

**RECOGNITION, HONOR AND STANDING:  
A PARADIGM OF POLITICS**

**INTRODUCTION**

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Poetry can give some satisfaction to the mind, wherein  
the The nature of things doth seem to deny it.

Francis Bacon

Modernity affirmed the value of ordinary life and with it, the quest for material well-being. The classical concern with virtue and Christian one with salvation were downgraded.<sup>1</sup> Enlightenment thinkers developed a novel understanding of the psyche that reflected and possibly accelerated this shift in values. For ancient Greeks the psyche consisted of three drives: appetite, spirit and reason, each seeking its own ends. They considered appetite dangerous and corrupting, valued the spirit because it motivated people to participate in civic life, but had the highest regard for reason. Reason sought to understand what made for a happy life and had the potential to constrain and educate appetite and spirit to collaborate with it toward that end. Moderns rejected the spirit altogether, largely because of its association with the aristocracy. They legitimized appetite as drive, reconceiving it as the source of economic growth and political order. Reason was downgraded to a mere instrumentality, “the slave of the passions” in the words of David Hume.

The spirit may have dropped out of the philosophical and political lexicon, but this does not mean that it has disappeared as a fundamental human drive. For Plato and Aristotle, the spirit gives rise to a universal need for self-esteem. It makes us admire and emulate the skills, character and achievements of people considered praiseworthy by our society. By equaling or surpassing them, we gain the respect and build self-esteem. The spirit craves honor and recognition. As they are so important to self-esteem, it responds

with anger to any impediment to self-assertion in private or public life. Similarly, it desires to avenge all slights of honor or standing to ourselves and our friends

Paradigms of politics and international relations are rooted in appetite. Liberalism and Marxism describe politics as driven by material interests, and realism acknowledges their primacy after security. Constructivism makes no substantive assumptions about the world, but emphasizes the importance of identities and their construction through a process of interaction between actors and their societies. Following Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle, I maintain that the spirit is present in all human beings and that the need for self-esteem is universal, although manifested differently from society to society. This book develops a paradigm of politics and international relations based on the spirit. I do not claim that it has the potential to explain politics and international relations, only that they cannot be understood without taking this otherwise ignored motive into account.

The power of the spirit should be evident to all faculty and graduate students. Surely, none of us in our right minds would enter academic life if we were motivated primarily by material well-being. While far from uninterested in material rewards, professors are motivated by such considerations as interest in their fields, need for autonomy, commitments to improve society and desire for recognition and honor. The latter is marked by rank and title, publication in top-ranked journals, awards given by professional societies and membership in honorific associations. As in other professions, increases in salary or earnings or research budgets are often sought as much for the status they confer as the material benefits they enable. This phenomenon, which Rousseau and Smith thought a defining feature of modernity, is even more evident in the sports world where the salaries of top players become the marker of their standing.

If material interest dominates anywhere it should be in corporate boardrooms. Even here, there is ample evidence that CEOs, often backed by their boards, pursue policies that are self-evidently at odds with the economic interests of their companies. Companies have life narratives that encode values and procedures important to them which provide a degree of security and purpose to their executives and employees. They often prefer the “ontological security” -- a concept I will discuss in detail in Chapter Four -- these narratives provide to the profits that changes in procedures or missions could bring. There is reason to think that such commitments were a major cause of the declining competitiveness of General Motors, Ford, IBM and a host of lesser known corporations. The honor and standing of corporate leaders can also trump considerations of profit. A particularly prominent example is Bill Gates’ refusal to settle the suit against Microsoft brought by several states and ultimately tried in federal court. Microsoft’s attorneys pleaded with him to settle out of court on the grounds that victory was both unlikely and unnecessary and that a trial and negative judgment would be likely to damage the company’s reputation and stock price. Gate’s insisted on going forward, presumably because he felt personally challenged and with it, a corresponding need to vindicate himself and humble his opponents.

International relations is undoubtedly the hardest domain in which to make the case for the spirit as an important, if not, at times, dominant motive. This is because the spirit can only express itself in society, and existing theories of international relations either deny the existence of international society, or describe it as relatively thin. The last 150 years of international relations are arguably the most difficult period in which to document the importance of the spirit. Monarchies and their dynastic rivalries gave way

to modern states, an increasing number of them democracies. Concomitant with this change, aristocratic and warrior elites were replaced by bureaucrats, lawyers and business people. Philosophers as different as Tocqueville and Nietzsche lament that modern society has become plebian, focused on satisfying the most immediate of appetites and devoid of grand projects that fire the imagination and require sacrifice. Has the spirit disappeared from public life as it has from political philosophy and social science?

Even a cursory examination of international relations in this modern period indicates the continuing importance of the spirit. Let us begin with the Cuban missile crisis, one of the key turning points of the Cold War. When President Kennedy was informed that Soviet missile sites had been discovered in Cuba, he exclaimed: “He [Khrushchev] can’t do this to me!”<sup>2</sup> Most analysts of the crisis have interpreted Kennedy’s anger as a response to the strategic and political dilemmas he suddenly confronted. The national interest and political survival alike demanded that Soviet missiles be kept out of Cuba, but the on-going missile deployment could only be stopped by military action, or the threat of military action, and either involved enormous risk. There was also a personal dimension to his anger. The Soviet premier had promised the American president through official and informal channels that he would not send missiles to Cuba. Kennedy felt played for a patsy. He was enraged by this slight to his honor, and his first inclination was to avenge himself by attacking the missile sites humiliating Khrushchev. He gradually overcome his anger, and conspired with Khrushchev to allow him to save face by means of a negotiated withdrawal of the missiles.<sup>3</sup>

Standing and reputation subsequently dominated American calculations. Neither Kennedy nor his secretary of defense considered Soviet missiles in Cuba as much a military as a political threat. A successful Soviet deployment, they reasoned, would confer tremendous prestige on Moscow and its leader, and do equivalent damage to the standing of the United States and its president. The repercussions of a successful challenge would be felt throughout the world, give heart and courage to pro-communist guerrilla movements, and undermine the resolve of America's allies.<sup>4</sup>

Concern for standing and reputation was even more apparent on the Soviet side. Khrushchev sent missiles to Cuba to deter an expected American invasion of that island, help redress the overall strategic balance and get even with Kennedy for deploying Jupiter missiles in Turkey. The Jupiters were so vulnerable that they could only be used for a first strike against the Soviet Union or for purposes of intimidation. They infuriated Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership. They were interpreted as only the latest example of a string of American efforts to humiliate the Soviet Union and deny it the status its military and economic accomplishments warranted. These included repeated drops of weapons and agents into the western provinces of the Soviet Union in the early years of the Cold War, U-2 spy plane over flights of the Soviet Union carried out by the Eisenhower administration between 1956 and 1962, and the West's unwillingness to recognize East Germany. On the eve of the missile deployment, Khrushchev told his ambassador to Cuba that "The Americans are going to have to swallow this the same way we have had to swallow the pill of missiles in Turkey."<sup>5</sup>

Resolution of the missile crisis paved the way for détente. Here too, standing was an important motive. Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev was willing to make substantive

concessions in return for American recognition of the Soviet Union as a coequal superpower.<sup>6</sup> When the Soviet economy stagnated, scarce resources were still directed into strategic weapons and delivery systems, and the military more generally. Western analysts explained this behavior with reference to security concerns or bureaucratic politics. While not discounting these motives, there is considerable evidence that expenditure on the military was intended above all to maintain the Soviet Union's claim to superpower status. The extent to which this was an important goal in its own right is indicated by the sacrifices Soviet leaders were prepared to make in other areas to maintain a powerful army and state-of-the-art naval and strategic forces.<sup>7</sup> A not insignificant segment of the population of the former Soviet Union laments its passing, and in part because it was a great power whose opinions and interests were respected by the global community.<sup>8</sup> Standing is important for individuals and institutions alike, and to the extent that individuals identify with the state -- one of the defining characteristics of nationalism -- they tend to project many of their emotional needs on their state (as they do with their favored sports team) and seek vicarious fulfillment through their successes. We tend to associate the goals of honor and standing with dynastic political units, but as the Cold War indicates, they are at least as important for modern democratic, industrial and post-industrial states.

