Krzysztof Ostrowski, Center for Comparative Research, Warsaw  

Henry Teune, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

   With the "breaks" in the political systems of Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-1991, the pressing question for political science shifted from that of war and peace to democracy.  The first issue was the processes through which these political systems would move-transition-to democracy; later, democratic consolidation became the focus the concept was being applied to Southern Europe and Latin America.

 The first step in democractization was elections held under new constitutions.  The old leadership was out and the only way of establishing the legitimate authority of a new political leadership was through elections.  Early speculation about the "new democracies" was that somehow the long and rocky road to political parties in the West as the "democratic" institutional intermediate between the people and the government could be by-passed through the institutionalization of popular political movements and extensive use of media.

   This possibility was especially attractive because in the communist countries the "civic society" on which political parties rested in the West was destroyed and the time thought required for its evolution was dangerously long. The exception was the former Yugoslavia which built local organizations for political and economic objectives.  By 1992-93, political science discussions turned to the necessity of political parties in national elections as the only way to assure accountability of the government to the people.

 The problem with this national electoral theoretical perspective on political parties was that it is only a small piece of the triad of institutions, processes, and values for the stability of political systems. If political parties were to become institutionalized, they would have to have organization at the local level as well as posses formal legal recognition at the national.  They could connect the local population's values, especially as expressed in elections, to the values and practices of local authorities.  This was the point of departure of the proposal to the RSS.

 The Democracy and Local Governance research program had gathered data on local political leaders from randomly selected localities in nine former communist countries from 1991-92 and was about to take a second look at the leaders in those same countries and communities in 1995-96 after one or more elections. The two general hypotheses were that political parties would matter locally and that there would be a relationship between voting in the sampled localities and the perceptions and values of the local political leaders.

 What was lacking were data on the communities, particularly voting patterns in two or more elections and  their general social and economic conditions.  The two obvious economic problems besetting the transition economies of these "new democracies" were unemployment from privatization and housing deficiencies from the past.  Because of radical changes in the central governments, this information in many cases would have to be obtained locally.  The collection of these data, their construction into a "cross-national community file", and their analysis were the operational core of the group project proposal submitted to the Research Support Scheme in 1994.

 The theoretical perspective informing the research is that there are underlying dynamics of political party formation in any "new" democracy and especially those in Central Europe because most of them shared a common political history since the late 1940’s.  They were a common part of the development of Europe earlier.  Hence, the data analysis would proceed as if the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia were part of a single political cultural region (pooled analysis of all localities); as a part of a group of countries with a common regional history (pooled analysis compared with Austria); and each country separately.  The analysis would determine whether pooling the localities without regard to countries was justified.

 The hypothesized relationships for the former communist countries in Central Europe are that after the first "cleansing" election of rejecting the political leaders and their parties of the former political regime, a political center would begin to take hold at the local level.  The center would be based primarily on political values and practices of local leadership and would include beliefs about the importance of political parties.  Democratic consolidation would take shape in voting choices other than the endorsement or rejection (left and right voting) of past political and economic practices.  The center, however, would be defined by both the left and the right, in a vacillating process of elections--to reject the past by voting right, then to correct the initial excesses of the new government with a left vote, and then to back a right-center political group, perhaps stabilizing there.

 An example is Lithuania where the right won in the first election, the left returned in the second, and a right-center took control in a third (for which this research project has no data at the local level).  In addition, the vacillation between right and left, settling at the center would be more obvious in local elections, for which data are not available to report here, than at the national level.

 Of course, the main potential de-stabilizing force in this process of democratic party formation is the economy.
The strong assumption of swings and shifts in voting with changing economic conditions, although highly qualified by national histories of voting, is generally and strongly supported in election studies over the past half century.  One of the main fallouts of the transitions to market economies in these countries of Central Europe has been threatened or actual unemployment.  But the reported unemployment rates varies widely by country and locality, the Czech Republic having both low unemployment and little difference among localities, while in Hungary unemployment is both high and substantially varied among regions and localities.

