"The Politics of Overseas U.S. Basing Agreements: Domestic Political Change and the Contestation of Security Contracts"

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Base Politics:
Political Change and Security Contracts in the American Periphery

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Introduction: Two Cases of Base Politics

In March 2004, just days after his surprising election victory, Spain's President-elect Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero ordered the immediate withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. Zapatero's dramatic decision fulfilled an election campaign pledge but generated acrimony with the United States, as the previous administration of Jose Maria Aznar had offered nearly unqualified support for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Less noted at the time was that during the Spanish withdrawal the United States continued to fly hundreds of daily sorties and logistical missions in support of OIF from the Moron airbase and Rota naval station on Spanish territory. Yet, the Spanish media and major political parties ignored the issue, even though public opinion polls showed that a solid majority of the Spanish public opposed granting the United States this base access.[1] Remarkably, U.S. defense and policy planners in Spain had expected that the new administration would withdraw its blanket authorization for the use of the bases and were surprised when no such request materialized.[2] After all, they reasoned, why would a regime that had withdrawn from a military campaign in response to domestic political pressures not also oppose the use of its territory to support the same unpopular war?

Just eighteen months later, the government of Uzbekistan formally notified the United States that it was terminating U.S. access to the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) base in the south of the country. Since the fall of 2001, the U.S. military had used K2 as a major staging facility to support reconnaissance, combat and humanitarian missions in neighboring Afghanistan. The eviction notice was the culmination of growing tensions

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[1] Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales y Politica Exterior (INCIPE) 2003, 219.

[2] Author's interviews with US foreign policy and defense officials. Madrid, April 2005.

between the countries after the Uzbek government harshly cracked down on anti-government demonstrators in the eastern city of Andijon in May.[3] Throughout June, the U.S. State Department and Congress had grown increasingly critical of the Uzbek government's actions and human rights records, even while U.S. defense officials continued to support their Uzbek counterparts. The expulsion notice came just after the United States backed a United Nations decision not to turn over refugees from Andijon to Uzbek security services and, instead, to fly them out to Romania for resettlement.

Despite their different geographical settings and political systems, these basing episodes in Spain and Uzbekistan share important commonalities. First, the politicization and depoliticization of the US military basing presence within each of these host countries varied considerably over time. Although the American use of bases on Spanish territory was depoliticized in 2004, 17 years earlier another Socialist (PSOE) government headed by President Felipe Gonzales aggressively denounced U.S. air strikes against Libya and prohibited the use of Spanish bases for the campaign. Why did a PSOE government curtail base access for an American military action unsanctioned by the United Nations against Libya in 1986, but not against Iraq in 2004? Similarly, why did the Uzbek government that had so vigorously courted a U.S. military presence in September 2001 suddenly reverse its decision four years later?

The second common feature of these cases is that neither the broader security relations between the United States and the host country, nor domestic public opinion determined the dynamics of these political shifts. In the case of Spain, a NATO ally, the Zapatero government allowed the use of bases for OIF even as bilateral relations between

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[3] See Cooley 2005b.

the two countries plummeted after the Spanish pullout. At the same time, anti-Americanism in Spain was high and public opinion on basing rights was firmly against the government's continued permissive stance. In Uzbekistan, the security climate in Afghanistan had hardly changed in 2005 in a manner that would compel the Uzbek government to recalculate the external security benefits it derived from the presence of U.S. forces at K2. Moreover, locals favored retaining the base because of its positive economic impact in an otherwise impoverished part of the country. Neither security factors nor public opinion can explain the depoliticization of the basing issue in Spain and its subsequent politicization in Uzbekistan.

The Enduring Political Significance of Overseas Military Bases

This book develops a theory of "base politics" to explain when and why bilateral military basing agreements become accepted, politicized or challenged by host countries. It seeks to explain variation in base politics within and across cases, as well as to clarify the various elements and nuances of basing agreements. This is certainly not the first comparative study of U.S. overseas bases, but it is the first to focus on the changing domestic politics of bases and base access, rather than the military or security dimensions.[4]

At first glance, the topic of base politics itself may seem rather anachronistic given that "overseas bases" conjures images of superpowers maneuvering to secure

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[4] Certain comparative studies also contain some very helpful political analysis. See especially, Sandars 2000, Duke and Krieger 1993; McDonald and Bendahmane 1990; and Duke 1989.

access during the Cold War.[5] But although many of the Cold War's larger installations are now being dismantled and downsized, the number of overseas U.S. military installations and base hosts is actually increasing. Indeed, overseas bases are now vital for current U.S. security strategy and the global war on terror, making a systematic understanding of the politics of the issue all the more important for scholars and policymakers.[6] And while it is certainly true that in many countries like Spain the current use of military bases by the United States hardly raises an eyebrow anymore among mainstream political parties or the media, this depoliticization is neither a "natural" state of affairs nor is it inevitable. Rather it is the product of a distinct political evolution within the host country that has removed the issue from the realm of "high politics" and turned it into a matter of routine security cooperation and governance. Moreover, as the Uzbek case suggests, base politics can still explode and inflict significant damage on U.S. security interests, influence and prestige.