The origins of World War I offers more support for this thesis. Numerous explanations have been advanced for the origins of that conflict, many of which stress the security dilemmas of the great powers, their offensive military strategies or domestic problems that encouraged aggressive foreign policies.<sup>9</sup> What these explanations have in common is their emphasis on security -- of states, leaders, ruling elites or organizations --

as the overriding motive of key actors in this drama. They ignore concern for standing, or subsume it to security.<sup>10</sup> A few historians and political scientists insist, with reason, that standing was a key goal in its own right, and responsible for many of the policies that escalated interstate tensions in the first two decades of the twentieth century. These include the scramble for colonies, the German naval buildup and challenge of France in Morocco, Italy's war with the Ottoman Empire and de facto move away from the Triple Alliance and Russian support for South Slav nationalism. None of these initiatives were motivated by security, and arguments could have been made – and in some cases were made at the time – that these ventures were damaging to national security. Some of the key decisions that led to war in the July 1914 crisis, among them Russian support for Serbia and the British decision to intervene once it became clear that Germany would violate Belgian neutrality, were also motivated largely, or in part, by concern for standing and honor.<sup>11</sup> In Chapter Five, I will make the case that in the absence of the competitive quest for standing a war between the great powers in Europe in the early decades of the twentieth century is very much less likely.

Consider a more contemporary case: opposition to the American occupation of Iraq. The Bush administration expected its forces to be hailed as liberators, and they were initially welcomed by at least some Iraqis. The Americans had no plans for a rapid transfer of power to an independent Iraqi or international authority. They assumed tight control over the reins of civilian authority, headed by an American puppet exile with little, if any, local support. American forces increasingly came to be regarded as an army of occupation. Violent resistance triggered equally violent reprisals and set in motion an escalatory spiral that further cast the Americans in the role of occupiers. Insensitive to

the needs of the spirit, American authorities belatedly attempted to satisfy Iraqi appetites by restoring electricity, providing gasoline and diesel fuel, rebuilding schools and hospitals and doing their best to provide security. These programs – which the Bush administration repeatedly cited as evidence of its goodwill and commitment – did nothing to placate the spirit, and were run in a manner that dramatically highlighted Iraqi subordination. The same was true of dilatory American efforts to create an independent Iraqi governing authority and repeated public insistence that Washington would continue to have the last word on all important matters.<sup>12</sup> Interviews with Iraqis from all walks of life indicated fury at their perceived insubordination. One respondent angrily admitted that Saddam may have killed thousands of Iraqi civilians, and the Americans only hundreds. The American occupation was still intolerable, as he put it, because “Saddam was one of ours.”<sup>13</sup> Such affronts probably would have aroused anger anywhere, but all the more so in a culture where questions of standing and honor for the most part take precedence over satisfaction of appetites.<sup>14</sup>

These several examples highlight the importance of standing as a powerful motive for individuals, organizations and states. They indicate that at the interstate level, standing and security are distinct but often related motives. In some situations, standing and security are diametrically opposed. Colonies and navies were symbols of great power status in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and pursued by France and Germany at the expense of their security. The French challenge to Britain in Egypt and the Sudan provoked a war-threatening crisis with Britain in 1898, a country the French should have been wooing – as they later did – to provide a counterweight to Germany.<sup>15</sup> German construction of a blue water navy precluded an Anglo-German alliance, actively

sought by British foreign secretary Joseph Chamberlain at the turn of the century, and by threatening Britain, pushed it toward accommodation and military cooperation with France.<sup>16</sup> On other occasions, standing was valued in its own right by leaders of both superpowers, but was also considered important for their security. This was true for American and Soviet policymakers throughout much of the Cold War.

The third logical possibility -- leaders sacrificing standing for security -- is more problematic. As standing in the international community has traditionally been based on military and economic power, and as security policies have the goal of preserving or increasing that power, it is difficult to find situations where leaders believed their standing would suffer from policies designed to enhance their security. One example from the missile crisis is Robert Kennedy's objection to a preemptive air strike against the Soviet missile sites in Cuba on the grounds that it would be a Pearl Harbor in reverse.<sup>17</sup> Eight years earlier President Eisenhower ruled out the use of atomic bombs in Vietnam to save the French garrison surrounded at Dien Bien Phu.<sup>18</sup> One of the reasons he gave was that the United States could not afford to use a nuclear weapon once again against Asians. For both men, concern to avoid loss of standing and its expected political costs, ruled out policies that other officials were advocated in the name of national security.

The Bush administration came down on the other side of the question. The president authorized the Department of Defense to hold people swept up in the invasion of Afghanistan at the American base in Guantanamo, Cuba for indefinite duration without charging them with any crime and without access to legal counsel.<sup>19</sup> The White House subsequently allowed the CIA to engage in the "extraordinary rendition" of

prisoners to other countries where information might be extracted from them by methods that would be illegal in the United States. Both practices, critics charged, were contrary to international law and practice and core values of American democracy. They also doubted that any useful information could be extracted by means of torture. The administration insisted that security benefits of these practices were real and outweighed any loss of reputation they might bring about, but did try – unsuccessfully it turned out -- to keep their export of terrorist suspects a dark secret.<sup>20</sup> They have made similar, and equally disputed claims, with regard to email and telephone surveillance without court warrants.<sup>21</sup> It is too early to tell, but is reasonable to expect that American initiatives associated with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have led to a precipitous loss of standing among allies and third parties and will have important, long-term implications for the ability of the United States to influence these countries on a wide range of issues.

### **THE PROBLEM OF STANDING**

Standing is a social construction. First in the European political system, and then in the international one, it has been achieved primarily on the basis of military and economic power. Revolutionary regimes (e.g., the United States, the French Republic, the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China) unsuccessfully claimed standing on alternative criteria, and ultimately sought standing on the basis of their material capabilities. Multiple challenges to these criteria of standing are now underway, which I will describe in Chapter Six. They raise the prospect that we are in the early stages of a reformulation of the nature of and criteria for standing. Evidence for this assertion is drawn from the world-wide negative reactions to the US-UK invasion of Iraq and the

justifications for Security Council seats put forward by Japan, India, Brazil and Germany, most of which are based on claims that have nothing to do with military power.

Alternative criteria for standing have been most fully articulated by Canada and some of the states of the European Union and by Iran and Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle East. If any of these conceptions gain support – they already have substantial appeal on a regional basis -- it will have profound consequences for the goals of actors and the nature of influence. Historically, I will show, goals and influence are closely related. To the extent their resources permit, political units tend to adapt to their environment, and gravitate toward those levers of influence they consider most effective. Over time, such a process can shift the nature of the goals they seek, as particular means of influence are more conducive to certain goals and inappropriate to others. Shifts in goals can transform the identities of actors, and with it, the character of the system.

The international arena can be considered a site of contestation where different actors -- by no means all of them states -- claim standing on the basis of diverse criteria. They often invest considerable resources in publicizing and justifying their claims in efforts to gain support. I do not know of any surveys that have asked questions specifically aimed at ranking the prestige of states, or tracking how these rankings might have changed over time. There is, however, strong evidence for a precipitous decline in American standing since the end of the Cold War. Public opinion polls indicate that respect for the United States has plummeted by reason of its unilateral foreign policies and military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>22</sup> This decline is independent of perceptions of American power, which remain high, and indicates the extent to which criteria other than military and economic power have become important. This shift in

attitudes, documented among elites and public opinion in almost all regions of the world, may help explain which the United States may be the most powerful state the world has ever witnessed, but finds it increasingly difficult to translate that power into influence.

