing at least 12 persons. As there could have been no coercion involved in recording statements before such varied bodies, and there is circumstantial evidence of the involvement of a ruling party MLA in the trial before the fast track court in Vadodara, the inescapable conclusion is that Zahira Sheikh and her mother gave their testimony in favour of the accused under duress. Now before the media, they have clearly shown the subversion of the trial by the ruling establishment.

Not surprisingly, the Citizens for Justice and Peace, the group that gave Zahira Sheikh the confidence to go back on her court testimony, is talking of seeking a retrial outside Gujarat. After the experience of the twists-and-turns trial in Vadodara, where the witnesses were accompanied by a BJP member of the Legislative Assembly, there are apprehensions about the possibility of a fair trial in the BJP-ruled State. In the event of the retrial taking place in Gujarat, the CJP has decided to ask for a Special Public Prosecutor. Obviously, Zahira Sheikh and her family do not want to return to Vadodara where they will again be vulnerable to intimidation. Indeed, they have said they would not get justice in Gujarat where, they asserted, the public prosecutor, the police and the politicians were protecting the accused. Through all this, the Gujarat Government has maintained a stodgy silence, not giving any indication of an intention to appeal against the court verdict. Evidently, without pressure from civil rights groups, non-governmental organisations and the media, the State Government is unlikely to take the case to its logical conclusion. In the interests of justice, and to prevent other cases relating to Gujarat riots from fizzling out, the Best Bakery case must be reopened and retried.

ADDENDUM: Judges debate over what scope the Central government and the Federal authorities have to re-open and retry the case, under existing legal procedures.

:: Conrad Barwa 8:10 PM [Permanent Link] :: ::
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Jamali & Musharraf:

Pakistan's Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali, right, see off President Pervez Musharraf for three-nations tour from airforce base in Islamabad, Pakistan on Monday, July 14, 2003. Jamali held fresh talks with key opposition leaders, urging them to resume negotiations about Legal Frame Order (LFO), constitutional amendment introduces by Musharraf to enhance his power. (AP Photo/Press Information Department, HO)

:: Vikash Yadav 12:08 PM [Permanent Link] :: ::
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Political Drum-beating in Pakistan:


The Pakistani PM Jamali asked for a “broad based consensus for the survival of the democratic system” a confusing precept given that democratic rule means rule by majority vote rather than by consensus. What he meant became clearer when he said that the Opposition “it should show maturity for the continuation of democratic system and cooperate with the government” and after consultations with ‘allied parties’ which urged “the opposition to stand by the government in the larger interest of democracy and for the progress of people” all of which rather renders the whole concept of an Opposition in any representative assembly rather redundant. Strong shades of Ayub Khan’s guided democracy experiments and other such facades seem to be replicating themselves under yet another military dictator in Pakistan.

While the MMA has temporarily agreed to back Musharraf’s LFO order, delaying a parliamentary standoff and constitutional crisis for the time being; its leader Quazi Hussein Ahmed is under no illusions as to what is at stake, commenting that “the president would be negating the parliament he had himself helped create if he continued with his inflexible attitude on the LFO, he said that it would mean that he (the president) wished to establish a dictatorship in the name of democracy”. It is a sad day when Islamist fundamentalists are on the side of pro-democracy forces against autocratic rule. Past experience has shown that military repression inevitably tends to benefit religious parties in Pakistani elections and this raises some worrying concerns for the future.

Meanwhile, Musharraf is busy posturing and indulging in some creative thinking as can be seen from his claim that Pakistan is a peace-loving country and has no aggressive designs against any state. He said the country's entire defence shield "is for peace and to live with honour and dignity among the international community." One can be forgiven for wondering why honour and dignity cannot be gained without such an unwieldy military apparatus and how exactly Pakistani border claims from the Rann of Kutch to Kashmir fit into this world-view but as the audience were made up of board members from the Pakistani Ordnance Factory, maybe his rhetoric is a little more understandable from a political point of view; although it does indicate that he shows scant interest in pushing the defence establishment the real power behind the throne in Pakistan, into a transformed role which could accommodate a lasting peace with India or ensure than civilian democratic rule is not endangered in the future. The Man on Horseback does seem willing to get out of the saddle just yet.