Military Bases and American Hegemony

U.S. military bases and access rights are the lynchpin of American global power. Overseas bases in countries such as Spain and Uzbekistan allow the United States military to exercise supremacy over the global commons and enable it to rapidly project

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[5] The defining work on Cold War base functions and access is Harkavy 1989.

[6] For example, according to the 2002 National Security Strategy, "[T]o contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces." NSS, September 17, 2002.

power both within and across regions.[7] Securing overseas bases and access agreements with a number of countries was critical for the recent U.S.-led military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.[8] For example, the K2 base in Uzbekistan was vital for the OEF mission while facilities in Spain were used for both the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. Beyond their combat roles and functions, bases also provide service and repair facilities, storage, training facilities and logistical staging posts. They can also be used to conduct surveillance, coordinate tasks, collect intelligence and facilitate command, control and communications (C3).[9] As it turns out, overseas bases can even be used as extra-territorial sites on which to detain and interrogate enemy combatants and terror suspects.[10]

The sheer number of U.S. overseas bases is staggering. According to the Department of Defense's 2004 Base Structure Report, the United States officially maintained 860 overseas military installations and another 115 on non-continental U.S. territories.[11] 17 of these facilities were estimated to be worth more than $1.5 billion, while an additional 22 were valued at between $828 million and $1.5 billion.[12] Of course, such official figures do not include the numerous secret installations and jointly operated

[7] See Posen 2003.

[8] See Harkavy 2005, 31-33.

[9] For a comprehensive list of functions and discussion, see Harkavy 1989.

[10] See Dana Priest, "CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons," *Washington Post* November 2, 2005, A1.

[11] U.S. Department of Defense, "Base Structure Report, Fiscal Year 2004," 11. Available at: ttp://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/20040910_2004BaseStructureReport.pdf

[12] U.S. Department of Defense, "Base Structure Report, Fiscal Year 2004," 21. Estimated values are based on the official plant replacement value (PRV) of each installation.

bases and/or tacit governance arrangements that are scattered overseas.[13] Not surprisingly, some commentators refer to this vast overseas network of bases and troop deployments as the "U.S. empire" and compare it to the peripheral holdings of previous imperial powers.[14]

The structure of this basing network is also changing. The Pentagon's current Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR) marks the first fundamental transformation of U.S. basing posture since World War II as U.S. defense planners adjust to new strategic imperatives such as the global war on terror.[15] The GDPR will reduce U.S. forces in several major Cold War base hosts – especially Germany, Korea and Japan – but it will also establish a global network of smaller, more flexible facilities. These "new bases" will be located in several regions where the United States has not traditionally maintained a presence, including Africa, Central Asia and the Black Sea. As a result, the United States seems set to abandon its traditional role as an "offshore balancer" and more directly engage regional threats such as terrorists and insurgents.[16] One explicitly political goal of the GDPR is to reduce the footprint and local friction caused by the basing network and establish smaller facilities that are less politically and socially intrusive.

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[13] See Johnson 2004, 151-185.

[14] On overseas deployments and bases as a form of American empire, see the contrasting perspectives offered by Kaplan 2005 and Johnson 2004.

[15] See Campbell and Ward 2003.

[16] On offshore balancing, see Layne 2006; and Mearsheimer 2001.

Importance of Bases to US Relations with its Allies and its "Imperial" Periphery

The cases of Spain and Uzbekistan also suggest that when politicized, bases become prominent institutions and symbols of U.S. power, identity and diplomacy. The physical presence of overseas U.S. troops and installations – from the large garrison towns in Germany that appear like imported American counties to the small but restricted sites in Central Asia – signifies that the host country has sacrificed some of its sovereignty to accept a U.S. military presence.[17] Negotiations over bases and their governing agreements can be the most pressing bilateral issue that host countries face with the United States, as they were in Spain in the mid-1980s and Uzbekistan from 2001 to 2005.[18] Moreover, the way that the United States responds and reacts to host country concerns about the bases is usually interpreted as an indication of the broader respect or esteem that the United States holds for the base host. In short, the basing presence is also the most immediate institution through which a host country's politicians and public experience, debate and even contest U.S. hegemony.

Basing agreements reached with certain countries also resonate across other countries and regions. They may even signal political and social commitments to the base host that U.S. officials do not necessarily intend. For example, America's Western European allies strongly opposed the U.S.-Spanish 1953 Madrid Pacts with General Franco and argued that the deal bestowed international legitimacy when he was otherwise ostracized from the international community. Similarly, although the basing agreement

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[17] On the comparative political significance of spatial planning in bases, see Gillem 2004. On the social and political impact of different overseas camptowns, see Baker 2004.

[18] See McDonald and Bendahmane 1990.

with Uzbekistan focused on fighting common terrorist elements in the Central Asian region, other states and publics across Central Asia saw the deal as a U.S. endorsement of the Uzbek regime's repressive policies and undemocratic tendencies. Historically, U.S. officials have found it difficult to prevent basing agreements from being perceived as broader political endorsements of host country regimes.