We can conjure up quite contrasting visions of the future. If current attempts to restructure the basis of standing fail, military power is likely to remain the principal criterion for ranking states. If there is a shift in the nature of standing, and especially one that delegitimizes the use of force for anything but the most immediate defensive purposes, or humanitarian intervention with the backing of large segments of the world community, America's standing will continue to decline -- in the absence of a major reorientation of the country's foreign policy.

The Iraq war is likely to play an important role in determining the nature of standing. Military power is likely to be validated, and the United States to remain at the top of the international pecking order, to the extent it can impose its preferences on Iraq and the Middle East more generally. This was certainly the expectation of key policymakers in the Bush administration who recognized that the greatest comparative advantage of the US was its powerful and technologically sophisticated military instrument. They counted on "Operation Shock and Awe" to soften up Iraqi resistance and impress a watching world with the ease with which US and British ground forces could go on to topple Saddam Hussein and install a puppet regime in Baghdad. They expected other countries to bandwagon, and Iran, Saudi Arabia, Palestine and North Korea to become more pliant. None of this happened, in part because of Washington's flawed political and military strategy, but more fundamentally, because of the difficulty of imposing one's will on an occupied country -- especially when its occupier is isolated

politically and its internal adversaries the recipient of outside physical and moral support. When a future generation of international relations' theorists looks back on the Iraq war, they may see it as a decisive turning point in international history, as the beginning of a post-Clausewitzian era where it became all but impossible to use force to achieve political goals by bending or breaking the will of an adversary.

Existing theories of international relations do not ask questions of this kind, nor are they capable of answering them. They have impoverished conceptions of human motives, and do not address the question of standing or subordinate it to security.<sup>23</sup> They fail to recognize the diversity of goals that states and their leaders seek, or how the hierarchy of goals can change within states or across cultures and epochs, and how goals and means are influenced by the robustness of regional and international societies and their conceptions of standing. These are questions pertinent to international relations, not just to foreign policy, because they influence, if not determine, the character of the system.

The spirit tends to express itself in a negative way when threatened. Affronts to the integrity or independence of actors accordingly arouse anger and resistance. This phenomenon helps to sustain the Iraqi insurgency, as it does Palestinian opposition to Israel's occupation of the West Bank. More positive expressions of the spirit require a relatively robust society. To achieve standing, there must be some consensus about how it is won and lost, formal or informal rules for making this determination and actors or institutions responsible for this task. Standing can be attained within groups and organizations, and the incentive to do so can be exploited by leaders to advance their political goals. *Hamas* and other groups that have sponsored suicide bombings, have

publicized the names of successful bombers, paid stipends to their families and encouraged young people to lionize them.<sup>24</sup> Society has always been most problematic at the regional and international levels, but it has often been thick enough, especially at regional levels, to allow, and even regulate, competition for standing among participating units. This was certainly true in fifth and fourth century Greece, and at various periods of Indian and modern European history.

Appetite can be satisfied outside of society. In ancient times, raids and brigandage were accepted ways of procuring wealth and women. Affluence and sex are acquired differently within society, and the former, if not the latter, can be pursued and enjoyed more effectively when actors understand and adhere to a common set of rules or norms. Modern industrial economies are distinguished by mechanical sources of power and the division of labor, both of which, as Adam Smith was among the first to observe, permit more efficient production and wealthier societies.<sup>25</sup> This only happens in societies that are physically secure, where contracts are protected by laws and courts and where there are no unreasonable barriers to raw materials, labor and markets. Economists maintain that efficiency and overall wealth are further facilitated by the extension of these conditions beyond confines of individual political units.

### **THE PROBLEM OF ORDER**

To theorize about international relations we need to go beyond the field that is commonly considered international relations.<sup>26</sup> As the degree of order and its character determine the character of politics, any theory of international relations must be rooted in a broader theory of society. Existing paradigms and theories within them are inadequate

in this regard. Realism all but denies the existence of society at the international level, and realist theories generally treat the character of international relations as universal, timeless and unchanging. Liberalism recognizes a strong two-way connection between the character of state actors and the nature of their relationships. It says little to nothing about what shapes the character of actors or how they evolve, and, moreover, is restricted to one historical epoch. Constructivism emphasizes the decisive role of society in constituting actors and shaping their identities, but has as yet failed to produce a full-blown theory of international relations. For reasons that will become apparent in Chapter Two, I treat Alexander Wendt as a structural liberal. Marxism links society and international relations in a more comprehensive manner, because it is fundamentally a theory of society. It nevertheless fails in its accounts of history and of international relations in the nineteenth and twentieth century. I develop a more extensive critique of these paradigms and theories within them in Chapter Two with the aim of identifying the conditions a better theory of international relations would have to satisfy and how that might be done.

As politics and society are inseparable, the first requirement of a good theory of international relations is to provide a theory of society, or at least those aspects of it most relevant to the character and evolution of politics at the state, regional and international levels. This is a daunting task. It also involves something of a Catch-22 because understandings of society and politics presuppose each other, at least in part. Their co-dependency harks back to a paradox that troubled fifth and fourth century Greek philosophers. If true knowledge is holistic -- and I believe it is -- we need to know everything before we can know anything.<sup>27</sup> Plato developed his theory of *a priori*

knowledge to get around this paradox. He posited a soul that had experienced multiple lives in the course of which it learned all the forms. Knowledge could be recovered with the help of a dialectical “midwife” who asks appropriate questions.<sup>28</sup> Thucydides pioneered a more practical strategy; he nested his analysis of the Peloponnesian War in a broader political framework, which in turn was embedded in an account of the rise and fall of civilization. By this means, the particular could be understood -- as it had to be -- by reference to the general. Knowledge, once retrieved and transcribed, could become “a possession for all time.”<sup>29</sup> I hope to emulate Thucydides – certainly not in writing a possession for all time – but in explaining the particular with reference to the general. I offer my theory of international relations as a special case of a theory of political order. Both theories are embedded in an understanding of the historical evolution of society.

Of necessity then, my project has a double theoretical focus: political order and international relations. As each theory is implicated in the other, a simple linear approach is out of the question. I can neither formulate a theory of political orders and extend it to international relations, nor develop a theory of international relations and base a theory of political order on it. I adopt a more complicated, layered strategy. I begin with the problem of order, and propose a framework for its study, but not a theory. This framework provides the scaffolding for a theory of international relations, part of which I construct in the remainder in this volume. As I noted at the outset, I develop a paradigm of politics based on the spirit and apply it to international relations. In a follow-on volume I intend to integrate this paradigm into a more comprehensive theory of international relations, the outlines of which I describe in Chapter Three. In the conclusion to the next volume, I want to draw on my theory to refine our understanding

of order. Like the calculus or the hermeneutic circle, such a series of approximations can bring us closer to our goal, if never actually there.

### **DO WE NEED ANOTHER GRAND THEORY**

Social scientists have been working away at the problem of order for a long time, not that any of them, to my knowledge, have analyzed it in terms of Plato's and Aristotle's categories. Scholars have worked from the bottom up – tackling small, and more manageable pieces of the puzzle -- and from the top down – in the form of grand theories in the tradition of Hegel and Marx. Both approaches are valuable, and it is arguable that the former would be much more difficult to do in the absence of the latter. Grand theories establish research agendas that pose the more discrete questions that scholars attempt to answer. They are also responsible for many of the frameworks and concepts that shape this research.