 Nonetheless, a few years of an open political system would provide time for political parties to form.  Some of these would follow the classical "left-right" pattern; many would seek a particular niche among voters defined by groups and regions.  The principle of winners and losers would weed out most of parties and a left-to right continuum could take shape, necessary to establish governing coalitions.  To the extent they could be effective in governing, political parties would be able to increase their legitimacy.

 The data are analyzed in two sets of variables: 1) with unemployment and the leaders' perceptions of unemployment in one set and 2) with political factors, including the leaders' value of political participation, but excluding economic variables.  The dependent variables in both sets are the percentage votes for the main left party and the center parties in the last election as well as increases/decreases in those percentages for those parties across two elections. Center parties are either the largest single party in the center or the two largest center party in coalition, either electoral or governmental.  Unlike most studies of voting and economic conditions which are based on aggregates of individual behavior and their conditions, this research links the values, perceptions, and practices of local political leaders to what happened in elections as well as to the economic conditions of their political constituencies.  Indeed, one of the main findings of this research is the strong linkage between the left-center-right voting of local populations and the values and perceptions of local political leaders.
 

The Importance of Local Political Parties

 The formation of parties depends on their legitimacy, which in turn depends on their serving higher level values and goals of the society and political system.  That legitimacy is especially important if grounded in the minds and habits of elites.  A growing discrepancy between what is believed to be legitimate among elites, especially those in positions of authority, and the population, is a general condition for unconventional and anti-systemic political behavior by the people and counter elites.

 Two questions about the perception and practice of local political leaders can be used to infer that local parties have taken hold between 1991-92 and 1995-96.  Among about 11 channels of participation offered to the question, "Which of the following ways can people best influence decisions", political parties increased in all countries except Lithuania and substantially so in the others, except the Czech Republic. The following is the percentage mentioning political parties as a best way to influence decisions.
 
Table 1.  People’s influence through parties
  (percent of leaders per community)
 

 1995  1991
  % Cases % Cases
CENTRAL EUROPE 33 118 26 110
 
POLAND 39 30 29 30
HUNGARY 21 28 11 28
CZECH REP 53 20 47 20
SLOVAKIA 39 19 29 15
LITHUANIA 17 21 21 17
 
AUSTRIA   No data
 

  A second question was to whom leaders turned to for political support when necessary.  Out of a list of about 16 groups, including the media and colleagues, the following table reports percentages mentions of local party leaders, indicating a slight increase for the leaders for all of the Central European leaders, but with differences among countries, including a sharp decline in Slovakia.
 

Table 2.  Support from local party officials
  (percent of leaders per community)
 

 1995  1991
  % Cases % Cases
CENTRAL EUROPE 20.6 118 19.4 110
 
POLAND 28.7 30 21.5 30
HUNGARY 6.1* 28 6.4* 28
CZECH REP 32.2 20 25.2 20
SLOVAKIA 25.1 19 36.4 15
LITHUANIA 13.1 21 15.2 17
 
AUSTRIA   54.2 24

* In Hungary choice limited to 3 out of 20. In other countries unlimited

 This table suggests political party institutionalization at the local level is slowly taking place in Poland and the Czech Republic, but is shaky in the other countries. especially Hungary.  The latter case is especially noteworthy, for in three questions asked specifically about political parties in 1995-96 (but not earlier) political parties are evaluated positively by Hungarian leaders, but are seen as not functioning well.  In a direct question about whether political parties are important or unimportant for the country and the community, the following are the mean responses, where "0" is scored as unimportant, "1" as somewhat important, and "2" as very important.
Table 3. Importance of political parties
 Country Community
Central Europe 1.52 0.94
 
Poland 1.52 0.64
Hungary 1.58 0.91
Czech Rep 1.68 1.12
Slovakia 1.5 1.07
Lithuania 1.3 1.09

 The following table presents the beliefs about why people get involved in political parties. (The items are in line with similar questioning of Western political leaders.)  The scores are mean scores, where 0=unimportant; 1=somewhat important; and 2=very important.