:: Conrad Barwa 8:29 PM [Permanent Link] :: ::
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India's Iraq Policy: Part Three: The Military Angle:

It looks like a formal decision will be reached today on not sending any combat troops to Iraq, by the Cabinet Committee concerned. One voice, which has not been heard from much openly, is that of defence spokesmen and analysts.Capt. Bharat Verma (retd.) editor of the Indian Defence Review, provides a moderate view from such a perspective. After the usual colonial references and warnings about serving under a foreign flag, he injects some much-needed realism into what the reception of Indian troops that would venture to Iraq would actually be:

...it’s a delusion that an average Iraqi will consider us as part of the “Stabilization Force” instead of an “Occupying Force”! Day in and day out, the American and British forces face this dilemma with rising public anger and increasing terrorist attacks against the invaders. In the Twenty First Century, possibly the dumbest thing to do is to physically occupy someone else’s land. New Delhi’s stance of no “territorial ambition”, therefore, will start finally paying dividends in the coming decades and should not be undone for earning a few dollars more.

This is not something new or that has not been said before, but it is noteworthy that it is also an opinion shared by at least some members of the defence establishment itself. Interestingly, Verma also is sceptical and critical about any economic gains from such a policy:

Fourth, singular reason to deploy Indian troops in Iraq being flaunted by some under the disguise of economic stakes is faulty and short-sighted. In the aftermath of invasion and due to rising anti-American sentiments, the petro-dollars surplus from West Asian countries will anyway be invested in the EU, China and India with an increasing momentum. If one looks at the macro level, this is a much larger pie than investment from one single country.

This inveigles into the current debate about what the fallout of the Iraq war will actually be for the global economy and how it will affect the basis of US influence. Capital inflows to the US continued into the beginning of recession in 2001 when share prices fell back down to their old level – in the period of international instability and uncertainty after the WTC attacks and Afghan campaign the US seemed like a secure destination for funds. The revamped military budget in 2002 was $396 billion (exceeding the combined expenditures of Russia, Japan and Europe) but was considerably less than the annual inflow of funds at $500 billion. As Martin Wolf in the Financial Times commented “The US current account deficit is 50% bigger than its defence spending…..Indirectly the rest of the world pays for US power.” The biggest single source of funds flowing into the US is Asia, which accounts for 40% (half of which comes from Japan) next comes the Eurozone with 25% (with just under half from the EU). Effectively investors in Japan and to a lesser extent Europe were lending it the money which it uses to maintain its military superiority – this superiority was of course one of the factors making the US a ‘safe haven’ for investors in East Asia and elsewhere in turbulent times encouraging their governments to hold very large amounts in dollars (or dollar-denominated bonds). And providing the wherewithal for US firms and consumers to buy more from the rest of the world. It was a virtual circle albeit not quite the one fondly envisioned by most neo-liberal economists. Yet this link observed by several scholars such as Peter Gowan, Alex Callinicos and Robert Brenner creates come problems for US policy. Dependence on external inflows to maintain such military hegemony is destabilising; alternative scenarios where investors abroad would withdraw their funds from the US, could have the potential to create a vicious cycle as capital would flee to other safer havens. As Michael Wolf in the Financial Times again observes, “In military affairs the US can be unilateralist. But in the world of economics it is intrinsically multilateral. Those running the world’s sole superpower would do well to remember this potentially painful fact.” Of course it is simplistic to think that the US occupation of Iraq alone will set in train this course of events but it is a danger that is overlooked by the current thrust of US policy, and the problems of how to solve this reliance on foreign capital inflows and maintain a military large enough and technologically advanced enough to maintain hegemony is a dilemma that will not find its solution s in the physical occupation of the regional oil-fields of the Middle East, particularly if the military and political costs of occupation accelerate.

Verma sees a more apocalyptical confrontation looming in the post war scenario:

Iraq will ultimately turn into a full-fledged battleground between Christianity and Islam- our troops, therefore, must not be caught in this crossfire. Unlike Americans who appear to lead a crusade against Islam, we do not have such a quarrel. For example our historic dispute on the Western Front is with Pakistan and quite frankly, it is not with their religion. They happen to be Islamic is of no consequence to us!

