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Publications Short
Description
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Strategic Firms and Endogenous Consumer Emulation
with Andrew Postlewaite,
Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 2008,
Vol. 123(2), pp. 621-661.
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Better informed consumers may be treated preferentially
by firms since their consumption serves as a quality signal for other
customers. For normal goods this results in wealthier individuals being
treated. We investigate this phenomenon in an equilibrium model of social
learning with heterogeneous consumers and firms that act strategically. (Tech Appendix)
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A Model of Money with Multilateral Matching
with Manolis Galenianos,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 2008, Vol. 55, pp. 1054-1066.
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We introduce sales mechanisms that reveal private
information into a monetary economy, derive the distributions of money
holdings and prices and show that inflation leads to scarcity from which
the poor suffer most. Therefore, inflation acts as a regressive tax.
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Efficiency of Simultaneous Search Journal of Political Economy, 2009, Vol. 117(5), pp. 861- 913.
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Simultaneous
search by workers in a frictional labor market converges to the efficient
Walrasian outcome when workers search costs are small. It remains
constrained efficient even if costs are not small since firms
strategically set wages to attract workers and can communicate with all
their applicants. Despite homogeneity, wage dispersion is essential.
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Sorting vs Screening - Prices as Optimal Competitive
Sales Mechanisms with Jan
Eeckhout, accepted subject to
changes for the special issue on Search Theory at the Journal of Economic Theory.
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In a setting where sellers compete for buyers by
setting prices or more complicated sales mechanisms, they can sort buyers ex-ante by attracting different types or screen
them ex-post through auction-like mechanisms. We investigate the role of
the matching function for the competing mechanism design problem; in
particular when simple price setting is optimal.
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Sorting and
Decentralized Price Competition with Jan
Eeckhout, accepted at Econometrica.
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We
analyze the impact of search frictions in the standard competitive
assignment problem of Becker’s (1973). Assortative matching depends on a
simple trade-off between the supermodularity of the match-value and the
elasticity of the search technology. For a large class of matching
frictions the relevant condition is root-supermodularity. (older WP version)
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Working Papers Short
Description
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Identifying Sorting – In Theory
March 2009
(first draft 07/08)
with Jan Eeckhout, , under revision for Review of Economic Studies
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In a simple search model, we show that wage data
alone does not allow for identification of positive or negative
assortative matching.
Nevertheless, the strength of sorting can be identified. Since the
latter fully determines the output loss from mismatch, it seems a
fruitful direction for further research.
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Game-theoretic Foundations of Competitive Search
Equilibrium
with Manolis Galenianos, Mar. 2009
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In large class of directed search games where a
finite number of firms strategically competes to attract workers, we
prove that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. We provide novel
characterization and uniqueness results, and show that the limit outcome
as market size grows indeed micro-founds the standard specification for
large directed search economies.
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