Table 4. Motives for joining political parties

 Work for personalcon-victions Gainpoliticalinfluence Supportdemo-craticinstitut. Commu-nity development Gain political exper-ience Get toknowpeople Helpotherpeople Promoteowninterests Meetobliga-tions Keepfamilytradition Conformtopressureof others
Centr.Europe 1.4 1.26 1.25 1.19 1.02 1 0.97 0.87 0.71 0.58 0.29
 
Poland 1.45 1.49 0.96 1.08 1.16 0.94 0.86 1.12 0.63 0.85 0.31
Hungary 1.4 1.01 1.22 1.23 0.96 1.26 0.88 0.72 0.34 0.47 0.21
Czech Rep 1.3 1.19 1.38 1.07 0.73 0.79 0.96 0.93 0.68 0.55 0.27
Slovakia 1.18 1.14 1.34 1.07 0.88 0.81 0.89 0.88 0.71 0.32 0.29
Lithuania 1.62 1.45 1.51 1.51 1.32 1.1 1.33 0.62 1.35 0.63 0.39
 

 In all countries, except Poland, the leaders see people's reasons for affiliating with political parties primarily as either to work for their own convictions or to support democracy.  In Poland with a longer experience with parties, even if under the guise of Solidarity, the leaders believe that people join parties to gain political influence and experience as well as to pursue their convictions.  In Hungary meeting people and community development are considered very important reasons for joining parties.  In should be noted that in the Hungarian sample, the communities, although on average similar to the other countries, has a larger number of smaller ones because of the nature of urban development there, where Budapest takes 20% of the total population, another strata of larger cities another large percentage, with the remaining in smaller towns.

 In evaluating the functions of political parties, all countries, again, excepting Hungary, see parties as somewhat or very important but primarily in the electoral process--forming majorities in governing bodies, competing in elections, and formulating alternative programs.  Across the six functions listed for response, political parties in Lithuania and the Czech Republic are seen as clearly more important in political activities than in the other countries. In Hungary, parties are perceived as having important functions of interest politics (meeting the interests of the electorate) but are not particularly relevant to recruiting candidates for office or involving people in politics.

 The following table gives the mean scores for community leaders on the functions of political parties, where 2=very important; 1=somewhat important; and 0=unimportant. (Note the order given is by size of the mean, not by order in the question.)

Table 5. Functions of political parties

 Formingmajorities Competingin elections Formulatingprograms Meetingelectorateinterest Recruitingcandidatesfor offices Involvingpeoplein politics
Central Europe 1.43 1.38 1.37 1.36 1.13 1.08
 
Poland 1.41 1.53 1.22 1.06 1.14 1.03
Hungary 1.12 1.02 1.37 1.45 0.54 0.99
Czech Rep 1.58 1.41 1.49 1.42 1.34 1.11
Slovakia 1.42 1.41 1.37 1.37 1.17 1.03
Lithuania 1.75 1.57 1.51 1.57 1.66 1.28
 

 Hungary has a different pattern of response than the other countries.  Parties, which are not much used to get support nor seen as very important ways of people influencing decisions, are viewed as attracting people for social ends and as a way of building community rather than establishing governments in elections.

Economics and Left Party Voting

 A clear pattern evolves in a step-wise regression on the five Central European Countries that experienced a transition to democracy. The prediction of left voting in localities yields almost a stereotyped view: where leaders see jobs/employment as a serious problem, value economic equality but not political participation, and yet see the economic impact of foreign trade, workers tourists, media, etc as significant vote left.  (These variables produce a multiple "r" of .7.) The actual level of unemployment does not enter the regression equation.  In contrast, voting for the center party is positively associated with unemployment but with little perception of it as a community problem but nonetheless seeing people participating in political parties to support democracy.  (These variables have a multiple "r" of .8)

