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POLITICIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE: COSTS AND BENEFITS

Everyone knows that “politicization” is bad.¹ It is assumed to damage the credibility of intelligence. Some are unconcerned because they believe it seldom happens, or matters little when it does. Virtually no one, however, believes that it is a good thing. For the most part this is true -- especially when we think only in terms of the popular understanding of the concept. Depending on the definition of the term, however, politicization is to some degree inevitable, and in some forms, necessary.

The notion that there could be anything less than evil about politicization is never admitted by anyone on either side of debates on the subject, but is nonetheless true. The strict definition of “politicize” is not ipso facto pejorative, but is “to give a political tone or character” or “to bring within the realm of politics”² -- which is, after all, the realm with which intelligence is concerned. In foreign policy, only simple facts or explanations of minor matters about which policymakers know or care little are uncontroversial. Assessments of facts on matters of much importance are always controversial. Most of what is seen as illegitimate politicization is only the reflection of what, in other arenas, is considered normal controversy. It is seen as evil because of the universal norm that intelligence judgments be more objective, nonpartisan, and scientific than other judgments. The

¹ “The term ‘politicization’ is nearly always applied to actions of which one disapproves.” David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 209n.

² Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 1986), p. 1755.

paradox, however, is that the real world of policy makes politicization in one form the worst thing that can happen to intelligence, but in another form, the best. The pejorative presumption obscures this, and makes it harder to navigate away from the worst and toward the best forms.

The prevalent conception behind the pejorative connotation is that politicization fabricates or distorts information to serve policy preferences or vested interests.³ This view covers a multitude of sins, some blatant and crude, some subtle and artful. But in any degree this sort of politicization is a malign choice, a simple act of corruption -- although it is one usually motivated by the best of intentions to serve what is seen as a good higher than intellectual probity.

The more forgiving concept sees the problem not as a choice but as a condition. For issues of high import and controversy, any relevant analysis is perforce politically charged, because it points to a policy conclusion. Various disputes -- about which elements of information are correct, ambiguous, or false; which of them are important, incidental, or irrelevant; in which context they should be understood; and against which varieties of information pointing in a different direction they should be assessed -- are in effect if not in intent disputes about which policy conclusion stands or falls. The latter view of the problem is more realistic in its approach to making intelligence serve policy, but entails much greater risks in keeping straight the boundaries between the two realms. In one sense intelligence cannot live with politicization but policy cannot live without it. Grappling with the problem is frustrated by the unwillingness of any, on any side of the debate, to see their own approach as politicized.

Before proceeding further, let me stipulate one simple standard to which intelligence analysis must adhere, and let none of what follows confuse the sanctity of the standard. The irrevocable

³ For other definitions see Harry Howe Ransom, "The Politicization of Intelligence," in Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1987), p.

norm must be that policy interests, preferences, or decisions must never determine intelligence judgments. As I will argue, there is a difference between such corruption and another form of bringing intelligence “within the realm of politics” -- the presentation and packaging of assessments in ways that effectively engage policymakers’ concerns. Keeping the difference straight may be difficult, and skeptics will think that it is so difficult that it should not be attempted, lest the attempt slide down the slippery slope to corruption. Nothing in what follows, however, should be read as challenging the principle that intelligence cannot serve policy if it panders to it.

Types of Politicization and Intelligence-Policy Interaction

The prevalent concept of politicization as the unforgivable top-down dictation of analytical conclusions to support existing policy dominates discussion of the problem, but this is seldom seen in stark form. The second, more forgiving concept of politicization as subtle contamination of analysis by policy predispositions is manifested far more frequently, but there is no consensus about whether it should be considered politicization, whether it can be avoided, or what should be done to cope with it. Politicization in either sense exists in the eye of the beholder, and more specifically, the beholder whose political frame of reference differs from the implications of the analysis beheld. Much confusion and rancor about what constitutes politicization flows from different models of how the intelligence process should relate to policymaking. These might be considered the "Kent" and "Gates" models.⁴

⁴ See the discussion of these approaches, and the various other terms used to characterize them, in H. Bradford

The Kent model derives from the legendary Yale historian Sherman Kent, who wrote the first major postwar treatise on intelligence and headed the Office of National Estimates in its formative years. Kent warned against the danger of letting intelligence personnel get too close to policymaking circles, lest their objectivity and integrity be compromised by involvement.⁵ This view that objectivity takes precedence over everything dominated the culture of the Central Intelligence Agency (although not of all other intelligence organizations in the line operating departments) for at least its first three decades.