Rethinking the Politics of U.S. Hegemony: Some Paradoxes

A comparative study of the politics of the base issue also challenges many of the conventional assumptions that we might have about the overseas impact of American hegemony. Most prevailing studies of U.S. overseas bases or American empire – whether supportive or critical –assume that the U.S. military is fairly unconstrained in its capacity to establish bases and project power from these various overseas installations.[19] Yet, as the case of Uzbekistan suggests, the considerable power differential between the United States and overseas base hosts does not always guarantee enduring access and influence abroad. The American presence abroad, even in relatively weak countries, is more frequently politicized and contested by host states than is commonly assumed. Indeed, both supportive and critical accounts of "American Empire" tend to ignore how base hosts nudge, manipulate and even resist the American presence, often for their own independent political purposes.[20] Like other empires of the past, "pericentric

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[19] See especially Johnson 2004; Johnson 2000 and Bacevich 2002. Also see Ferguson 2004 and 2002. For an important exception regarding the importance of institutional constraints on American hierarchy, see Ikenberry 2001. On the analytical differences between hegemony, empire and different hierarchical orders, see Ikenberry 2004.

developments" within base hosts have frequently constrained and even clashed with the preferences of U.S. policymakers.[21] U.S. planners certainly try to shape and influence base-related developments, but ultimately the historical record suggests that they have not exclusively determined these internal political processes.[22] The Uzbek eviction was one of the latest and most dramatic examples of this politicization and contestation, but it is certainly not exceptional.

On the other had, a focus on base politics suggests that the transatlantic rift generated by the 2003 Iraq war may not be as acute as it is commonly portrayed, at least not in this important security area.[23] When examined through the prism of base access transatlantic cooperation has remained significantly high, even during the Iraq campaign. The Spanish policy of opposing the war while at the same time granting basing access to the United States for OIF missions may seem paradoxical, but it was echoed by other European countries including Greece and Germany, where in 2002 Chancellor Gerhardt Schroeder used an antiwar plank to win re-election. As in Spain, basing issues in these other European countries have evolved from being issues of high politics – openly

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[20] For an important exception, see Lundestad's "empire by invitation" thesis. Lundestad 1986.

[21] The term "pericentric" is taken from Michael Doyle's theoretical overview of historical empires and refers to theories that view peripheral political developments as the key determinants of the timing and form of imperial rule. Such pericentric theories can be contrasted to metrocentric theories that focus on imperatives and factors in the metropole as key variables. See Doyle 1986. The most theoretically influential pericentric and revisionist account of the British Empire can be found in Robinson 1968.

[22] On why relations of international hierarchy do not usually promote institutional change within political peripheries, see Cooley 2005a.

[23] For representative examples see Daalder 2003 and Asmus 2003. For an academic perspective, see Evangelista and Parsi 2005.

debated and contested by political parties, the media and elites – to routine and even bureaucratic issues that are not subjected to public scrutiny. Or, from another perspective, the consolidated democratic institutions of base hosts have "locked-in" the security contracts and the governance arrangements of American security hegemony.

Thus, a focus on basing issues paints a dramatically different picture of the overseas reception and acceptance of American hegemony than we are accustomed to. The volatile institutional characteristics of weaker, more peripheral countries actually allow them to more openly challenge U.S. security hegemony, while the consolidated democratic systems of long-standing security partners lead them to more passively accept U.S. base rights as a routine matter and/or democratic commitment.

The Argument: Nested Hierarchies and Political Change

By their very nature, bases are simultaneously institutions of international security cooperation or security contracts as well as domestic political organizations. To fully appreciate the politics surrounding a foreign military presence, we must understand how domestic political imperatives systematically interact with the broader international context and why these interactions produce different outcomes. To do so, we must go beyond traditional security-based theories and apply a number of seemingly disparate concepts in political science – including studies of democratic transition and consolidation, hierarchical relations among patrons and clients, and new institutional theories of contracting – to the basing issue.

Nested Hierarchies, Two-Level Politics

Given that a foreign military basing agreement is a hierarchical contract between a sending and a host country, the domestic political institutions of base hosts are themselves nested within this overall hierarchy.[24] Rulers of base hosts must therefore simultaneously manage relations with the sending state as they pursue their own internal political survival.[25] These dual imperatives interact in what is known as a "two-level game," as rulers use base-related issues and resources for their domestic political purposes, but can also invoke domestic constraints as a bargaining tactic in their basing negotiations with the sending power (See Figure 1.1).[26]

FIGURE 1.1 HERE

[24] On security contracts and hierarchy, see Lake 2003 and 1999; and Weber 2000.

[25] On the imperatives of political survivorship, see Bueno de Mesquita et. al. 2003.

[26] See Evans, Jacobson and Putnam 1993; and Putnam 1988. For an application to U.S. base negotiations (in Denmark and Greenland), see Archer 2003.

Figure 1.1

"Nested Hierarchies and Two-Level Interactions in Basing Relations"



For example, when in December 2001 the United States established the Ganci airbase in Kyrgyzstan, it awarded multi-million dollar refueling contracts to a firm controlled by Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev's immediate family, thereby providing a significant revenue stream that the regime used to consolidate its rule and dispense patronage to domestic political allies.[27] However, after the ouster of the Akayev regime in 2005, the new Kyrgyz government declared the existing compensation formula invalid and insisted that the United States significantly increase lease payments in order to compensate the Kyrgyz people for supporting the base-related corruption and anti-democratic practices of the Akayev regime. This continuous interaction between domestic and international factors is a hallmark of the nested nature of basing politics and makes two-level games just as important for hierarchical settings as they are for anarchical ones. Specifically, the politics of a basing agreement will usually be determined by two such interactions: the host state regime's dependence on the contract for its political survival and the contracting environment within the base host.