Indeed. This Huntingtonian vision may be a crude way to break down the simmering resentment and sporadic violence, which is linked to questions of political order, nationalism and regional irredentism as well but religious faultlines will certainly assume an increasing predominance in the future, though grandiose civilisational conflict seems unlikely. The Indo-Pak, rivalry has several strands, from the Pakistani point of view, given the religious base of their nationalism the divide does encompass Islamic and non-Islamic tensions; from the Indian perspective, being a nominally ‘secular’ republic religion may well be the reason for the conflict seen on the other side o0f the fence but the motivations on this side were meant to be purely secular and grounded in nationalism rather than faith. How much this is true in practise is highly debatable; both because of the challenge of Hindu nationalism and to what degree Indian secularism merely provided a passive way of endorsing Hindu hegemony at the political level under the guise of religious pluralism and the fact that secularism is more compatible with Hinduism than it is with Islam; by which nationalism in the former can be projected as ‘secular’ with out losing its religious or sacred character while in the latter this separation would undermine the very basis of faith. Verma’s confidence may well be quite misplaced here in how Pakistan and increasingly many Indians see the conflict. Concluding he agrees with a symbolic, compromise that would allow India to send aid and assistance without any military commitment:

The wise route for New Delhi to devise is the same as in Afghanistan. We should therefore not hesitate to send doctors, engineers, and humanitarian aid, or to run hospitals and schools as part of the famous Indian healing touch. We must help train their police force, journalists and the television crews. Unlike the American democracy that tries to impose its values overtly on an alien culture and land, we don’t. Our liberal democratic traditions merely seep into others by virtue of our normal healing work. The goodwill India has achieved in Afghanistan without sending troops is awesome and that is the highway of the Twenty-first Century to extend influence, backing it with solid military power, should the need ever arise. Therefore, in my considered opinion, deploying troops under a foreign flag (and not within the United Nation Mission) is a “no-no”. Not for a few dollars more anyway!

This seems to be the increasingly popular way of ‘saying no, without saying no’ that is gaining ground amongst moderate circles of all political hues. While the question maybe academic by now, VR Raghavan sheds some more light on what role Indian troops would be required to play exactly in Iraq:

The Indian force is required by the U.S. Command to be in the Kurd-controlled northern part of Iraq. It would therefore relieve the U.S. 101 Division that is currently operating in the area. The U.S. Division is apparently needed to bolster the faltering military control in central Iraq. Baghdad, Falujah, the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf have seen scenes of the U.S. military being attacked. Military `pacification' of central Iraq is essential to establish a new government. The ratios of troops to space demand the deployment of a greater number of American troops in the Iraqi political heartland. Indian troops will thus enable the U.S. to impose a military dominance through which a political outcome can be enforced.

This makes sense from the US point of view, releasing as it would have done its own troops for actual fighting while leaving the task of policing to other forces and also would have been welcomed by the Indian side as it would have allowed a preservation of the fiction that the stabilisation force would be there for the benefit of the local populace and would avoid the burden of suffering heavy casualties. The Kurdish area being generally the most peaceful and due to the longstanding Kurdish animosity towards being governed from Baghdad makes it relatively more quiescent as does the presence via the KDP and PUK an actual institutional and political infrastructure that can assume administrative responsibilities, enjoys some degree of popular legitimacy and more crucially are favourably disposed towards the US and allies. Of course, Raghavan is quick to note that some challenges are still present for any military commanders of the region:

In the Kurd-held areas, two challenges will face Indian military commanders. The Kurds are sharply divided into two warring groups. They have held their peace on account of U.S. pressure and the hope of a political role for them in Iraq. That outcome is not even on the horizon since there is no legitimate government in Baghdad. What is certain is that if Iraq's territorial and ethnic integrity is to be ensured, as promised by the U.S., the Kurds are likely to get no more than a subsidiary role in the future governance of Iraq. Add to this the substantial oil resources of the northern areas and the Kurds' desire to control them and the situation is fraught with both political volatility and military turbulence.

