:: Monday, June 02, 2003 ::

Sharon's Proposed Visit to India: A Sea Change in Israel-Indian Relations?

This story about a potential visit to India by the Israeli PM has raised considerable flap in Indian talking shops, since Brajesh Mishra first extended the invitation for Sharon to visit India; the response has been predictable from within Indian with the Left-Centrist camp almost hysterical in its denunciation and the Saffronist brigade salivating at the prospect of a Hindutva-Zionist tie-up; it is time for some clear thinking on the subject; a more in-depth discussion can be found on the relevant thread at Dialognow.Of course with the recent events in the Middle East, the visit now seems extremely unlikely but as a sign of things to come I think it is worthwhile pondering whether it really signifies any real shift in Indian foreign policy from an Indian point of view.

We have after all held relations with states as bad if not “worse” than Israel in the past; it would not make sense to exclude Israel on "moral" grounds alone as such. Of course one could argue as to whether it makes sense from a National Interest viewpoint to have foregone this; personally I could never understand why we did back the Palestinians so one-sidedly as it brought us little benefits, many Indian diplomats I have spoken to me talk of oil and strategic partnerships with ME Arab states but I don't think we merited any special treatment by OPEC for our stand and due to Pakistani objections we were not even allowed more than observer status at the OIC meets despite our large Muslim population. I don't mind pushing forward the cause of Indian Muslims, unlike other Indians who seem to have an aversion to anything Islamic, but it seems to me that if we bear the costs of such a stand so should we also enjoy some of the benefits; we seem to have plenty of the former with none of the latter. On issues like Kashmir and the Chinese conflict it has only been the secular Arab regimes that have consistently tended to support us; given the unrepresentativeness of these regimes I don't they represented the mass of the populace very well. The great mistake with Indian foreign policy is that we always get things the wrong way around; qualified support should have been given to Israel on a non-committal basis before 1956 with opposition post 1967.

Having said that I don't think we lost out big by our stand necessarily (unlike say over supporting the USSR over the USA) in this regard. We are and were hardly alone in not establishing relations with Israel - most African states did the same as did staunch US allies in East Asia like South Korea which had no domestic Muslim constituency to placate did not establish such relations until after Oslo (similarly did many Asian MNCs hold off from doing business there until Oslo II). It is not as if any large costs were imposed on us by such a policy and given Indian positions in the Cold War it was largely consistent with the broader pattern. It makes sense since foreign policy is not determined by morality and Nation-states are not individuals they do not have any sense of morality in their actions; it is futile to think so. Many persist in thinking that Indian foreign policy was somehow moral in the past; this is an untenable rosy view of the past, what morality there was remained confined to symbolic gestures and rhetoric in actions where there was a potential conflict between some national security objective and morality; the former won out in the great majority of cases. Ironically our shambolic foreign policy always manages to the wrong thing at the wrong time; now when there are stronger reasons for a cooler approach towards Israel we seem to be moving closer towards it. Arms purchases etc are in my view a very poor reason for this, as it is better to develop an alternative and more consistent source of supply in this regard; Israel is too dependent on US funding to be a reliable long-term supplier and given the politics of the Middle East is itself a major consumer which may swamp out exports should another open conflict occur. The Israeli policy in this regard is very good and efficient, they will not sell or collaborate on military related projects/deals unless the benefits are skewed in their favour; given the current glut of weaponry due to arms dumping by the USMI this has been obscured from view.

As for Sharon's visit , I think it was the wrong move and unnecessary to invite such a controversial figure to India - the reasons for not doing so don't have to be moral at all. Why should we? What will we get that one wouldn't from the relationship otherwise; Will Sharon be sending Israeli troops to assist us in our next conflict? Share Shin Bet intelligence with us? Give us the latest American weaponry in high bulk at affordable prices (paid in advantageous rupees as the Russians did)? Possible but unlikely. A smart foreign policy move would be to get these things as far as possible without needing to generate any negative fallout from Sharon's visit; Saffronists and those who believe in some sort of aggressive military chest-thumping might welcome a public association with Likudniks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I see no reason to get more involved in this than mere diplomatic support for the Palestinians - something which basically the bulk of the LDCs along with Europe are also in concord with; basically only the US is a diehard supporter of Israel. What will we gain from moving closer to the Zionist-US axis? Will the US stop giving aid to Pakistan? Will it unconditionally take India's view on Kashmir (something which it has never done consistently) in the UN? Will it apply pressure on Musharraf to police the LoC and stop CBT? Will it extend to us the same trade concessions that it has done to China? Will it accept our nuclearisation policy? Again I have my doubts, US foreign policy is driven by its own (increasingly unrepresentative) interests; it will hardly stretch itself out for India and past incidents such as the dispatch of the USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal shows that it is quite happy to allow its allies to commit genocide while taking action against those who seek to prevent it. The US and Israel can have a stable alliance because the latter is too small to challenge the former and has only limited aims to achieve regional predominance in the Middle East, outside of which it has no ambitions at all; so playing second fiddle to the US suits it. India, however, like China is too big to assume such a dependent role. Moreover foreign policy is not conducted in a vacuum, we are meant to be a Republic and a Democracy: the first means that sovereignty should be maintained both internally and externally, no use being a Republic if one turns into a US vassal with policy decided in Washington rather than New Delhi or indulging in military adventurism aboard that impinges on the sovereignty of other Nation-States; the second means that foreign policy like all other policy should be conducted in a manner that allows maximum control of state and corporate institutions to remain in the hands of elected and legitimate representatives. One only has to look at imperial powers at their zenith such as Britain or the US to see how strength abroad translates into domestic stagnation and neglect.