The heyday of grand theories in the social sciences was in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For scientific and normative reasons they became an increasingly disreputable enterprise. They ignored the extent to which their concepts and premises on were the products of specific historical circumstances. They devalued agency and individuality. Wittgenstein and Feyerabend in philosophy, Benedict and Geertz in Anthropology and Mills in sociology, all sought to replace such theories with local and contingent understandings.<sup>30</sup> Postmodernism is even more hostile to grand theories. Jean-François Lyotard defines postmodern "as incredulity toward metanarratives" and the idea of progress they encode. He calls upon scholars to replace them with open-ended, multi-cultural, relativistic, non-judgmental accounts.<sup>31</sup> Some of

the opponents of grand theories (e.g., Feyerabend, Kuhn and Foucault) have been accused of favoring a relativism that borders on incoherence.<sup>32</sup> Quentin Skinner notes with irony that some of the writers (e.g., Wittgenstein, Foucault, Derrida) most opposed to theory have themselves authored such theories.<sup>33</sup> Other figures, like Althusser, Habermas and Rawls, returned quite self-consciously to the project of grand theory in the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>34</sup>

Many early modern and Enlightenment figures, and all nineteenth century grand theories generally assumed both epistemological and social-historical progress.<sup>35</sup> Reason would lead us to a better understanding of the human condition and the course of history. The future would be better than the present, and understanding the course of history would help bring a better world into being. Marxism is the quintessential example of such a theory, but many modern thinkers – Locke, Kant and Hegel among them -- were optimists in this sense. Nietzsche broke with this tradition. To the extent that he envisaged an “end to history” it took the form of cultural desolation. Two World Wars and the Holocaust sounded the death knell of philosophical optimism, and appeared to many to confirm Nietzsche’s view of history. Post-structuralists like Foucault and Derrida, rejected the Enlightenment “project” and its progressive narrative of history as a defunct and dangerous fiction.<sup>36</sup>

Epistemological optimism, which reached its high water mark in pre-war Popperian neo-positivism, has also been seriously eroded. Hermeneutic approaches have made great inroads. They stress the importance of understanding and self-reflection, which constitute a kind of knowledge that is not described by science. Theory is limited in a double sense: it cannot possibly encompass all there is to know, and is undermined

by self-reflection, which leads people to remake their worlds, and by doing so, to invalidate any social laws that previously described their practices.<sup>37</sup> Hermeneutics has reduced epistemology to a sub-set of knowledge, but as Rorty has argued, it is not inalterably opposed to epistemology.<sup>38</sup> It rejects all privileged standpoints, but is not relativistic. North American neo-positivism, well-entrenched in economics and political science, seem the only outposts of social science.

I appreciate both objections to grand theory. The post-World War II disillusionment with the Enlightenment represents a predictable response to the horrors of that conflict, recurrent episodes of ethnic cleansing and genocide, the threat of nuclear annihilation, most recently associated with the Cold War and the ever more real possibility of environmental catastrophe. Like all historical moments, it is a unique one, not a privileged position from which to make objective judgments. There was probably more pessimism at the end of Thirty Years' War, yet within a century it gave way to the extraordinary optimism of the Enlightenment. One cannot rule out a similar reversal in the future, as the moods and practices of philosophy and social science alike are so dependent on developments in the broader society. There are nevertheless sound epistemological reasons for questioning metanarratives of progress. Even if they rely on a dialectic as their mechanism to move history forwards, it is always through a series of progressive stages and toward a predetermined telos that represents an end to history. All grounds for judging one epoch or social-economic order superior to another are arbitrary.

Grand theories can be purged of normative assumptions and telos. We can describe changes in human societies, and their organizing principles without embedding judgments about which societies are superior, more conducive to justice or better able to

meet human needs. We can even incorporate a concept of “development” (although not of “progress”) in our analysis without smuggling in normative assumptions, if by development, we mean nothing more than increasing complexity.<sup>39</sup> The theory of evolution understands development this way. In the course of the last few decades, biologists, and other serious students of the subject, have moved away from the long-standing portrayal of evolution as the upward ascent of life to the pinnacle of *homo sapiens* to recognition of it as a process not driven by any purpose and not leading to any particular end.<sup>40</sup> Evolution, I will argue in Chapter Three, is the quintessential theory of process, and the appropriate model for the kind of theory I have in mind.

Postmodernists also oppose grand theory on the grounds that it is inimical to freedom, self-definition and choice by imposing analytical categories on societies and their members, and by doing so, creating or strengthening pressures on them to conform to these archetypes. Many social scientists understand that neither typologies nor propositions can possibly capture the diversity of behavior and beliefs. Such formulations do not, of necessity, deny agency, although most theories that rely on so-called structures to do their heavy lifting have strong incentives to downplay the role of actors.<sup>41</sup> I am sensitive to the need for organizing principles and the ability of actors to transcend them. This is one of the reasons why my foundational concepts are based on the Greek understanding of the psyche. It generates a useful set of ideal types. As is true of all Weberian ideal types, they do not describe real individuals or societies which contain elements of all three ideal-type worlds I describe. My theory celebrates diversity and explores its consequences for both order and agency. It derives its analytical power from *changes* in the distribution of the three motives associated with the psyche, their

consequences of order at the individuals, sociality, regional and international levels and the implication of this for interactions across these levels of aggregation.

### **THE HERMENEUTIC CHALLENGE**

A more serious challenge for a grand theory is the relativistic one posed by hermeneutics. Grand theory is distinguished by the generalizations it makes across cultures and epochs. To do this, it must, of necessity, deploy conceptions that arose in one cultural context to describe behavior in diverse and different ones. This was not a problem for post-Kantian empiricists, who were drawn to semantic understandings of language, which conceived of concepts and their objects as ontologically distinct.<sup>42</sup> Frege described concepts as distinct from objects, although he recognized that they are essentially predicates, and cannot exist without the objects they describe.<sup>43</sup> Russell thought it was possible to infer the universality of concepts from the logical properties.<sup>44</sup> Much of social science operates on this assumption.

The linguistic turn effectively undermined any belief that language might serve as a neutral and transparent medium of analysis and communication. Deleuze and Guattari rightly observe “Every concept relates back to other concepts, not only in its history but in its becoming or its present connections.” As concepts are built from components imported from other concepts, they have no independent or intrinsic meaning, and can only be understood in terms of other concepts. They are best described as “centers of vibration” that resonate rather than cohere or correspond with one other.<sup>45</sup> Concepts have no fixed meanings. Wittgenstein demonstrated that their meanings derive from concrete usages, which vary not only across subjects, but with the same subject who may mobilize

different meanings in different contexts.<sup>46</sup> To the extent that concepts possess any autonomy, it is because they are constitutive of social reality. That reality, as well as the concepts used to describe it, are nevertheless products of historical context and local circumstances.<sup>47</sup>

Historians of political thought also emphasize the ways in which concepts have connotations that evolve in response to how they are used by actors.<sup>48</sup> These historians spurn reductionist discourses of the past, and with it, the allegedly perennial questions and problems around which they were structured.<sup>49</sup> Quentin Skinner insists that the texts of the classical canon “cannot be concerned with our questions, but only their own.”<sup>50</sup> There is an evolving dialogue within and between political theory and philosophy about the ways in which they understand conceptual meaning, and its implications for their respective projects and mutual relationship.<sup>51</sup>