Not a very promising prospect. The modalities of Command and Control are also sketched out by him, in a fashion that leaves little doubt as to who will really exercise final say over the deployment of such troops:

Indian military commanders have for long been wary of vague and unclear political directions. For 50 years, operations in India's Northeast have been conducted without political clarity. The Sri Lanka experience remains embedded in Indian military memory as an example of ambivalent, uncertain and unclear political direction on the strategic purposes of military operations. Iraq will witness Indian commanders receiving command directions from U.S. authorities.

This time unlike the Northeast, it is unlikely that the muddled operations of the military will be shielded from public view and the political costs will be much higher. The promise of a UNSC permanent seat also gets the short shrift it deserves:

Indian policy makers may even be offered their Holy Grail of Security Council membership. The fact however will remain of a smaller power buying major power partnership through provisioning competent military labour and paying for it.

And some of the costs and dangers in the use of the military option as well as the logistical implications of such a force are also spelled out quite clearly:

The military is the easiest instrument to apply. It responds fast, gets to the scene of action fast and produces results quickly. Political leaders the world over grasp this instrument in haste and live to regret the decision later. Pulling back a military also imposes costs. The political costs of a pull-back of the military from Iraq, after a flawed choice of deployment, can have serious political costs….

…The burden of maintaining a force in Iraq will tax the capacity of Indian authorities to breaking point. Maintaining the IPKF across the Palk Straits in Sri Lanka was bad enough. A supply line that extends by sea from Mumbai to Basra and then by land across Iraq to Mosul will deter any logistician. The costs cannot even be contemplated. Within weeks of Indian forces reaching Kurd areas, we can expect a `Mosul surcharge' on income tax to fund the enterprise. The impact on internal turnovers of troops from Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast to the hinterland for rest and retraining will also be felt.

Such considerations are probably just grist to the academic mill now that the Cabinet has decided not to accede to the US request but it is a matter of concern that such an obviously flawed measure could even be entertained seriously as opposed to dismissed out of hand. It displays the same mix of aggressive posturing and lack of confidence and approval seeking that has been a persistent element in Indian foreign policy-making since independence. Those who hoped for a more firm and self-assured stance in the wake of Saffronist ascendance are now proven to be quite mistaken in their belief. Even the way the rejection was handled raises disturbing questions; such as the actual prevarication of the PM justified as ‘open-minded thinking’ and the marginalisation of the resistance to any intervention by the most of the Opposition and coalition partners within the NDA administration, to say nothing of the domestic popular antipathy towards the war. With important state elections coming up later this year, lack of performance on the governance front and disappointing economic growth after a downturn in the agricultural sector the government has obviously deferred to electoral logic in avoiding such an entanglement at this point of time. Yet this does not preclude the fact, that if domestic and internal political and economic conditions had been more favourable, then such military adventurism would be more seriously and fondly considered. Little has been learned from the last 50 years of mis-management of foreign relations, it seems and while the old mistakes of NAM and Pancsheel have been discarded, brand new errors based on untenable and unstable jingoism have taken their place.


:: Conrad Barwa 7:47 PM [Permanent Link] :: ::
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Zombies of American Capitalism:

Here is an interesting article on some of the downsides of the Global IT industry in India.

"IT Sweatshops Breaking Indians"

Manu Joseph, Wired News


:: Vikash Yadav 4:45 PM [Permanent Link] :: ::
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Sri Lankan Army & Iraq:

Officers of the Sri Lankan army attend a ceremony to declare open a U.N. sponsored peacekeeping training program in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Wednesday, July 2, 2003. (AP Photo/ Gemunu Amarasinghe)

The Sri Lankan government said last week [July 3] it would consider any request to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq. "If such a request is made, we will surely consider it," Foreign Minister Tyronne Fernando told reporters after officially opening an UN-sponsored peacekeeper training programme.

Meanwhile, the Indian government (un-)officially decided yesterday that it will not send troops to Iraq. [Read article in The Hindu].

:: Vikash Yadav 9:18 PM [Permanent Link] :: ::
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