 Table 6. Regression of left vote

              LEFT =  UNEMP PRJOB ECEQ DEMSC PART SUPDE IMPCO MT R F SIG
CENT.EUROPE  5.32 2.46  -2.77  2.29 0.71 25.52 0.0000
 
POLAND       2.25 0.39 5.05 0.03
HUNGARY  3.92      0.62 15.34 0.0006
CZECH 2.4       0.45 5.77 0.0248
SLOVAK        NO NO NO
LITHUANIA  -2.16      0.44 4.66 0.0435
 
AUSTRIA 4.81     no data no data 0.71 23.19 0.0001
ALL 6  3.47 5.6     0.57 26.53 0.0000
 

Table 7. Regression of center vote

        CENTER = UNEMP PRJOB ECEQ DEMSC PART SUPDE IMPCO MT R F SIG
CENT.EUROPE 6.08 -6.96    3.33 2.09  0.79 43.59 0.0000
 
POLAND  -2.41      0.41 5.82 0.02
HUNGARY       2.38 0.43 5.68 0.0251
CZECH -3.97        0.64 15.75 0.0006
SLOVAK        NO NO NO
LITHUANIA        NO NO NO
 
AUSTRIA      no data no data NO NO NO
 ALL 6 4.74 -4.27 -2.6  2.24 2.56  0.7 20.03 0.0000
 

Table 8. Regression of increase of left vote

   INCR. LEFT = UNEMP PRJOB ECEQ DEMSC PART SUPDE IMPCO MT R F SIG
CENT.EUR 10.26      -3.89   0.76 55.04
 
POLAND -3.17      -3.27 0.67 11.37 0.0003
HUNGARY
CZECH   3.16  -2.09 2.77  0.69 6.26 0.0033
SLOVAK
LITHUANIA
 
AUSTRIA 2.96     no data no data 0.53 8.81 0.0069
ALL 6 11.85  -3.32  -6.22   0.83 66.3

Explanation of column labels:
UNEMP - unemployment rate
PRJOB - problems:uneployment; perception of leaders
ECEQ -  value of economic equality
DEMSC - democratic values
PART -  value of participation
SUPDE - motives for joining parties: support for democracy
IMPCO - importance of political parties for the community
MTR -   multiple R
F -     F value
SIG -   significance of F
 

 More striking is that the increase in left voting in the Central European countries is explained by the actual level of unemployment and a low regard of political leaders for the value of political participation. (These variables account for 76% of the variance).  The two countries that show a pattern different from this are Poland, where an increase in left voting is associated with isolation from change in terms of little impact either of unemployment or perceived foreign economic activities and intrusions; and the Czech Republic, where the leaders endorse the value of economic equality but not political participation yet see political parties as rallying people to support democracy.

 The former communist countries of Central Europe exhibit a common pattern of local support for left political parties. What this suggests is that left voting and its increases are more a matter of  what is happening in local economies than national shifts.  Of course, local voting aggregates according to national electoral laws into national seats in parliaments and shifts national governments from left to center to right.

 
Politics and Voting Left and Center

 When unemployment and its perception by political leaders is removed from the list of variables in regressions on left and center voting, a political dimension of party formation can be observed.  For the five Central European countries the single best predictor is the leaders' value of political participation working in opposite directions: there is a negative relationship for left voting and a positive one for center party voting.  The other variables that enter the equation for left voting are not seeking support from local party leaders, having more trust in the people, but seeing political participation as declining during the past five years (67% of the variance).  Only the value of political participation variable enters the equation for center party voting for the five Central European countries (66% of the variance).
 