The Gates model -- after Robert Gates, Deputy Director for Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency in the Reagan Administration, and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the administration of Bush the Elder -- arose from critiques of ineffective intelligence contributions to policymaking, and the view that utility is the sine qua non. To be useful, intelligence analysis must engage policymakers' concerns. Policymakers who utilize analysis need studies that relate to the objectives they are trying to achieve. Thus analysis must be sensitive to the policy context, and the range of options available, to be of any use in making policy. (As Robert Jervis says, "intelligence is also easier to keep pure when it is irrelevant."⁶) This view emerged in the 1980s and has been ascendant ever since.⁷ Partisans of the Gates model see the earlier orthodoxy as a prescription for

Westerfield, "Inside Ivory Bunkers: CIA Analysts Resist Managers' 'Pandering' -- Part I," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 4 (Winter 1996/97), p. 409 and passim.

⁵ Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 195-201.

⁶ Robert Jervis, "What's Wrong with the Intelligence Process?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 1 (1986), p.39.

⁷ See for example, L. Keith Gardiner, "Dealing with Intelligence-Policy Disconnects," Studies in Intelligence 33, no. 2 (Summer 1989), and David D. Gries, "New Links Between Intelligence and Policy," Studies in Intelligence 34, no. 2 (Summer 1990), both reprinted in H. Bradford Westerfield, ed., Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 346-347. See also

irrelevance, and see their own approach not as politicization, but as contextualization, or as realistic management of policymakers' cluttered radar screens. Adherents of the Kent model see the Gates approach as a prescription for politicization in the prevalent pejorative sense, and indeed made a public issue of this in Gates' 1991 confirmation hearings.

Full disclosure: I have always leaned, with some ambivalence, toward the Gates model.⁸ Every analysis on any matter of great policy importance inevitably has implications for the success or failure of any given policy option. Packaging intelligence to be productive makes it harder to draw sharp lines between what is relevant and what supports a particular policy choice. How this may be done has implications for how to preserve honesty and utility at the same time. Whether it can be done is a question that underlines competing models of the role of analysis in policy.

The dimensions of the problem are better appreciated if we recognize that disputes are not just about whether or not intelligence is politically contaminated, but often involve contending forms of politicization. The form that evokes the most direct protests is the top-down variety, whereby policymakers are seen to dictate intelligence conclusions. A second form, however, is the reverse -- a bottom-up coloration of products by the unconscious biases of the working analysts who produce intelligence analyses. Since the founding of the modern American intelligence community liberal

Richard K. Betts, "Policy-Makers and Intelligence Analysts: Love, Hate or Indifference?" Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 1 (January 1988). For a detailed account of the shift, and the organizational changes that facilitated it, from the perspective of the aggrieved, see John A. Gentry, "Intelligence Analyst/Manager Relations at the CIA," in David A. Charters, Stuart Farson, and Glenn P. Hastedt, eds., Intelligence Analysis and Assessment (London: Frank Cass, 1996).

⁸ As academics often forget, models are more distinct in theory than in practice. For example, while Kent warned of the danger of corruption from too close a relationship between intelligence and policy, he also warned, "of the two dangers -- that of intelligence being too far from the users and that of being too close -- the greatest danger is the one of being too far." Kent, Strategic Intelligence, p. 195. Bar-Joseph uses the terms "professional" and "realist" for what I call the Kent and Gates models. He identifies Michael Handel as one of the main proponents of the professional approach," and cites me as a member of the realist school (Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States, pp. 25-28). The fact that Handel and I were close friends and agreed more than we disagreed is

policymakers have suspected analysts in the intelligence agencies of the military services and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) of hawkish predispositions, and conservative policymakers have suspected analysts in CIA and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of dovish inclinations. These images suggest a problem for the Kent model, because unacknowledged prejudices allow analysts' autonomy to foster politicization in the name of objectivity, and enable analysts "to pass off opinions as facts."⁹

A third form operates in both directions, mediating between contrasting mind-sets of policymakers and analysts. This involves the shaping of intelligence products by analysts' managers, acting in their capacity as editors or institutional brokers, in ways that original drafters consider to be inconsistent with evidence and motivated by policy concerns. Accusations of politicization often flow from a clash between the latter tendencies, unconscious bottom-up bias, and bias in editorial management.