The protocols of the hermeneutic approach can be extremely limiting to the broader goals of social science. They would restrict comparison to cultures and eras bounded by shared concepts. Even that condition would be hard to meet, as concepts are continually evolving, and not always understood or used the same way by actors within the same discourse. Applied with rigor, the principle of comparability of fundamental concepts would restrict research to individual texts – as it tends to in the history of political philosophy – or in tracking the evolution of discourses they sustain. Such analysis depends on hermeneutic reconstruction of texts, a feasible, if difficult enterprise. Comparative analysis of concepts is an altogether different matter. Nietzsche observes that only concepts that have no history can be defined.<sup>52</sup> His insight is particularly applicable to foundational concepts. Liah Greenfeld has documented the irresolvable

ambiguity of the concept of democracy, John Dunn has done the same for civil society and Jens Bartelson for the state. They show how the very centrality of these concepts renders them ambiguous. Their meanings cannot fully be determined by examining their semantic components or their inferential connections to other concepts because they are partially constitutive of these components and inferences by virtue of the theoretical significance and metaphorical possibilities they impart to them. No amount of rigorous, analytical work will come up with definitions that are useful to everyone, and attempts to do so are likely to reduce the utility of the concept. It makes more sense to understand the role such foundational concepts serve for a discourse.<sup>53</sup>

There is a fundamental difference in the goals of political theory and social science. The former approaches concepts as objects of investigation while the latter uses them as analytical resources.<sup>54</sup> If we were to limit ourselves to concepts embedded in a local discourse, we could only compare societies that share this discourse and its associated concepts. This is unsatisfactory on the face of it. Concepts as diverse as class, stratification, civil society, anomie, evolution and projection were all developed in the nineteenth century, and our analysis of previous economics, history, politics and social life would be severely impoverished without them. Such concepts must nevertheless be applied with caution. Those who use them must avoid “ontological gerrymandering,” which involves the manipulation of boundaries to make the phenomena we study problematic, but leaves the categories we use to study them unproblematic.<sup>55</sup> We must also resist the temptation to shoehorn social reality into the conceptions we use to describe it. Classic examples of the latter include Marxist efforts to describe societies as diverse as sixteenth century Russia and eighteenth century China and India as “feudal,”

and the characterization by international relations scholars of fifth century Greece and the second half of the twentieth century as “bipolar.”<sup>56</sup>

In *Tragic Vision of Politics*, I used a hermeneutic approach to reconstruct concepts used explicitly by Carl von Clausewitz and Hans J. Morgenthau, and implicitly, by Thucydides. In this book, I do the reverse: I transport concepts developed or used by Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle to other cultures and epochs. Anthropologists call this an “etic” framework.<sup>57</sup> I contend these concepts capture universal attributes of human nature that are expressed in all cultures at all times -- although they are manifested and conceptualized in a wide variety of ways. I am interested in both their manifestations *and* their conceptualization (or lack of it) as both reveal important things. Changes in discourses about these drives and behavior associated with them, reflects and encourages changes in behavior, and tells us as much about social evolution as behavior itself.

Aristotle thought it unlikely that human investigations could ever produce *epistēmē*, which he defined as knowledge of essential natures reached through deduction from first principles. Like some critics of neo-positivism, he was more inclined to accept the possibility of generalizations that held true for the most part (*epi to polu*) under carefully specified conditions.<sup>58</sup> For reasons I will elaborate in Chapter Two, my model for such a theory is the writings of Thucydides, Clausewitz and Morgenthau. All three aspired to provide a universally valid understanding by describing the underlying dynamics that govern particular social processes, in full recognition that their real world manifestations would vary in unpredictable ways due to idiosyncratic features of context.<sup>59</sup> The proper goal of social theory is to structure reality and make it more comprehensible by describing the relationship between the parts and the whole. By doing

so, I hope to offer scholar and practitioner alike a good first cut into the problem of order, and perhaps, some useful generalizations about what *might* occur at the regional and international level in certain well-defined circumstances.

### **WHY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?**

I noted that international relations is the hardest and most interesting case for any theory of political orders. Does it make sense to begin a study of order at the international level? Why not approach it at the less complex levels of the individual or the group? Plato opted for this strategy; he develops a theory of individual order in the *Republic*, which he then extends to society. Thucydides uses a roughly similar formulation to bridge individual, polis and regional levels of order. Modern psychology also starts with the individual, and progresses to group and mass behavior. I do something similar, starting with the individual and working my way up to international society and system. Following the Greeks, I contend that the dynamics of order are more or less the same at every level. I nevertheless emphasize different kinds of challenges to order at different levels of social aggregation, and see different resources available for coping with them. The most important divide is between groups and societies on the one hand and nations and international relations on the other.<sup>60</sup> They differ with respect to the overlap between legal and social norms, the extent to which behavior conforms to norms of both kinds, and the nature of the mechanisms that can be used to encourage or enforce conformity. In developing his concept of organic solidarity, Durkheim observes, and subsequent research tends to confirm, that legal and social norms are more in accord, and informal mechanisms of social control more effective, in smaller and less developed

societies (e.g., villages and towns) where the division of labor is relatively simple.<sup>61</sup> Moral disapproval of deviance is also more outspoken in these settings, and a powerful force for behavioral conformity.<sup>62</sup> So too is tolerance of deviation when it is understood as closing ranks against outside interference.<sup>63</sup> On the whole, however, tolerance of deviance varies directly with the division of labor; it is most pronounced in larger and more complex social systems.<sup>64</sup> Order is more difficult to achieve and sustain at higher levels of social aggregation.

Regional and international orders are particularly challenging because they are likely to have competing, rather than reinforcing, norms, and more glaring contradictions between norms and behavior. In these orders, moral outrage is generally a strategy of the weak, and is frequently associated with agents who are not even recognized as legitimate actors. Some striking instances aside -- among them, the boycott of South Africa to end *Apartheid*, the Montreal Protocol and subsequent agreements to ban chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and restore the ozone layer -- moral suasion only occasionally serves as a source of social control or catalyst for change.<sup>65</sup> As informal mechanisms of control are more important than formal ones in domestic societies, their relative absence -- and not the absence of central authority, as realists insist -- may be *the* defining characteristic of the international society and system.<sup>66</sup> The lack of normative consensus, paucity of face-to-face social interactions and the greater difficulty of mutual surveillance, all but preclude effective social control at the regional and international levels. That we observe any degree of order at these levels is truly remarkable, and makes it a particularly interesting puzzle.

Regional and international orders are set apart by another phenomenon: the human tendency to generate social cohesion by creating distinctions between “us” and “others.” The research of Tajfel and others on “entativity” suggests this binary may be endemic to all human societies.<sup>67</sup> It was first conceptualized in the eighteenth century in response to the an emerging pattern in Western Europe of promoting domestic cohesion and development by means of foreign conflict. Immanuel Kant theorized that the “unsocial sociability” of people draws them together into societies, but leads them to act in ways that break them up. He considers this antagonism innate to our species, and an underlying cause of the development of the state. Warfare drove people apart, but their need to defend themselves against others compelled them to band together and submit to the rule of law. Each political unit has unrestricted freedom in the same way individuals did before the creation of societies, and hence is in a constant state of war. The price of order at home is conflict among societies. The “us” is maintained at the expense of “others.”<sup>68</sup>

Hegel built on this formulation, and brought to it his understanding that modern states differed from their predecessors in that their cohesion does not rest so much on preexisting cultural, religious or linguistic identities as it does on the allegiance of their citizens to central authorities who provide for the common defense. Citizens develop a collective identity through the external conflicts of their state and the sacrifices it demands of them. “States,” he writes in the *German Constitution*, “stand to one another in a relation of might,” a relationship that “has been universally revealed and made to prevail.” In contrast to Kant, who considers this situation tragic, Hegel rhapsodizes about the life of states as active and creative agents who play a critical role in the unfolding

development of the spirit and humankind. Conflict among states helps each to become aware of itself by encouraging self-knowledge among citizens. It can serve an ethical end by uniting subjectivity and objectivity and resolving the tension between particularity and universality.<sup>69</sup>