Table 9. Regression on left vote

                     LEFT = PART DEM DPOL SLPA TRUS 5YP IMPF SUPD POLV MT  R F SIG
CENTRAL EUROPE -6.17   -3.33 2.21 -3.44    .67 16.99 0.0000
 
POLAND 2.75        -5.75 .77 19.42 0.0000
HUNGARY     -2.95      .5 8.71 0.066
CZECH          no no no
SLOVAK 2.45         .53  6.00 0.0269
LITHUANIA                   -3.73 .64 13.91 0.0014
 
AUSTRIA  -3.94       -6.9 .83 24.68 0.0000
ALL 6 -4.84    2.05   4.26 -4.98 .58 12.35 0.0000
 
 
 
 

Table 10. Regression on center vote

                CENTER = PART DEM DPOL SLPA TRUS 5YP IMPF SUPD POLV MT  R F SIG
CENTRAL EUR. 8.36         .66 69.86 0.0000
 
POLAND          no no no
HUNGARY    -2.833    2.31  3.18 .68 6.96 0.0016
CZECH           no no no
SLOVAK -2.86  2.87       .74 8.46 0.0039
LITHUANIA          no no no
 
AUSTRIA       2.45   .46 6.02 0.0221
TOTAL 6.73   -2.2      .56 22.7 0.0000
 

Table 11. Regression on increase of left vote

           INCR. LEFT = PART DEM DPOL SLPA TRUS 5YP IMPF SUPD POLV MT  R F SIG
CENTRAL EUR.  -2.92 -2.95 -6.99 3.38 10.92   -8.24 .93 69.14 0.0000
 
POLAND      3.11 -2.08   .56 6.25 0.0058
HUNGARY   2.37    no   -2.77  .55 5.34 0.0117
CZECH   3.44  5.49   2.57  .83 15.9 0.0000
SLOVAK   -4.11       .78 8.46 0.0017
LITHUANIA no data
 
AUSTRIA  -3.79        -4.09 0.71 11.19 0.0004
TOTAL -3.19  -3.69 -7.83 2.73 3.36 -2.11  -3.71 0.84 29.76 0.0000

Explanation of column labels:
PART - value of participation
DEM -  democratic values
DPOL - difference in political views
SLPA - support from local party officials
TRUS - trusting people
5YP -  participation 5 years ago
IMPF - foreign impact
SUPD - motives for joining parties: support for democracy
POLV - political views: left-right
MTR -  multiple R
F -    F value
SIG -  significance of F
 

 The regression with political variables for increases in left voting is more complex.  Five variables enter the regression in predicting increases in left voting: the local leaders are less democratic ("dem" variable, a composite of three value scales of pluralism, political equality and majority rule), see fewer political divisions, do not seek political support from local party leaders, have trust in the people, believe that political participation is higher than five years ago, and see themselves as significantly more left in their political views (69% of the variance).  (For a description of these variables, see B. Jacob, K. Ostrowski, and H. Teune, Democracy and Local Governance; Then Empirical Studies. Honolulu: Matsunaga Institute for Peace, 1993.)

 The patterns in the specific countries are mixed with the Slovak variables for voting center the most different from the Central European pattern.  What is seen there, unlike the other countries, is a rejection of the value of political participation and leader perception of political views dividing their communities.  (This and other regressions were evaluated by Prof. Donald Morrison of the University of Pennsylvania whose help with the problem of a small number of cases is acknowledged.)  One conclusion from this, as well as other analyses of data on Slovakia, is that it is undergoing significant political polarization among the leaders to which the electorate responds by voting for the center and rejecting the party of the left.  This is also reflected in the regression on increases in left voting, which is associated with leaders' perceptions of low divisions among the people based on their political positions.
 
 

Conclusions

 The survey data for Central Europe are part of a larger research program for which data on political values and beliefs have now been analyzed for nearly 15,000 local political leaders in national samples of local political units totalling over 900, spread across 23 countries in Eurasia, including the United States.  Although other countries are joining the research program with additional data, two dimensions of political differences at the local level are cross-national, globally apparent.

 First, local leaders and their politics are arrayed on the issue of "inclusionary" participation, a general issue composed of the values of accepting political differences and conflict, rights of participation regardless of the background and experience of people, and leaders following the wishes of the people.

