PHILIPP KIRCHER

 

 

 

 

 

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Teaching, Spring 2009

 

 

Econ 682:  Game Theory and Applications

                   Syllabus

                   Homework 1        (Solution to HW1)

                   Homework 2        (Solution to HW2)

                   Solution to Midterm

                   Homework 3        (Solution to HW3)

                   Homework 4        (Solution to HW4)

                    Solution to Final

 

 

Econ 712: Matching Theory, Competitive Search, and Competing Mechanism Design

                   Syllabus

Readings for Frictionless Matching:

 

                                      1/29  Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Tayfun Sonmez: "School Choice: A Mechansims Design Approach,” American Economic Review, 2003, 93/3

 

                                      2/02  Erdil, Aytek and Haluk Ergin: "What.s the matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice." American Economic Review 2008, 98/3, pp. 669-689.

 

                                      2/03  Chakraborty, Archishman, Alessandro Citannay and Michael Ostrovskyz (2007): "Two-sided matching with interdependent values," mimeo.

 

                                      2/03  Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sonmez and M. Utku Unver: "Kidney Exchange", Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2004


                                      2/24  Postlewaite, Andrew, George Mailath and Hal Cole (1992): "Social Norms, Savings Behavior and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, 1992, Vol. 100, pp. 1092-1126.

 

                                      2/26  Besley, Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak (2005): “Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents,” American Economic Review, 95(3), 616-636.

                   Readings for Search / Directed Search / Competing Mechanism Design:

                                      3/5    Lucas, Robert and Edward Prescott (1974): “Equilibrium Search and Unemployment,” Journal of Economic Theory, 7, 188-209.

                                                Set of readings for the next lectures:

                                                Burdett, Kenneth, Shouyong Shi and Randall Wright (2001): "Pricing and Matching with Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, 109, 1060-1085.

                                                Hosios, Arthur, "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies 57(2), 1990, 279-298.

                                                3/25  Acemoglu, Daron and Robert Shimer (1999): “Efficient Unemployment Insurance,” Journal of Political Economy, 107, 893-928.

                                                4/7     Rudanko, Leena (2008) "Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk in a Frictional Labor Market"

                                                4/9     Guerrieri, Veronica (2008): "Inefficient Unemployment Dynamics under Asymmetric Information"
Journal of Political Economy, 116 (4), 667-708

                                                4/14  Lang, Kevin, Michael Manove and William Dickens (2005): Recial Discrimination in Labor Markets with Posted Wage Offers,“ American Economic Review, 95/4, 1327-1340.

                                                4/16  Shi, Shouyong (2008): "An Equilibrium Theory of Learning, Search and Wages," (with Francisco M. Gonzalez), 2008.

                                                4/23  Eeckhout, Jan and Philipp Kircher: "Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition"

                                                4/28   Albrecht, James, Pieter A. Gautier, and Susan Vroman. “Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications.” Review of Economic Studies, 73 (2006), 869-891.

                                                4/28   Galenianos, Manolis, and Philipp Kircher (2009): “Directed Search with Multiple Job Applications,” Journal of Economic Theory, 114(2), 445-471

                                                4/28   Kircher, Philipp (2009): “Efficiency of Simultaneous Search,” mimeo.