We do have guests though from other Nation-states that may raise some eyebrows, one of the guests of honour at this year's Republic Day parade was the President of Iran Khatami, no doubt he is a moderate figure and to be esteemed given his views on relations between Islamic and non-Islamic nations; yet Iran is still a state that is seen to be part of the Axis of Evil and that does extend support to guerrilla organisations such as Hizbollah which the US regards as a terrorist organisation; as well as political patronage to other Islamist outfits in the region. The guiding principle must be not to stigmatise states (unless there are overwhelmingly good reasons to do so) but political elements within the state polity; I don't see anything wrong with Israeli leaders visiting India, in so far as one seeks to exert any pressure for the Palestinian cause influence through established channels will be more effective than simple non-recognition and can promote progressive trends. If Mitzna had become PM, then I for one would have welcomed his visit to India and seen it as a good step; of course if he had become PM I think an invitation to visit would probably not have been extended; similarly despite Iran's record one can welcome Khatami without necessarily having to extend the same hospitality to Khoimeini.


:: Conrad Barwa 5:56 AM [Permanent Link] :: ::
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Crossraods in Nepali Peace Talks:

At long last, His Majesty’s government of Nepal and the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) held talks in a hotel located near the royal palace, Narayanhity Durbar, on 27 April. A great deal of homework had been done by the two sides. A ceasefire had been in force since 29 January; a code of conduct had come into effect; several Maoist leaders and cadres had been released to create a congenial environment; above all, the Maoists had apparently given up a bit of their obstinacy on the future polity. It will not be an exaggeration to suggest that no one had expected any magical outcome. The way HMG had been taking the United Revolutionary People’s Council — the decision-making committee of the NCP (Maoist) — after the ceasefire, many had felt the former was not serious in beginning a fresh dialogue. In fact, various leaders of People’s War, who are said to have been inspired by Peru’s Shining Path, had been saying the government was not interested in any dialogue. Significantly, the Maoists, like mainstream parliamentary political parties, had also been terming the Chand government “illegal” and “unconstitutional”, and had been insisting on talking with King Gyanendra. Unsurprising as the King is the real power behind the Chand government, having appointed the latter without any direct popular mandate or consensus across the different political parties.

The Ceasefire: Prelude to a Lasting Peace?

The talks were held after a gap of 17 months — the last round having been held on 13 November 2001. In between, many events having serious implications occurred in the landlocked mountain kingdom. Nepal saw the Maoist insurgents going to war against the state, emergency being imposed and withdrawn, the popularly elected Pratinidhi Sabha being dissolved before its five-year term ended, a government with a popular mandate being dismissed and, above all, the executive powers of the state being usurped by a perceived constitutional monarch. After the declaration of a ceasefire on 29 January this year, the Maoists had made three key political demands: a round-table conference to be attended by all political parties, the government and the king; an interim government in place of the present Lokendra Bahadur Chand government; and a constituent assembly that will draw up a new constitution. On 27 April, both sides stressed the talks had been held in a cordial atmosphere. The government team was headed by Deputy Prime Minister Badri Prasad Mandal. Other members were: information and communications minister Ramesh Nath Pandey, health minister Upendra Devkota, labour minister Kamal Prasad Chulagai, physical planning minister Narayan Singh Pun, and assistant minister Anuradha Koirala. Earlier, the Maoists side had shown reservations about Badri Prasad Mandal heading the government team. Dr Baburam Bhattarai, coordinator of the Maoist talks team, had said that Mandal did not represent the “sentiments” of the Terai people. The Terai is located in the southern part of Nepal and the people of Indian origin, called the Madheshis, constitute a majority there. The Madheshis differ culturally from the Paharis (hillmen) who constitute a majority in the overall Nepalese population. Significantly Mandal is the first Madheshi to become the Kingdom’s deputy premier.