Regime Dependence and Hierarchical Contracts

Basing agreements are hierarchical security contracts, but not all agreements are hierarchical to the same degree. Contracts can vary from arrangements of almost pure hierarchy – where the sending country imposes all of the terms and conditions – to one of modified hierarchy where the host country retains significant sovereignty and exercises

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[27] David Cloud, "Pentagon's Fuel Deal is Lesson in Risks of Graft-Prone Regions," *New York Times*. November 15, 2005.

decision-making authority.[28] Basing agreements can provide a range of benefits and resources to host regimes. Most obviously, a foreign basing presence can offer a host nation security. David Lake points out that subordinate states in such hierarchical security arrangements tend to spend less on their security than states with no such foreign troop deployments.[29] Indeed, Chapter 6 will show how both postwar Japan and Italy relied heavily on the American security umbrella and large basing presence while they poured their own resources into domestic economic reconstruction and development.

In turn, the more that a ruling regime depends on the basing agreement and the resources that it provides for its political survival, the more likely it is that the terms of the basing agreement will be unbalanced or otherwise favor the sending country. In the 1950s, regimes in Japan and Italy signed highly unbalanced basing agreements that reflected their dependence on the U.S. presence, contracts that actually allowed for U.S. military intervention into their internal affairs. Similarly, from the 1950s to the 1980s South Korea was extremely dependent on the presence of tens of thousands of U.S. troops to deter the North. Consequently, the security contract between the two countries was considerably hierarchical, with South Korean forces actually operationally subordinated under U.S. command.

But security need not be the only, *or even main*, base-related benefit on which a host country's regime relies. Bases can also offer economic benefits and monetary *quid*

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[28] On the continuum of hierarchical security relations, see Lake 1999 and 1996. On the most common violations of sovereignty in international politics, see Krasner 1999. On the ability of states to design bilateral security contracts to parse the various property rights associated with sovereignty, see Cooley 2000-2001.

[29] Lake 2005.

pro quo that can help a regime maintain its domestic power. The Marcos regime in the Philippines and successive military governments in Thailand used the economic assistance provided by U.S. basing deals to prop up their patrimonial regimes. Bases can also provide important intangible benefits. Base deals confer legitimacy to a host country regime or signify that the host has joined the sender's security community.[30] Both the 1953 U.S.-Spain Pacts and the 2001 base deal with Uzbekistan offered these authoritarian hosts U.S. recognition and accompanying international recognition as members of "the West."

Contracting Environment: Uncertain and Stable

In addition to regime dependence, modes of base politics will also depend on the type of contracting environment that prevails in the host. Base agreements are actual contracts that specify the rights and obligations of each of the parties. Contractual settings can vary from stable environments, in which the legality and validity of the basing agreement is unquestioned, to uncertain environments in which the validity of the prevailing contract is challenged or contested. The institutional characteristics of different types of regimes –consolidated democracies, autocracies and democratizers – will generate different contracting environments. Accordingly, as countries move from one type of regime to another, during a democratic transition for example, the contracting environment will also change.

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[30] See Risse-Kappan 1996.

CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACIES: CONTRACTUAL STABILITY

Consolidated democracies offer the most stable contracting environments. In Chalres Lipson's formulation mature democracies make for "reliable partners" as they are obliged to adhere to contractual commitments made by their democratic predecessors in order to preserve their credibility.[31] A legislature's ratification of a security contract or treaty also institutionalizes the host government's commitment and inhibits the arbitrary reneging that characterizes non-democracies.[32] A contract concluded with a previous democratic regime, even if it is one with different policy preferences, usually cannot be unilaterally invalidated or have its legitimacy challenged on procedural grounds.

Moreover, in the party systems of consolidated democracies political parties moderate their policy stances on ideological and potentially divisive issues in order to attract more moderate or median voters. As comparative politics scholars have noted, party systems tend to become "cartels," in which the major parties seek to limit the range of policy alternatives presented to the electorate in a bid to secure their power and restrict their political agenda when they come to power.[33] For example, even the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in its bid to enter the governing coalition in the 1970s adopted a pro-NATO and pro-bases platform in order to take the issue off the political agenda and

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[31] Lipson 2003.

[32] Martin 2000.

[33] Blyth and Katz 2005; and Katz and Mair 1995.

focus its campaign on domestic policy.[34] Once in power, parties that were once ideological must govern pragmatically, maintain winning coalitions and cooperate with other parties on foreign policy and security affairs.[35] In consolidated democracies, only fringe parties are likely to bring up the bases issue, an act that mainstream parties often point to as an actual indicator of their extreme platforms.[36]

Finally, in consolidated democracies issues and policy areas tend to be delegated to specialized bureaucracies and agencies. Over time, bureaucracies and other institutional actors tend to become entrenched in the policymaking process and act as "veto players" in that issue area. The higher the number of veto players within the political system, the lower the likelihood that policy agendas can be altered or revised.[37] Overall, these institutional structures – legislatures, stable party systems and bureaucratization– in consolidated democracies tend to "lock-in" basing agreements or make them routine policy matters that are managed by technocrats, not political elites.

AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: A MIX OF STABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY

The contracting environment in authoritarian regimes offers a mix of stability and uncertainty. According to the popular "strongman" view of international agreements, authoritarian regimes make stable contracting partners because they can negotiate deals

[34] See Chapter 6.

[35] Cooley and Hopkin 2006, 11.

[36] For example, in Spain only the leftist Izquierda Unida regularly brings up the US bases issue. In Greece, the newly formed National Front has discussed the Souda Bay base in reference to possible CIA detentions at the Souda Bay naval base.

[37] Tsebelis 2002, 2. For an application of this argument to the similar issue of decolonization and territorial disengagement, see Spruyt 2005.

without public accountability and consent.[38] Decision-making tends to be centralized, allowing autocrats to rapidly conclude international agreements such as security contracts without having to consult with a legislature or political party. Moreover, through their control of the media and political institutions, autocrats can publicize aspects of the agreement that may be of political benefit while they conceal or mischaracterize those provisions that might be political damaging. For example, most contemporary accounts in the Spanish media of the 1953 Madrid Pacts portrayed the basing accords as steadfastly guarding Spanish sovereignty, even though the secret technical agreements of the accords granted the United States virtually unhindered basing access throughout the country.[39]

However, the ease with which authoritarian rulers can enter into a contract is tempered by a lack of domestic institutions that can credibly lock-in their commitment to the contract. Authoritarian rulers are relatively free to arbitrarily demand revisions and adjustments to agreements according to their own political needs and interests. Accordingly, Uzbek President Karimov faced minimal domestic constraints when he unilaterally terminated the basing contract. Furthermore, security contracts signed with non-democracies will only be valid as long as the ruling regime or coalition maintains power and may not survive the fall of a non-democratic regime. For example, when Colonel Mommar Qadaffi led a revolutionary coup in Libya to depose King Idris, he immediately expedited the withdrawal of the U.S. Air Force from Wheelus base on the grounds that the U.S. and British military presence had propped up the previous Libyan

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[38] For an overview, see Martin 2000.

[39] On the coverage of the 1953 agreements in the Spanish press, see Viñas 2003.

monarchy.[40] Similarly, the coming to power of the Derg in Ethiopia in 1976 and Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran in 1979 invalidated the governing agreements signed with previous authoritarian clients that guaranteed U.S. access to key communications installations.[41] The personalization of a security contract in an autocracy makes it likely that it will be challenged in the event of a regime change. Thus, authoritarian regimes provide a mix of both policy stability and uncertainty in their contracting environment.

DEMOCRATIZING REGIMES: CONTRACTUAL UNCERTAINTY

The most unstable contractual environments are found in states that are undergoing a democratic transition from authoritarian rule, but concluded a contract before the transition.[42] Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield have highlighted how democratizing polities are politically volatile and prone to elite-induced populism, nationalism and aggressive mobilization strategies for electoral purposes.[43] Rulers in transitioning or "democratizing" states can proclaim that security contracts and basing agreements signed with previous authoritarian governments are illegitimate and have not been subjected to democratic scrutiny or ratification. Democratizing elites may demand

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[40] For background on Wheelus, see the globalsecurity entry: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/facility/wheelus.htm.

[41] In the Ethiopian case, the U.S. had signed a 25-year arms-for base deal with Emperor Haile Selassie to use the Kagnew communications station in present-day Eritrea. In Iran during the rule of Shah Palavi, the United States maintained two important listening posts north of Tehran that allowed it to monitor intercontinental ballistic missile tests.

[42] On democratic transitions, see Anderson 1999; Huntington 1993; and O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986. On the foreign policy instability and war-prone nature of democratizing states, see Mansfield and Snyder 2004; and Snyder 2000.

[43] See Mansfield and Snyder 2004; and Snyder 2000.

adjustments to or renegotiations of these accords. In extreme cases, they may unilaterally invalidate the contract and even demand the expulsion of the foreign basing presence.

Institutional competition within democratizers may further fuel this contractual uncertainty. New domestic political institutions such as legislatures, constitutions, political parties, independent courts and local governments will vie to assert jurisdiction over foreign policy matters, including security contracting, in order to define and probe the extent of their institutional authority.[44] Thus, legislatures are more likely to demand that external contracts be subjected to ratification, new political parties are likely to address foreign-policy issues in their emergent platforms, courts may insist on reviewing the legality of external treaties and agreements, and local governments will explore their administrative power over base-related issues.