International relations as a zone of conflict and war was further legitimized by the gradual development of international law and its conceptualization of international relations as intercourse among sovereign states. In the seventeenth century, Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf endowed states with moral personalities and sought to constrain them through a reciprocal set of rights and duties.<sup>70</sup> The concept of sovereignty created the legal basis for the state and the nearly unrestricted right of its leaders to act as they wish within its borders. It also justified the pursuit of national interests by force beyond those borders so long as it was in accord with the laws of war. Sovereignty is a concept with diverse and even murky origins, that was first popularized in the sixteenth century. At that time, more importance was placed on its domestic than international implications. Nineteenth and twentieth century jurists and historians, many of them Germans influenced by Kant and Hegel (e.g., Heeren, Clausewitz, Ranke, Treitschke) developed a narrative about sovereignty that legitimized the accumulation of power of central governments and portrayed the state as the sole focus of a people's economic, political and social life. Without empirical justification, they described the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia as ushering in a novel, sovereignty-based international political order. The ideology of sovereignty neatly divided actors from one another, and made the binary of "us" and "others" appear a natural, if not progressive, development, as it did conflict and warfare among states.<sup>71</sup> This binary was reflected at the regional level in the concept of

the European “system,” which initially excluded Russia and the Ottoman Empire as political and cultural “others.” There was no concept of the “international” until the late eighteenth century, and its development reflected and facilitated the transformation of the European system into an international one in the course of the next century.<sup>72</sup> Here too, sharp distinctions were made, initially between the European “us” and Asian and African “others,” most of them societies that not yet organized along the lines of the European state. The antagonism that Kant describes reasserted itself at the regional and international levels.

Twentieth century international relations theory took shape against the background of the Westphalia myth, which became foundational for realists.<sup>73</sup> Their writings made interstate war appear the norm, and enduring cooperation an anomaly that required an extraordinary explanation. They plucked lapidary quotes out of context from Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes to lend authority to their claims that the international arena was distinct from the domestic one and that anarchy and warfare were its norm. Watered-down versions of the realist world view have come to dominate the policy communities on a nearly world-wide basis. Sovereignty and untrammelled pursuit of the national interest revealed themselves to be mutually constitutive. They are also in part self-fulfilling, as foreign policies based on narrow constructions of self-interest, made possible by the legal edifice of sovereignty, appear to confirm realist depictions of international relations and the fundamental differences they assert exist in politics within states and between them. Writing in the mid-1960s, before the emergence of constructivism, Martin Wight lamented that the realist project precluded any serious theorizing about international society. The “theory of the good life,” he observed, is only

applicable to orderly societies, and realists framed the international arena as a “precontractual state of nature,” where no real theory is possible.<sup>74</sup> Within this framework, the most theorists could do was to describe patterns of interaction among units.<sup>75</sup>

If the challenge of studying order at the international level is intriguing, the prospect of doing so is a little less daunting than it used to be. There has been mounting criticism of “us” and “other” dichotomies, and of the false, or at least exaggerated, binary constructed by historians, jurists and realists between domestic and international politics.<sup>76</sup> Important differences between politics at these levels nevertheless remain, and between both of them and individual behavior. One of the key insights of the Enlightenment, since elaborated by social science, is the extent to which systems produce outcomes that cannot be predicted or explained by knowledge about the actors that constitute the system. It is nevertheless impossible, as I demonstrate in Chapter Two, to build good theories solely on the basis of system-level characteristics and processes.

A wise scholar might be tempted to stop here. There are, however, compelling reasons to forge ahead. The most powerful one is normative. As I noted in the preface, justice is best served by an ordered world, but one that must be pliable enough to allow, if not encourage, the freedom, choice and overall development of actors. No existing order can be considered just, but many domestic orders -- social and political -- come closer to meeting the conditions in which this might become possible than do regional orders or the international system. Failed states (e.g., Somalia, Afghanistan, Haiti) and the international system as a whole are undeniably the most anarchical kinds of political systems, and the most in need of our attention, practical as well as theoretical.<sup>77</sup>

Understanding both levels of “order” in comparison to other levels, can provide insights that cannot be gained by studying them in isolation. Given the connection between theory and practice, it is important to create an alternative narrative that lends additional support to those scholars and practitioners who are attempting to move beyond narrow concepts of sovereignty and understandings of regional and international relations that assume that war is an unavoidable fact of life. For intellectual, ethical and practical reasons alike, we need to pursue our investigations even if our answers are partial, tentative and almost certain to be superseded.

### **OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT**

My theory of international relations based on a simple set of assumptions about human motives. Following the Greeks, I posit spirit, appetite and reason as fundamental drives with distinct objects or ends. I describe the different characteristics of spirit, appetite and reason-based worlds for individuals, societies and regional and international political systems. As the three drives are always present – and often, fear as well – real societies are mixed worlds that combine multiple motives in varying degrees. They are also likely to be lumpy, in that the mix of motives differs among the units or regions that make up the system.

The most stable and just individuals and societies are those in which reason is able to constrain and educate spirit and appetite to work with it to achieve a happy life. Such a state of balance is uncommon among individuals, and rarer still among the societies in which they live, and hardly ever seen in the regional or international systems in which these societies interact. Imbalance occurs when reason never gains control of

the spirit or appetite or subsequently loses control over either. Imbalance is a matter of degree, as is the disorder its brings to individuals or systems. Imbalance is almost always one-sided in the direction of either the spirit or appetite.

Individuals, societies, regional and international systems exist at different levels of social aggregation. They differ in numerous ways, but again following the Greeks, I treat them as similar for analytical purposes on the grounds that each level of aggregation can fairly be characterized by its mix of motives and degree of balance. This assumption allows me to bridge levels and develop a theory of change that explains movement toward order and disorder in terms of changes in balance and imbalance at the level in question and the ways in which it affects, and is affected by, balance and imbalance at adjacent levels. I offer two types of explanations for balance and imbalance: breakdown of traditional constraints among elite actors; and broader changes associated with modernization and exposure to alternative discourses.

I describe the mechanisms that translate imbalance into social disorder and breakdown. I argue that both spirit and appetite directed societies are delicately balanced, even when well-functioning. Spirit and appetite alike are satisfied through competition, and spirit-driven competition for standing is particularly intense because of its relational nature. When not held in check by reason, competition for either standing or wealth can transgress the accepted constraints and lead to a rapid unraveling of order. Imbalance in the direction of spirit can intensify intra-elite competition to the point where a critical mass of elite actors come to fear that they will be denied standing or even forfeit their lives. This fear becomes paramount when one actor or faction (or state or alliance) appears on the verge of capturing the mechanisms of state (or abusing its power to

establish unwanted authority over others) in pursuit of its parochial goals. In these circumstances, violence or warfare may break out, brought about through a power bid by one side or preemption by the other. Imbalance in the direction of appetite on the part of an elite is likely to lead to both emulation and resentment by other actors. It risks unraveling the social order through widespread violation of nomos and increasing class tensions that ultimately lead to the same kind of fear and responses to it associated with an excess of spirit.

Social orders at every level undergo cycles of consolidation and decline. As it is always easier to enter fear-based worlds than to escape from them, realism is the default social condition. Human history at this level is cyclical, as realists contend. However, there are broader historical trends. Over the span of human existence, societies, which are originally appetite-based, have evolved into spirit-based worlds, and then back into worlds of appetite, but ones that emphasize material well-being at the expense of other appetites. I raise the prospect of further evolution in the form of a return to a spirit-based world that would not be a warrior society, but one with diverse, if still competitive, forms of recognition and standing. This evolution is discontinuous, far from uniform, and driven by neither a single or necessarily dialectical process. Breakdowns of existing orders are an essential component, as they make way for change, but also stimulate learning (in the form of a renewed commitment to constrain and educate spirit and appetite). Evolution also exploits technological developments, for purposes of building and destroying orders. Although spirit, appetite and fear-based worlds have existed in pre- and post-industrial societies, with strikingly similar characteristics, technological, intellectual and social changes have contributed to transitions between them. Future

advances in bio- and nano-technology, and the ways in which they shape our thinking, might be expected to do the same.