 Second, political leaders everywhere differ on the place of a market economy, the role of government to intervene to assure that everyone has a job, that differences in wealth and income are not too great, and that the consequences of economic competition are regulated. (These differences are elaborated in H. Teune, "Globalization and Local Democracy", paper given at the International Studies Association-Japan Association of International Relations Joint Convention, Makuhari, Japan, September, 1966.)

 Central European political leaders are more divided on these two issues than their counterparts in the West or toward the East, especially in Asia. (See K. Ostrowski and H. Teune, "Three Political Cultures of Europe", paper given at the Theory Confrontation Seminar, Moscow, June, 1996.)

 One of the questions raised about party formation in the former communist countries where all political organizations and associations but one and the "civic society" were suppressed was what would be the social and economic bases for parties to develop and become part of the political fabric of these countries?

 The analysis of the voting and economic data on localities in these five countries along with the political values and beliefs of their recognized political leaders shows that political differences over government and the economy and the nature of participation in political decisions might be sufficient at least in the short run.  With time, the choices presented by local politics and political parties as the vehicles of political articulation and governance may become rooted in an evolving social and economic order that will provide a stable set of left-center-right choices around which political differences can be compromised and reconciled.

 
APPENDIX

Table 1. Political parties in the research

Country Left party Center parties Right party t1 elections t2 elections
Poland Democratic LeftAlliance (SLD) Democratic Union(UD) Catholic coalitionsKO - 1993WAK - 1991 1993 1991
Hungary Hungarian Socialist Party(MZSP) Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDS) Small Holders(FkgP) 1994 1990
Czech Republic Left Bloc -1992Communist Party - 1990 Civic Democratic Party (ODS) +Civic Alliance (ODA) - 1992Citizizen Forum -1990 Republicans (SPR-RSC) -1992Christian Democratic Union (KDU CSL) - 1990 1992 1990
Slovakia Party of Democratic Left(SDL) Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)Slovak National Party (SNS) 1994 1992
Lithuania Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party Centre Union, Lithuanian Socialdemocrati Party Homeland Union 1992 No data
Austria Socialdemocrati Party of Austria (SPOE) Liberal Party of Austria (FPOE) Austrian People’s Party (OEVP) 1992 1990

 Table 2. Party voting, leader’s affiliation and political views

VOTE FOR % LEFT  CENTER  RIGHT
 Mean Cases Mean Cases Mean Cases
CENTRAL EUROPE 27.05 109 25.16 113 9.34 108
 
POLAND 23.04 30 18.02 30 6.18 30
HUNGARY 32.93 28 31.7 28 8.64 28
CZECH REP 15.45 20 35.67 20 6.89 20
SLOVAKIA 13.09 13 33.01 17 11.75 12
LITHUANIA 47.56 18 7.78 18 16.8 18
 
AUSTRIA 38.86 24 24.15 24 21.33 24

LEADERS’ AFFILIATION % LEFT  CENTER  RIGHT
  Mean Cases Mean Cases Mean Cases
CENTRAL EUROPE 21.04 118 23.13 118 10.73 118
 
POLAND 22.61 30 32.27 30 15.49 30
HUNGARY 43.75 28 31.67 28 3.17 28
CZECH REP 10.59 20 18.82 20 8.97 20
SLOVAKIA 11.09 19 14.36 19 17.96 19
LITHUANIA 7.49 21 10.74 21 9.13 21
 
AUSTRIA 52.34 24 4.25 24 34.39 24

POLITICAL VIEWS 1995  1991
  Mean Cases Mean Cases
CENTRAL EUROPE 5.78 118 5.83 110
 
POLAND 5.68 30 6.08 30
HUNGARY 5.01 28 5.35 28
CZECH REP 6.11 20 6.31 20
SLOVAKIA 5.94 19 5.68 15
LITHUANIA 6.51 21 5.77 17
 
AUSTRIA   4.89 24

Score from 1 (left) to 10 (right)