Contrasting Functions and Thin Lines

In principle, no one can be against maximizing either credibility or utility in intelligence analysis. Why must a choice ever be made between them? The main reasons lie in the contrasting responsibilities for analysis and action, and resulting tradeoffs between accuracy and impact; thin lines between packaging that is sensitive to policy context and political pandering, and between editorial management and distortion; and competition between the managerial need to render consensus judgments and the intellectual need to highlight disagreements.

a reminder that the models are only indications of tendency and emphasis.

⁹ Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age (New Haven:

Pure professional analysts optimize the analysis and let the chips fall where they may -- even if they fall into a hole and are never noticed by anyone who could use them. As Uri Bar-Joseph puts it, "the quality of the intelligence product is more important than its marketing."¹⁰ Indifference to the reception that analysis gets, however, is a form of goal displacement, and as irresponsible as any other parochial bureaucratic tendency to let means become ends. Taxpayers hire intelligence analysts to inform policymakers, to produce useful rather than useless truth, not to produce truth for its own sake. If analysts or managers compromise quality in order to improve receptivity, however, they vitiate the purpose too, since informed judgment depends on accurate knowledge. These points are only truisms, but controversies about politicization reflect unresolved notions about how to navigate between the pitfalls.

Often the main issue in compromising quality is the danger of haste or oversimplification. Avoiding those problems leads analysts to take longer to produce, and to produce longer papers. As Arthur Hulnick's surveys indicated, "policymakers value research work...on the basis of brevity, timeliness and relevance in that order. Intelligence producers tend to reverse those priorities."¹¹ Analysis that undermines a policy option is most useful if it arrives before a decision to choose that option is made. It may be discomfiting or unwelcome even then, but it has more of a chance of affecting choice. Once policymakers move from decision to implementation, however, their interests become vested. Revisiting policy choice is not impossible, but is likely only in the face of

Yale University Press, 2000), p.97.

¹⁰ Uri Bar-Joseph, Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel, and Britain (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p. 28.

¹¹ Arthur S. Hulnick, "The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage: A Theoretical Approach," Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 2 (May 1986), p. 227 (emphasis in original).

outright failure. "We've fallen into the same pattern of mistakes as the French," George Allen told Sam Adams, during the controversy over estimating the number of Communist forces in Vietnam. "They didn't begin by faking intelligence; they merely assumed success in the absence of clear proof of failure."¹² Negative analysis has a higher hurdle to surmount if it is to figure in the implementation phase.¹³

Analysts' awareness of the complexity of the issues they deal with makes them sensitive to the reasons that policies will not work. Analysts who complicate and equivocate do not compete as effectively for the limited attention of consumers as those who simplify and advocate -- but the latter politicize their product more egregiously. "Advocacy is always not only more simple," Harold Ford writes, "but more fun than intelligence assessment. The latter has to be all-seeing, responsible, free from any taint of being 'cooked.' The former can pick, choose, and skew its facts and arguments. This is not a fair fight: advocacy will always look more attractive to a harassed policymaker than will the usually more sober facts of life."¹⁴

Outright pandering to policymakers is clearly recognizable as politicization. But what about a decision simply not to poke a policymaker in the eye, to avoid confrontation, to get a better hearing for a negative view by softening its presentation, when a no-compromise argument would be certain to provoke anger and rejection? Here is the fine line between corruption and counter-productive honesty. Intelligence managers who operate at high levels get to know that there are times and

¹² Quoted in Sam Adams, War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir (South Royalton, Vermont: Steerforth Press, 1994) p. 80.

¹³ See Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle," Jerusalem Quarterly no. 30 (Winter 1984), pp. 126, 128.

¹⁴ Harold P. Ford, Estimative Intelligence, Revised Edition (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), p. 177.

issues when it serves no purpose to fall on their swords, and when it is more sensible to live to fight another day -- even if it means caving in on a hopeless issue. "We live out our lives with families, friends, bosses, allies, and opponents (who may become allies)," Loch Johnson observes. "How we deal with them at time ta will influence how they deal with us at tb, as every legislator who practices logrolling and compromise understands."¹⁵ On the other hand, Kent warns, "When intelligence producers realize that there is no sense in forwarding to a consumer knowledge which does not correspond to preconceptions, then intelligence is through. At this point there is no intelligence and the consumer is out on his own with no more to guide him than the indications of the tea leaf and the crystal ball."¹⁶

Straddling these pitfalls takes us to the thin line between managerial responsibility and manipulation of analysis to suit policy. Intelligence products are supposed to represent the best judgments of whole organizations, not single authors. Thus as managers point out, "There is an inherent tension between the intellectual autonomy of the analyst and the institutional responsibility for the product,"¹⁷ and "If you are a manager, you are responsible for the product. You have to satisfy yourself that you can stand behind those judgments."¹⁸ As Robert Gates himself put it in a message to analysts after his bruising confirmation battle and the report of a task force on politicization that he established:

¹⁵ Loch K. Johnson, "Decision Costs in the Intelligence Cycle," in Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall, and James M. Keagle, eds., Intelligence: Policy and Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p. 186.

