Brief Biography of George J. Mailath Walter H. Annenberg Professor in the Social Sciences University of Pennsylvania January 2, 2008

 

George J. Mailath is Walter H. Annenberg Professor in the Social Sciences and Professor of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania. A native of Australia, Professor Mailath earned his undergraduate degree at the Australian National University. He obtained his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Princeton University, and then joined the faculty at University of Pennsylvania as an assistant professor in 1985, became an associate professor in 1992, professor in 1995, and was appointed the Edmund J. and Louise W. Kahn Endowed Term Professor in the Social Sciences in 1998. He was named the Walter H. Annenberg Professor in the Social Sciences in 2003. In 2006-2007, Professor Mailath was Alfred Cowles Professor of Economics at Yale University. In the Department of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania, Professor Mailath has served as director of graduate studies and as director of undergraduate studies. He is currently chair of the department.

His research interests include noncooperative game theory, evolutionary game theory, repeated games, social norms, and the foundations of reputations. Oxford University Press published the coauthored (with Professor Larry Samuelson) graduate text Repeated Games and Reputations: Long Run Relationships in August 2006. He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society, a member of the Council of the Game Theory Society, a co-founder of the journal Theoretical Economics, and is or has served as an associate editor or editorial board member of Econometrica, the Review of Economic Studies, the Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, the International Economic Review, and Economic Theory. He is co-editor of the Econometric Society Monograph Series and is a member of the Economics Advisory Panel of the National Science Foundation.

Professor Mailath's recent research has focused on the sustainability of cooperation and reputations in long-run relationships. Many long-run relationships occur in settings of imperfect monitoring, that is, settings where the behavior of individuals is not observed by others. There may be imperfect information, however, that allows society to punish opportunistic behavior. In recent work, Professor Mailath (with Professor Stephen Morris) has argued that in many situations, this punishment is necessarily of a temporary nature. In other work, Professor Mailath (with coauthors Professors Martin Cripps and Larry Samuelson) has argued that imperfect information also implies that the reputation that people attempt to develop for "good behavior" (such as a firm developing a reputation for high quality products) is necessarily temporary.