Finally, the competitive party system in a democratizer may further undermine the validity of existing contracts. Nascent party systems – where political parties are underdeveloped and concentrate on mobilizing core activists and constituencies with ideological appeals – may further encourage politicians to adopt uncompromising, anti-base stances and platforms.[45] As a result, rulers and politicians in democratizing states can campaign on the base-issue as an electoral strategy. In post-authoritarian Spain, Turkey, Greece, the Philippines, Thailand, Okinawa, Japan and Korea, major candidates running for national or regional office publicly questioned the validity of prevailing

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[44] On the dynamics of institutional competition and democratic consolidation, see Diamond and Gunther 2001; Linz and Stepan, 1996; and Gunther at. al. 1995.

[45] On the consolidation party systems, see Sartori 1976. For a further expansion of this logics and application to the base issue in democracies, see Cooley and Hopkin 2006.

basing contracts, arguing either that the deals had been signed by previous autocrats or that the agreements had been unfairly imposed by the United States during a time of occupation. In all of these cases, these candidates actually won their election.

A Typology for Understanding Variations in Base Politics

These two dimensions – the political *dependence* of the base host's regime and the *contracting environment* – broadly determine the parameters of how and when basing agreements become politicized, challenged or accepted by a host country. Figure 1.2 presents a typology of these various "dependence-contracting" configurations and depicts four different political contexts for the basing relationship. The arrows represent typical shifts in the politics of the issue following a regime change or other major institutional transformation in the domestic politics of a base host.

FIGURE 1.2 HERE

The northeast quadrant characterizes basing agreements signed by democratic hosts that are highly dependent on the sending country. These arrangements are the most likely to be hierarchical in their terms and relatively uncontested at the time of their signing. This cell would include the initial postwar basing arrangements that the Un9ited States concluded with Japan, Italy and Germany. In these three cases, security treaties were extremely imbalanced and favorable towards the United States. The original bilateral facilities agreements signed with Greece, Turkey and Italy during the 1950s would also be placed in this cell. The cell would also include the 1947 Military Bases Agreement with the Philippines, which was a prerequisite to Philippines sovereignty, as well as the formal U.S. occupation and administration of the island of Okinawa where between 1952 and 1972 the U.S. military enjoyed unchecked base rights. Cases of postwar occupation are particularly interesting in that legal hierarchy guarantees the sender the right to impose imbalanced or hierarchical agreements, but the very move to independence and subsequent democratization may lead base hosts to almost immediately question the validity of these original deals. This was certainly true of both Japan and the Philippines in the 1950s. In spatial terms, deals imposed by occupation tend to shift towards the left, while deals established in a democratic, yet still hierarchical, setting will tend to shift southwards.

The northwest quadrant depicts political settings where base hosts are highly dependent on the sender, but are characterized by an uncertain contracting environment. This group would include autocratic base hosts that became political clients of the sender such as the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos, South Korea under its military strongmen or Kyrgyzstan under Askar Akayev. In all of these authoritarian cases, rulers

relied on different aspects of the basing contract to support their domestic political survival. This cell would also include dependent democratizers, such as the Philippines and Japan in the 1950s that pushed for a renegotiation of their basing accords arguing that the United States had unfairly imposed an imbalanced deal during its postwar occupation. Thus, for both dependent autocracies and democratizers in this cell, the terms of basing agreements will be politicized and even renegotiated, but the actual presence of U.S. forces themselves will not challenged.

In the southeast quadrant lie basing contracts with hosts whose regimes are not politically dependent on the sender and offer a stable contracting environment. Security contracts with these states will tend to be relatively less hierarchical, more transparent and well institutionalized. This configuration characterizes the basing arrangements that the United States currently enjoys with nearly all of its democratic allies in Europe and mainland Japan.[46] Basing issues in this cell are part of a broader set of routine bilateral security cooperation and access agreements and are generally removed from everyday party politics and debate. The extreme example within this cell is Great Britain, which has institutionalized basing cooperation with the United States since World War II without actually ever signing a formal military facilities agreement.[47] One of the consequences of this type of institutional setting is that anti-base movements or protest campaigns will lack an institutional forum for their resolution. For example, anti-nuclear

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[46] Despite their very different modes of base acquisition, Germany and Britain have both proven remarkably reliable base hosts and, with the exception of some anti-nuclear campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s, the base issues have remained relatively depoliticized by the main political parties in these countries.

[47] See Duke 1987.

campaigns and NGOs in Germany and Britain over the 1970s and 1980s mobilized against the stationing of nuclear weapons, but governing political parties, even those of a more leftwing orientation, were severely constrained in their ability to meet these demands.[48]

Finally, states whose regimes are not dependent on the United States and whose contractual environment is uncertain will politicize and challenge basing contracts and are the most likely to evict the U.S. troop presence. States in this category include non-dependent authoritarian regimes that decide that the basing agreement no longer serves their political interests as well as newly democratic states that are transitioning from authoritarian rule, but no longer require the sending country's patronage or support.

Non-dependent democratizers are also the most likely to use domestic institutions as leverage to secure better contractual terms. James Fearon has observed that democracies may be more effective in signaling their commitment in crisis situations because they risk losing political office if they back down, what he refers to as "audience costs."[49] Audience costs are particularly acute in democratizers and allow rulers to maximize their bargaining leverage on base-related matters. Such interactions typified U.S. base negotiations during the 1970s and 1980s with democratizing polities such as Greece, Spain, Panama, Turkey and Thailand. In all of these negotiations, host countries claimed that prevailing basing agreements had been signed with non-democratic regimes

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[48] For instance, in 1979 Chancellor Helmut Schmidt controversially bucked the base of his own Social Democratic Party and agreed to station medium range nuclear weapons (Euromissiles) on German territory. On the evolution of the nuclear issue and U.S. relations with Western Europe, see Lundestad 2003, 201-225; and Sandars 2000.