¹⁶ Kent, Strategic Intelligence, p. 205.

¹⁷ Kay Oliver testimony in Gates hearings, quoted in Westerfield, "Inside Ivory Bunkers: CIA Analysts Resist Managers' 'Pandering' -- Part II," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10, no. 1 (Spring 1997), P. 19.

¹⁸ Douglas MacEachin testimony in Gates hearings, quoted in Westerfield, "Part II," p. 24.

...unwarranted concerns about politicization can arise when analysts themselves fail to understand their role in the process. We do produce a corporate product. If the policymaker wants the opinion of a single individual, he can (and frequently does) consult any one of a dozen outside experts on any given issue. Your work, on the other hand, counts because it represents the well-considered view of an entire directorate and, in the case of National Estimates, the entire intelligence community. Analysts...must discard the academic mindset that says their work is their own.¹⁹

These are responses to the frequent complaints of working level analysts that their work is massaged and distorted by higher-ups before it is disseminated.

The next sections suggest ways in which policy interests can affect intelligence analysis, with illustrative cases that involved allegations of politicization. Each also involved policy issues of the highest priority -- those on which it is more realistic than in most instances to argue that a process that focused on careful organization of alternative interpretations, rather than a single best estimate, should be the solution to concerns about politicization. How such a comparison of alternative interpretations should be organized, however, can be a matter of controversy in itself.

Conscious Politicization: The Vietnam Order of Battle Estimate

The most blatant forms of politicization are deliberate suppression of information that undermines policy or fabrication of information to fortify policy. This is the common image of politicization, but it rarely happens unambiguously. The long war in Vietnam, however, provided many instances of stark dishonesty motivated by the need of those waging the war to convince

¹⁹ "A Message to Analysts on 'Politicization' by Robert M. Gates," 16 March 1992 (manuscript), p. 7.

audiences (and to believe themselves) that they were winning.²⁰ The most discussed major case was the 1967 dispute over the estimate of Communist military strength in South Vietnam. CIA was arguing for higher numbers in the order of battle (O/B) estimate and the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) for lower numbers. CIA wanted to count a wider range of irregular forces (including organizations with marginal roles in supporting military operations) and to attribute higher numbers than the military to those forces. Most public accounts of the dispute come from those who sided with CIA, and who saw MACV's behavior as intellectually corrupt.

Even this case is more ambiguous than the common conception of politicization implies. There are some grounds on which to argue that MACV's overall judgments turned out to be better than CIA's. For example, the number of Communist forces used in the Tet Offensive was substantially lower than even MACV's strength estimate.²¹ The dispute over the proper numbers was also not hidden from top policymakers at cabinet level and in the White House. The official published Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 14.3-67), which settled more or less on the military's lower numbers as the best estimate, also included discussion of the disputed categories of forces and higher estimated figures. That made the exercise technically honest, but did not neutralize the impact of the lower figures. Unlike academics, policymakers are not attuned to

²⁰ See the many examples cited in George W. Allen, *None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam* (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 2001), especially the charge against Walt Rostow on pp. 236-237.

²¹ Lt. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson, USA (Ret.), *Secrets of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990), pp. 64-65; Harold P. Ford, *CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968* (n.p.: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998), p. 100; James J. Wirtz, *The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 158-162; T. L. Cabbage II, "Westmoreland vs. CBS: Was Intelligence Corrupted by Policy Demands?" in Michael I. Handel, ed., *Leaders and Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass, 1989), p. 133; see also p. 165. See also Renata Adler, *Reckless Disregard: Westmoreland v. CBS et al.; Sharon v. Time* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986).

careful scrutiny of qualifications and footnotes: "Prose caveats buried deep in the SNIE ... could not compete among senior readers with the impression created by the tabulation of ostensibly hard numbers up front in the Conclusions section."²²

Holding in abeyance the question of which methods of estimation were correct in their ultimate implications, there were instances of raw politicization, especially in connection with the conference between CIA and MACV to thrash out the figures before the SNIE. For example, the military applied methodological double standards in counting. All casualties from Communist irregular forces, marginal in combat roles or not, were included in the "body count" that was then compared with the aggregate strength figures that did not include those forces from the beginning, thus inflating the apparent progress in attrition. And in one conference military representatives insisted that a CIA estimate was invalid because it was based on too small a sample of districts -- twenty-eight -- but defended an estimate of their own that was based on a single district.²³

Military personnel involved in the negotiations confessed privately that the O/B figure should be higher, but that there had been a command decision to keep the number below 300,000.²⁴ This was implicitly confirmed in an Eyes Only cable from General Creighton Abrams (then Westmoreland's deputy) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Earle Wheeler, three weeks before the conference. Abrams suggested dropping two categories of Viet Cong irregular organizations to keep the number at the previous level, because "We have been projecting an image

²² Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, p. 102.