### **PLAN OF THE BOOK**

Chapter One tackles the problem of political order. I offer a definition of political order that recognizes its inherent instability, and discuss the ways in which challenges and changes can be supportive or destructive of order. I propose a framework for the study of political order based on four explanations for order and disorder (fear, interest, honor and habit), three levels of order (natural, customary and legal), and three conceptions of justice (retribution, equality and fairness). My paradigm of honor will build on some of the connections this framework generates, and others will be explored in the second volume.

Chapter Two offers a critical review of the four principal paradigms in international relations (realism, liberalism, Marxism and constructivism), and key theories within these paradigms. I use this critique to identify a set of goals for a better theory of international relations as well as the strategies by which those goals might be achieved. One of my principal objectives is to demonstrate the need for a theory of process, as theories of structure, almost by definition, cannot address the problem of change. Students of the history of social science warn of the dangers of organizing a field in terms of paradigms or traditions.<sup>78</sup> Inevitably, some literature is excluded, the uniqueness of other works downplayed and authors in general read in response to works and arguments that preceded them. As my purpose is not to present an overview or

history of the field, but to identify problems and promising lines of inquiry, I believe such a typological approach is justified.

Chapter Three offers an extended overview of the theory itself. I discuss generic human political motives, the ideal-type worlds to which they give rise, the kind of political order unique these worlds, the causes and dynamics of their breakdowns, the nature and causes of change and their implications for order. If each ideal type world represents the vertex of a triangle, all real worlds are situated somewhere within this triangle. My theory allows us to devise measures to identify the mixed character of any particular world, and track its movement across this triangular field. I embed my theory of orders in a theory of history that offers some guidance about the nature and direction of this movement, and about the changing character over time of two of my three ideal worlds. I conclude with a frank discussion of the problems inherent in my theory and how they might be addressed.

Chapter Four develops a new paradigm of politics based on the spirit that finds expression in striving for honor and standing. I draw on relevant classical, anthropological and psychological literature, and the examples of ancient Greece, pre-French Revolution Europe, China at various stages of its history and pre-Tokagawa Japan. The Greek understanding of the spirit, widely shared in traditional societies, recognizes the universal human need for self-esteem, and how it is achieved through the display of excellence in activities highly valued by the peer group or society. Societies to which standing is central are highly competitive because honor is a relational quality, but they must also be robust because standing requires consensus about how it is achieved and maintained. Standing and honor were roughly equivalent in ancient Greece, but are

not the same in the modern world. The latter part of the chapter looks at why and how they have diverged, how the concept of standing has evolved, and the conceptual implications of these changes for politics.

Chapter Five analyzes the role of standing and honor in the modern world. It explains why the category of the spirit was rejected as an analytical category, although it remained an important concern for some key Enlightenment and Counter Enlightenment figures. Rousseau and Smith understood the craving for material goods in the modern world as a means of gaining recognition and standing. Montesquieu and Tocqueville sought to adapt honor to materially-oriented and democratic societies. I demonstrate how the search for standing offers an alternative explanation for the emergence of the modern state. Many of the wars of early modern Europe were fought for standing, not for security, and much of the need to extract resources was not for war but for the kind of conspicuous consumption that gained standing for dynasties and states. The hardest case to make for the spirit is in modern, interest-based worlds. I accordingly attempt to show how the critical importance of the quest for standing and honor was in nineteenth and twentieth century international politics. I use several mini-case studies toward this end, including the origins of World War I and the conduct of the Cold War.

Chapter Six extends my analysis of the nature of standing into the present and future. In the West, international standing has almost always been claimed on the basis of military and economic power. Periodic challenges from revolutionary regimes to claim standing on an alternative basis have always failed. Multiple challenges to traditional conceptions of standing are now underway, and constitute an important, and largely neglected dimension of international politics. I examine these challenges, and

consider the possibility that we are in the early stages of a reformulation of the nature and criteria for standing. Any such change would have profound consequences for the identities of actors, the goals and means of their foreign policies and the nature of power and influence. I suggest criteria for tracking such evolution and assessing its likely consequences.

A concluding chapter poses a series of research questions that arise from my analysis that I have not address, and, I believe, form the basis for a rich follow-on agenda.

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<sup>1</sup> This is a central theme of Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self*.

<sup>2</sup> Add cite XX

<sup>3</sup> Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, ch. 5; Garthoff, *Reflections on the Missile Crisis*, pp. 43-55.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, chs. 2 and 3; Garthoff, *Reflections on the Missile Crisis*, pp. 6-42.

<sup>6</sup> Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, pp. 40-63; Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the old War*, pp. 152-56.

<sup>7</sup> Add cite XX

<sup>8</sup> Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics*, pp. XX.

<sup>9</sup> Lebow, "Contingency, Catalysts and International System Change," and Hamilton, "On the Origins of the Catastrophe," for an overview of these explanations.

<sup>10</sup> Offer, "Going to War in 1914: A Matter of Honor?," is an important exception.

<sup>11</sup> Standing and honor, which were closely tied together for fifth and fourth century Greeks, have diverged in the modern world. Chapter Four will examine their meaning and evolution, and its implications for politics and international relations.

<sup>12</sup> Daalder, *America Unbound*; Hersch, *Chain of Command: Mann, Rise of the Vulcans*; Phillips, *Losing Iraq*; Woodward, *Plan of Attack*.

<sup>13</sup> Interviews conducted and quote provided by Prof. Shawn Rosenberg.

<sup>14</sup> Add cites XX

<sup>15</sup> Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments*, pp. 251-80; Loew, *The Reluctant Imperialists*. Pp. 19-72; Robinson, Gallagher and Denny, *Africa and the Victorians*, pp.

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76-159; Sanderson, *England, Europe, and the Upper Nile*; Brown, Fashoda

Reconsidered; Lebow, *Between Peace and War*, pp. 71-75.

<sup>16</sup> Add cites XX

<sup>17</sup> Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, p. 31. Stern, *Averting "The Final Failure,"* p. 108

<sup>18</sup> Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, vol 2., p. 84; Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, pp. 260-70, on Eisenhower's response to Dien Bien Phu.

<sup>19</sup> See Human Rights Watch, [http://www.hrw.org/doc/?t=usa\\_gitmo](http://www.hrw.org/doc/?t=usa_gitmo), for detailed information.

<sup>20</sup> Scott Shane, "Report Questions Legality of Briefings on Surveillance," *New York Times*, 19 January 2006, p. A19.

<sup>21</sup> Lowell Bergman, Eric Lichtblau, Scott Shane and Don Van Natta, Jr., "Spy Agency Data After Sept. 11 Led F.B.I. to Dead Ends," *New York Times*, 17 January 2006, pp. A1 and 12; David E. Sanger and Eric Lichtblau, "Administration Starts Weeklong Blitz in Defense of Eavesdropping Program," *New York Times*, 24 January 2006, p. A18; Eric Lichtblau, "Gonzales Invokes Actions of Other Presidents in Defense of U.S. Spying," *New York Times*, 25 January, p. A18; Eric Lichtblau and Adam Liptak, "Bus Presses on in Legal Defense for Wiretapping," *New York Times*, 28 January 2006, p. A1, A9.