[49] Fearon 1997 and 1994.

and that their voting publics would not support their extension. In certain cases, democratizing states may even expel the sending state altogether or otherwise terminate the basing contract, as was the case in the Turkey (1974-1978), Spain (1988), Thailand (1975-1976) and the Philippines (1991).

THE ROLE OF NGOs AND THE MEDIA IN NON-DEPENDENT DEMOCRATIZERS

Within non-dependent democratizing base hosts, two additional types of social actors – civic groups and the media – can also politicize and contest the base issue. Over the last two decades, NGOs have become increasingly important actors in world politics, using new information technologies to create transnational networks of principled-issue activists.[50] In relatively late democratizers such as Korea, the explosion of civil society has also generated hundreds of NGOs that work on base-related issues such as the impact of the U.S. military presence on the environment, crimes perpetrated by U.S. personnel and the plight of sexual workers in basing areas.[51] In fact, the exceptional networking and organizational savvy of Korean anti-base NGOs made an important contribution to President Roh Moo-Hyun's 2002 election.[52] Although NGOs did play important parts in organizing anti-base campaigns in other countries during their democratization, including

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[50] On networks of principled activists, see Keck and Sikkink 1998. On NGOs as important new normative actors in international politics, see Price 2003.

[51] For a discussion of these groups, see Moon 1999.

[52] From the 1990s onwards, Korean NGOs have used the USFK presence as a vehicle for increasing their voice and influence in Korean political affairs. Please note, however, that to argue that the basing issue offers political opportunities for NGOs does not in any way impute their normative motivations or invalidate their concerns about these issues. On the need to decouple the ideas of NGOs from the strategies that they employ, see Sell and Prakash 2004.

the Philippines and Spain in the 1980s, these tended to be local or community-based organizations that rarely managed to promote their activities on a broader national stage.

The media in democratizing states can also play a critical role in politicizing the basing issue.[53] The media systems of late democratizers are characterized by "polarized pluralism," as media outlets are segmented by political affiliation and retain strong ties to political parties.[54] Moreover, the previous secretive nature of many basing arrangements makes the issue a particularly good target for media campaigns for greater governmental transparency. Just as democratizing politicians explicitly link the presence of the bases to support of a previous non-democratic regime, democratizing media outlets can point to the bases issue as a symbol of previous state censorship and media secrecy.[55] For example, the national newspapers that openly supported the political campaigns of the socialist parties in Greece (PASOK) and Spain (PSOE) in the early 1980s also demanded greater openness from the government on the details of basing provisions. Furthermore, reporters and media outlets that hold strong views about the basing presence will actively seek out news stories to promote this agenda. For example, on the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa the editorial boards of the Ryuku Shimpo and the Asahi Times, the two local

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[53] On how the media can promote destructive nationalism in democratizing states, see Snyder 2000; and Snyder and Ballentine 1996.

[54] Hallin and Mancini 2004. In their study of such polarized systems, including the southern European states, the authors further observe that, "journalism is not as strongly differentiated from political activism and the autonomy of journalism is often limited." 74.

[55] On the dynamics of democratization and the media, see Milton 2001 who observes, that, "the news media are a tool to help identify political problems and develop solutions to them. In the initial phases of the transition to democracy the news media have the crucial role of explaining what is politically and economically plausible and realistic." 497.

newspapers that account for 90% of the island's total readership, openly state that their political goal is to remove the U.S. military presence and consciously select negative stories that focus on base-related accidents and social costs.[56] Finally, in late democratizers such as Korea new media outlets such as internet news agencies and blogs have become important source for news about base-related issues, especially for anti-base activists.[57]

By contrast, the institutional environment of a consolidated democracy makes these same actors unlikely to target the base issue. Although politicians, media outlets and NGOs could still campaign against the basing presence, a consolidated democracy's stable contracting environment, treaty commitments and cartelized party system would severely constrain any government's actual ability to secure an actual renegotiation.

FIGURE 1.3 HERE

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[56] Author's interview with the editorial board member of a major Okinawan daily newspaper. Naha, Okinawa. May 2003.

[57] Song 2004. The role of the new media in Korea's base politics is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

Spain and Uzbekistan Reprised

To return to the examples of base politics described at the outset, the shifting positions of these base hosts reflected underlying institutional changes in their respective domestic political environments. In the Spanish case, the use of Spanish bases by the U.S. military for its Libya campaign in 1986 was considered illegitimate by the PSOE because these governing agreements had been established during the Franco era and had not been subjected to democratic ratification.[58] Having received public credit for "successfully" solving the base issue by renegotiating the Franco-era agreement in 1988, the PSOE then abandoned its aggressive stance on the basing issue and removed it from the policy agenda. Revisiting the issue in 2004 held no political gain for PSOE leaders who, as the Spanish party system consolidated across four successive PSOE governments, had come to portray their party as moderate, competent and responsible on foreign affairs and security issues. Thus, in 2004 President Zapatero may have disagreed with the American military campaign in Iraq and withdrawn Spanish forces from that theater, but he honored the base access granted for OIF, viewing it as a legitimate contract signed with a previous democratic government.