The five-member Maoist team, apart from Bhattarai, included Krishna Bahadur Mahara, a former member of Nepali Parliament, and Matrika Prasad Yadav. No date has been set for the next round of talks but they are likely to begin soon. The one-day talk between the two sides took place after more than 7,500 Nepalese — including army and police personnel, political leaders and activists and other innocent Nepalese — lost their lives. The Maoists have been demanding abolition of monarchy and establishment of a republican form of government and a representiative democracy.

The Divine Right of the Monarchy:

After the conclusion of the 27 April talks, Krishna Bahadur Mahara said that the two sides had agreed to appoint four facilitators who are expected to give fillip to the talk and iron out differences. The Maoist leaders had met leaders of mainstream parliamentary political parties, including former Prime Minister and President of the Nepali Congress Girija Prasad Koirala, and former deputy Prime Minister and general secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) Madhav Kumar Nepal. In fact, Koirala has been leading a movement to revive the dissolved Pratinidhi Sabha. He is a consistent critic of Gyanendra’s policies since assuming the throne.On 26 April, speaking at a public meeting organised by the Nepali Congress District Committee at Kanchanpur, Koirala warned against the end of monarchy if the king fails to comprehend time and history. He claimed that the uprising would reach a decisive point encompassing people at all levels. Blaming the palace for the current instability, he said the trait of the divinity in the king had been lost since the 1 June incident. He stated: “Now the people are incarnation of Lord Vishnu”.

Significantly, divinity has not been attached to Nepalese monarchy since its inception; indeed it was contrived and added to this institution by one Rana Prime Minister (a hereditary post between 1846 and 1951) to suit the power and privilege of the office. It was the seventh Shah king, Prithvi Narayan Shah, who for the first time came to be known as “Shah Deva”. It is only since then that the theory of the monarch being the incarnation of Vishnu also gained popular currency. The Ranas had, through this theory, made the Shah kings unapproachable to the people. In any case, the office of the hereditary Rana Prime Minister was made immensely strong at the cost of hereditary kingship, in a maneer not unknow to Asiatic monarchies the most famous example of which was the relationship between the Shogunate and the Japanese Emperor. Be that as it may, Girija Prasad Koirala does not want the government-Maoist talks to fail. Addressing a rally of workers and labourers on the 114th May Day in Kathmandu, Koirala warned both the government and the Maoists not to look for a cause for fleeing from the negotiating table. UML general secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal, who, along with Koirala, is going to launch a “decisive and different” joint movement from 4 May, echoed similar warnings and sentiments.

On their part, the Maoists are not taking the talks casually. In an interview to an Indian daily only recently, Baburam Bhattarai said: “We have not surrendered, the struggle is on; it is only a ceasefire”. He stressed: “We don’t want to go back to arms, but will be forced to do so if the monarchy doesn’t have a helpful attitude”. Indeed, a Catch-22 situation is developing. On its part, HMG is not taking any chances. It has learnt from past experience. In fact, an agreement between HMG and the USA and the visit of the Indian Army chief to Nepal before the commencement of the bilateral talks had angered Bhattarai. On 25 April, Nepal and the USA signed a Memorandum of Intent formalising both nations’ participation in anti-terrorism assistance programme. Nepal’s home secretary Tika Dutta Niraula and US Ambassador to Nepal Michael Malinowski signed the agreement to allow further cooperation between both the states in their fight against terrorism.

Dealing with the Insurgency:

The programme focuses on advanced investigative security, and counter-terrorism techniques with the idea of rooting out all forms of terrorism and deterring future terrorist acts, according to a statement issued by the US Embassy in Kathmandu. The five-year programme will adopt a multi-disciplinary approach, stress respect for human rights and employ subject experts from the US government agencies. Nepal is one of the 127 states that have taken part in this programme to combat terrorist activities. The statement added that this agreement was a symbol of the special relationship that existed between the US and Nepal and their mutual interest in halting terrorism. The anti-terrorism programme started in 1988 by the US Congress provides training, consultation and equipment resource assistance to partner nations. In the past two years, over 200 Nepalese officers have received training in eight specialised areas.

The visit of the Indian army chief, Gen NC Vij, before the bilateral talks, was a coincidence in as much as his visits programme had been fixed well in advance. In any case, India has never hidden its predilections for a constitutional monarchy based on multiparty democracy. It has shown its unhappiness over the marginalisation of political parties. Nor has it ever hesitated in helping HMG in curbing terrorism. Indeed, many feel that the ceasefire came into existence because of India’s dealing with the Maoists in its own territory. Achieving a meaningful peace and institutionalising democracy in Nepal does not appear to be an easy affair. But Nepal’s failure on this front would only make things difficult for every segment of society.

:: Conrad Barwa 6:30 PM [Permanent Link] :: ::
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