<sup>22</sup> Add cites XX

<sup>23</sup> Hans Morgenthau and Robert Gilpin are examples of the latter, and their understanding of what they call prestige will be discussed in Chapter Four.

<sup>24</sup> Add cite XX

<sup>25</sup> Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, ch. 1; Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, for a contemporaneous and somewhat more jaundiced account of the social consequences of the division of labor.

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- <sup>26</sup> Onuf, "Alternative Visions," also makes this point.
- <sup>27</sup> Dumont, "The Modern Conceptual of the Individual," for the conception of holism, and its contrast to hierarchy.
- <sup>28</sup> Plato, *Meno*, 86b1-2, and *Cratylus*, 400c, for his theory of rebirth and its connection to knowledge.
- <sup>29</sup> Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 1.22.4. Lebow, *Tragic Vision of Politics*, chs. 3,4 and 7 for an account of this framework.
- <sup>30</sup> Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*; Feyerabend, *Against Method*; Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*; Geertz, *Local Knowledge*.
- <sup>31</sup> Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, "introduction," p. xxiv.
- <sup>32</sup> Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*; Putnam, Hilary, *Meaning and the Moral Sciences*.
- <sup>33</sup> Skinner, "Introduction: the Return of Grand Theory," pp. 12-16.
- <sup>34</sup> Althusser, *For Marx*; Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*.
- <sup>35</sup> Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History*, pp. 218-35, on the development of the concept of progress.
- <sup>36</sup> Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, pp. 153-54.
- <sup>37</sup> Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*; Gadamer, *Truth and Method* and *Philosophical Hermeneutics.*, pp. 18-82. Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," made this latter point during the turn of the century *Methodenstreit*.
- <sup>38</sup> Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Part III.

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- <sup>39</sup> For evidence on the increasing complexity of human societies, see Smith and Szathmáry, *Origins of Life*; Christian, *Maps of Time*; Marx and Mazlish, *Progress: Fact or Illusion?* Chaisson, *Cosmic Evolution*, on larger trends towards complexity.
- <sup>40</sup> Gould, *Dinosaur in a Haystack*, pp. XX.
- <sup>41</sup> Mazlish, “Progress in History,” on how theories of progress and agency can be reconciled.
- <sup>42</sup> Frege, “On Sense and Meaning”; Ogden and Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*.
- <sup>43</sup> Frege, “On Concept and Object.”
- <sup>44</sup> Russell, *Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 56-57.
- <sup>45</sup> Deleuze, Giles and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, pp. 17-21, 25.
- <sup>46</sup> Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Grammar*, pp. 64, 202-07.
- <sup>47</sup> Farr, “Understanding Conceptual Change Politically”; Gunnell, *The Orders of Discourse*; Runciman, “History of Political Thought: The State of the Discipline”; Toews, “Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn.”
- <sup>48</sup> Richter, *History of Political and Social Concepts*, for the intellectual background of the transformation. Toews, “Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn,” for an overview. Exemplars of linguistic, contextualist and discourse analysis approaches, include Dunn, “The Identity of the History of Ideas”; Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”; Koselleck and Gadamer, *Hermeneutik and Historik*; Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce and History*; Pagden, ed., *The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe*; Shöttler, “Historians and Discourse Analysis.”
- <sup>49</sup> Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, is a case in point.
- <sup>50</sup> Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” p. 65.

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<sup>51</sup> Bartelson, “Political Thought and the Linguistic Turn,” for a thoughtful overview.

<sup>52</sup> Nietzsche, “‘Guilt,’ ‘Bad Conscience’ and the Like,” in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, pp. 493-532.

<sup>53</sup> Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*; Bartelson, *The Critique of the State*; Dunn, “The Contemporary Political Significance of John Locke’s Conception of Civil Society.”

<sup>54</sup> This point is also made by Bartelson, “Political Thought and the Linguistic Turn.”

<sup>55</sup> Woolgar and Pawluch, “Ontological Gerrymandering.”

<sup>56</sup> Copeland, *The Origins of Major War*, for an example of the latter.

<sup>57</sup> Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism*.

<sup>58</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1141a-b, on Aristotle’s contrast between theoretical and practical wisdom.

<sup>59</sup> See my *Tragic Vision of Politics* for a comparative analysis of their respective approaches to war and politics.

<sup>60</sup> Regional orders come in between and display considerable variance. Regional order in Europe more closely resembles a domestic society, whereas regional orders in the Middle East or South Asia— to the extent that we can even use that term order – more closely resemble international relations. Thucydides and Plato distinguished Greece from the rest of the ancient world on the basis of its cultural unity, which led to a different structure of relations among its political units. For the same reason, Buzzan and Waeber, *Regions and Powers*, wisely argue that since the end of the Cold War, regional clusters have become the most appropriate level at which to study international politics.

<sup>61</sup> Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, pp. 400-401.

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<sup>62</sup> Erikson, *Wayward Partisans*; Shilling and Melor, “Durkheim, Morality and Modernity: Collective Effervescence, *Homo Duplex* and the Sources of Moral Action.”

<sup>63</sup> Brian Lavery, “Scandal? For an Irish Paris, It’s Just a Priest With a Child,” *New York Times*, 22 January 2005, p. A6, describes local support for a 73 year-old Roman Catholic priest who fathered the child of a local school teacher and unwillingness to talk about it to representatives of outside media. The local bishop was also been supportive and did not remove the priest from his pastoral duties.

<sup>64</sup> Glaser, “Criminology and Public Policy.”

<sup>65</sup> Klotz, *Norms in International Relations*; Parson, *Protecting the Ozone Layer* on the role of moral outrage in the last two of the issues

<sup>66</sup> International Society and system are distinct but overlapping, and given the complexity of contemporary political, economic and social relations, it is probably impossible to distinguish the two categorically. We should nevertheless be aware of the problem, which I will return to later in this volume. For some of the relevant literature, see, Bull, “The Grotian Conception of International Society”; Buzzan, *From International to World Society?*, pp. 133-34; Dunn, “System, State and Society.”

<sup>67</sup> Tajfel, *Human Groups and Social Categories*; Brown, “Social Identity Theory,” for a literature review.

<sup>68</sup> Kant, *Idea for a Universal History*, p. 44-47; *Perpetual Peace*, p. 112.

<sup>69</sup> Hegel, *The German Constitution*, pp. 15-20; *Elements of the Philosophy of the Right* and “The Philosophical History of the World,” for the development of his thought on the

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state. See also Pelczynski, "The Hegelian Conception of the State"; Taylor, *Hegel*, ch. 16; Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*.

<sup>70</sup> Grotius, *De jure belli ac pacis* (1625), Hobbes, *De Cive* and *Leviathan*; Pufendorf, *De jure natura et gentium*; Onuf, *Nations, Markets and War*, ch. 4.

<sup>71</sup> Kant, *Idea for a Universal History*, p. 44-47; *Perpetual Peace*, p. 112.; Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, pp. 220-29; Sander, "Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth."

<sup>72</sup> Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, ch. 5.

<sup>73</sup> Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., p. 312; Krasner, *Sovereignty*, pp. 73-82.

<sup>74</sup> Wight, "Why There is No International Theory."

<sup>75</sup> Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society," and *The Anarchical Society*, ch. 1; Watson, "Hedley Bull, States, Systems and International Society."

<sup>76</sup> For example, Walker, *Inside/Outside*; Brown, *Sovereignty, Rights and Justice*; Agamben, Giorgio, *Homo Sacer*; Edkins and Pin-Fat, "Through the Wire: Relations of Power and Relations of Violence."

<sup>77</sup> Rotberg, ed., *When States Fail*, is a good starting point.

<sup>78</sup> Gunnell, *The Orders of Discourse: Philosophy, Social Science and Politics*; Schmidt, , *The Political Discourse of Anarchy*.