Similarly, in 2001 the government of Uzbekistan was eager to offer its cooperation and airbase facilities to the United States in order to jointly fight terrorists and Islamic extremists in Central Asia and be associated with the U.S.-led coalition. This security cooperation helped President Islam Karimov eliminate political opponents, equip his security services with modern hardware and publicly justify his tough internal policies

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[58] Moreover, at the time the PSOE was mobilizing support for a referendum on NATO membership and did not want to appear weak on the basing issue.

through his security cooperation with the United States. After Andijon in May 2005, the Uzbek government regarded a continued American presence as a potential threat to its regime security, especially given the recent series of American-backed revolutions in other post-Soviet states. By contrast it viewed Russia and China as alternate security partners that would be unconcerned about Uzbek democratization and would support his regime's hard-line tactics. Given the Karimov regime's authoritarian character, it faced few domestic constraints on evicting the United States, even if the action displeased elements of the local populations that had benefited economically from the presence of K2. Domestic politics and the imperatives of political survivorship altered Karimov's calculations regarding the purpose and political utility of the U.S. base.

Thus, one of the more surprising findings of this book is that democratic rule in a base host does not necessarily guarantee a stable basing relationship with the United States. Although consolidated democracies are much more likely to accept basing agreements and adhere to those contracts, just as Spain did in 2004, democratizing states are more likely to aggressively challenge the validity of the contracts that govern the foreign basing presence. Maintaining permanent bases in democratizing hosts such as Afghanistan and Iraq may become politically impossible if the regimes of these countries no longer have to depend on the United States and if they do not become democratically consolidated. Further, pressing for democratization in base hosts where anti-Americanism is already high and may render maintaining a U.S. military presence politically impossible. These are important and perhaps disconcerting lessons for U.S. planners to consider as they attempt to promote democratic change abroad while they simultaneously negotiate basing rights with these same polities.

In normative terms, critics might regard the policy stability of the base issue in consolidated democracies as undue compliance and deference to the United States and its security agenda. Spain's decision to allow its bases to be used for OIF was mirrored by that of other NATO allies, despite official governmental opposition to the conflict and open public hostility towards the U.S.-led campaign. Similarly, reports in 2005 that the CIA had been transferring prisoners to secret detention camps through many of these European bases further suggest that the ability of America's long-time democratic allies to challenge the United States on base-related issues may be constrained by their very own democratic institutions. The same institutional features that make mature democracies reliable contractual partners might also make them relatively passive and compliant within a security hierarchy.

The Plan of this Book

Basing agreements cover a broad range of issues, many of which still remain poorly understood. Chapter 2 identifies the most politically significant aspects of military basing agreements – facilities, sovereignty and bargains – and provides a comparative analytical framework for tracking their evolution.

Chapters 3-6 constitute the main empirical portion of the book. Each of these chapters explores the evolution of base politics in two analytically instructive cases, one drawn from East Asia and the other from Southern Europe. The chapters are not comprehensive accounts of the history of the basing issue in these countries, nor are they meant to offer complete narratives of these countries' political development. Rather they examine how rulers in different base hosts played two-level base politics and how

internal political changes – especially periods of democratic transition and democratic consolidation – affected the acceptance, politicization and contestation of the basing issue within these hosts. Methodologically, the integration of a European and an Asian case in each chapter is designed to demonstrate the explanatory power of the argument across different regional, cultural and historical settings.[59] Accordingly, each chapter is designed as a theoretically instructive comparison of base politics that demonstrates both cross-case and intra-case variation.

Chapter 3 explores how authoritarian rulers in Spain and the Philippines used basing agreements to consolidate their domestic rule and then shows how democratizing dynamics in both countries generated a political backlash against these accords and the eviction of U.S. forces. Chapter 4 traces the evolution of the U.S. basing presence in South Korea and Turkey and shows how bases that were originally established for common security and deterrence were later politically challenged as these countries liberalized. Chapter 5 contrasts how the U.S. basing presence has been implicated in the center-periphery politics of the remote islands of Okinawa and the Azores and their respective mainland governments. Chapter 6 explores how dominant pro-American political parties in mainland Japan and Italy used the issue to consolidate their domestic power during the Cold War. The analytical separation of mainland Japan from Okinawa may strike the reader as unusual, but the division is meant to underscore and clarify the very different political logics that have driven base politics in different parts of that country.

[59] For other theoretically instructive comparisons across these regions, see Katzenstein 2005; Samuels 2003; and Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002.

Chapter 7 examines the base politics of the newer Central Asian cases of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and then assesses the likely political consequences of the GDPR in other new base hosts across Africa and the Black Sea region. Chapter 8 summarizes the main theoretical and empirical findings of the book and offers some tentative conclusions regarding the political viability of a future U.S. basing presence in Afghanistan and Iraq.

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