2010-2015

"Stable Matching with Incomplete Information," with Qingmin Liu, Andrew Postlewaite, and Larry Samuelson, Econometrica, March 2014, 82 (2): 541–587. Link to preprint.

"Reputations in Repeated Games," with Larry Samuelson, in The Handbook of Game Theory, vol. 4, Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir (editors), Elsevier Press, forthcoming. Link to preprint.

"Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications," with Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Journal of Economic Theory, September 2013, 148 (5): 1841–1861.Link to preprint.

"A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory," with V. Bhaskar and Stephen Morris, Review of Economic Studies, July 2013, 80 (3), 925–948. Link to preprint.

"Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets," with Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson, Theoretical Economics, May 2013, 8 (2): 535–590. Link to journal.

"Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence," with Martin W. Cripps, Jeffrey C. Ely, and Larry Samuelson, International Journal of Game Theory, February 2013, 42 (1): 55–98.

"Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall Under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring," with Wojciech Olszewski, Games and Economic Behavior, January 2011, 71 (1), 174–192. The proof of Theorem 3 can be found here.

2005-2009

"Reputation Effects," in The Encyclopedia of Complexity and System Science, Robert A. Meyers (Editor-in-Chief), Springer, New York, 2009, 7651-7662.

"Common Learning," with Martin W. Cripps, Jeffrey C. Ely, and Larry Samuelson, Econometrica, 76 (July 2008), 909-933.

"Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," with V. Bhaskar and Stephen Morris, Review of Economic Dynamics, 11 (July 2008), 515-528.

"Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection?" with Georg Nöldeke, Journal of Economic Theory, 140 (May 2008), 97-125.

"Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," with Martin Cripps and Larry Samuelson, Journal of Economic Theory, 134 (May 2007), 287-316.

"Social Assets," with Andrew Postlewaite, International Economic Review, 47 (November 2006), 1057-1091.

"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring," with Stephen Morris, Theoretical Economics, 1 (2006), 311-340.

"Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria," with Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson, Games and Economic Behavior, 53 (October 2005), 126-140.

2000-2004

"Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives," with Volker Nocke and Andrew Postlewaite, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 13 (Winter 2004), 617-633.

"Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices," with Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson, American Economic Review, 94 (September 2004), 896-918.

"Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," with Martin W. Cripps and Larry Samuelson, Econometrica, 72 (March 2004), 407-432. (For a useful clarification of the proof of Theorem 1, click here.)

"The Social Context of Economic Decisions," with Andrew Postlewaite, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1 (April-May 2003), 354-362

"Market Selection and Asymmetric Information," with Alvaro Sandroni, Review of Economic Studies, 70 (April 2003), 343-368.

"The Maximum Efficient Equilbrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," with Ichiro Obara and Tadashi Sekiguchi, Games and Economic Behavior, 40 (July 2002), 99-122.

"Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," with Steven A. Matthews, and Tadashi Sekiguchi, Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Vol. 2 [2002]: No. 1, Article 2. Link to preprint.

"Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," with Stephen Morris, Journal of Economic Theory, 102 (January 2002), 189-228.

"Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies," with Harold L. Cole and Andrew Postlewaite, Journal of Economic Theory, 101 (December 2001), 333-373.

"Investment and Concern for Relative Position," with Harold L. Cole and Andrew Postlewaite, Review of Economic Design, 6 (2001), 241-261.

"Who Wants a Good Reputation?" with Larry Samuelson, Review of Economic Studies, 68 (April 2001), 415-441. Warning: some characters in the proofs inexplicably did not print in the published version. The article is reprinted in the July 2001 issue. Download Acrobat file. The correct electronic version of the paper is also downloadable from the Review of Economic Studies website at http://www.restud.com/. Two corrections.

"Endogenous Interactions" with Larry Samuelson and Avner Shaked, in The Evolution of Economic Diversity, edited by Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano, Routledge, New York, 2001.

"Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies," with Harold L. Cole and Andrew Postlewaite, Advances in Theoretical Economics, Vol. 1 [2001], No. 1, Article 2. Link to preprint.

"Endogenous Inequality In Integrated Labor Markets With Two-Sided Search," with Larry Samuelson and Avner Shaked, American Economic Review, 90 (March 2000), 46-72. Omitted Calculations.

1995-1999

"Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms," with Harold L. Cole and Andrew Postlewaite, Journal of Public Economics, 70 (October 1998), 5-35.

"Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, 36 (September 1998), 1347-1374. References.

"Correlated Equilibria and Local Interaction," with Larry Samuelson and Avner Shaked, Economic Theory, 9 (1997), 551-556.

"How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?" with Larry Samuelson and Jeroen Swinkels, Games and Economic Behavior, 18 (February 1997), 193-218. Some typographic errors are corrected in the Erratum, Games and Economic Behavior, 19 (May 1997), 249.

"Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models," with Harold L. Cole and Andrew Postlewaite, Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer 1995), 12-21.

1990-1994

"Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games," with Larry Samuelson and Jeroen Swinkels, Journal of Economic Theory, 64 (December 1994), 325-371.

"A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure," with Loretta J. Mester, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 3 (June 1994), 272-299.

"Financing Losers in Competitive Markets," with Andrew Abel, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 3 (March 1994), 139-165.

"Perpetual Randomness in Evolutionary Economics," Economic Letters, 42 (1993), 291-299. (Text of an invited talk in the session Recent Advances in Evolutionary Economics at the American Economic Association meetings, Anaheim, CA, January 1993.)

"Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," with Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Andrew Postlewaite, Journal of Economic Theory, 60 (August 1993), 241-276.

"Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," with Larry Samuelson and Jeroen Swinkels, Econometrica, 61 (March 1993), 273-302.

"Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions," Journal of Economic Theory , 59 (February 1993), 169-182.

"Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," with Michihiro Kandori and Rafael Rob, Econometrica, 61 (January 1993), 29-56.

"Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth," with Harold L. Cole and Andrew Postlewaite, Journal of Political Economy, 100 (December 1992), 1092-1125. Erratum: "Response to "Aristocratic Equilibria"," also with Harold L. Cole and Andrew Postlewaite, Journal of Political Economy, 103 (April 1995), 439-443.

"Introduction: Symposium on Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Theory, 57 (August 1992), 259-277.

"Collusion in Second Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders," with Peter Zemsky, Games and Economic Behavior, 3 (November 1991), 467-486.

"The Impact of Asymmetric Information on Entry Deterrence--An Example," Economic Letters, 35 (March 1991), 333-338.

"Workers versus Firms: Bargaining over a Firm's Value," with Andrew Postlewaite, Review of Economic Studies, 57 (July 1990), 369-380.

"Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," with Andrew Postlewaite, Review of Economic Studies, 57 (July 1990), 351-367.

1987-1989

"Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (May 1989), 417-427.

"An Abstract Two Period Game with Simultaneous Signaling--Existence of Separating Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, 46 (December 1988), 373-394.

"On the Behavior of Separating Equilibria of Signaling Games with a Finite Set of Types as the Set of Types Becomes Dense in an Interval," Journal of Economic Theory, 44 (April 1988), 413- 424.

"Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types," Econometrica, 55 (November 1987), 1349-1365.