²³ Adams, War of Numbers, pp. 105, 114-15. This is the lengthiest account of the dispute by the CIA analyst most involved in challenging MACV estimates. For the main points behind his position see especially chaps. 4-5.

²⁴ Colonel Gains Hawkins, George Allen, and George Carver cited in Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, pp. 91, 93-94.

of success over the recent months," and the press would draw "an erroneous and gloomy conclusion....All those who have an incorrect view of the war will be reinforced."²⁵ At the time of the O/B conference Robert Komer, the highest civilian in MACV, lobbied against coming up with a higher number for similar reasons: "Komer concluded that there must not be any quantifying of the enemy's irregular forces, on the grounds that so doing 'would produce a politically unacceptable total over 400,000.'"²⁶ George Allen quoted Komer as saying "You guys [CIA] simply have to back off. Whatever the true O/B figure is, is beside the point."²⁷

The honest answer would have been to acknowledge that the categories of analysis had been changed, and to note that therefore earlier estimates were too low in the new terms of reference, and thus current estimates that were higher than the old ones could be consistent with the position that Communist strength had declined. Political and military leaders naturally feared that such an explanation, even if true, would either be overlooked, misunderstood, or seen as disingenuous, leading the press to ignore the methodological issue and trumpet the upward change in the estimated number, creating a false impression that would undermine policy.²⁸ When MACV gave a press briefing in November the new O/B figures were lowered further to 242,000, but, in line with advice from Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, no mention was made that the figures were the result of dropping categories of units from the count. The announced estimate thus was not simply

²⁵ Cable quoted by Samuel Adams in testimony in U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Intelligence (the Pike Committee) Hearings: U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: The Performance of the Intelligence Community, Part 2, 94th Cong., 1st sess., September-October 1975, pp. 684-685.

²⁶ Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, p. 94.

²⁷ Cable from Saigon, and Allen, quoted in Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, pp. 92, 97.

²⁸ Davidson, Secrets of the Vietnam War, pp. 34, 44, 66-67. Davidson's is the only published insider's account I have found that defends MACV's performance on the O/B estimate.

questionable in terms of overall accuracy; it purveyed incommensurate data in order to manipulate impressions of military progress not supported by commensurate comparisons with earlier data.²⁹

The change in categories counted was admitted later, but after the press had moved on.

There were three linked problems in this imbroglio. First, the subject of the estimate bore directly on the issue of single greatest priority in U.S. foreign policy: the success of U.S. strategy in the Vietnam War. There was no way that the conclusions could be insulated from political passions. Second, because of this, the conclusions had to be made public in a press conference. Sensitivity about misinterpretation or leaps to the wrong conclusions by opinion makers could not be assuaged by the comfort of secrecy. Policy leadership that could have afforded a thoroughly honest analysis if it was to remain classified could not possibly accept one that would be seen as striking at the heart of the policy.³⁰ Third, policymakers were no longer interested in using intelligence to make basic choices about strategy. The die had been cast, implementation was well underway, and reevaluation of alternatives would subvert the effort. These points do not excuse the politicization, but they explain it.

The main problem, however, was that the intelligence dispute could not be depoliticized because it could not be kept secret -- a prime example of the view that politicization flows from the

²⁹ Adams testimony in Pike Committee Hearings, Part 2, pp. 685-686.

³⁰ In other cases policymakers can use secrecy to politicize intelligence by manipulating its dissemination. Analysis may retain integrity, but be kept out of channels that could cause trouble. This can occur on behalf of policy views anywhere along the spectrum of hawks and doves or conservatives and liberals. For example in mid-1980, when Congress required that aid to Nicaragua "be contingent on a presidential certification that Nicaragua was not 'aiding, abetting, or supporting acts of violence,'" the Carter administration refused routine congressional staff requests to speak with the relevant CIA analyst. The embargo was lifted only two days before certification was announced. The committee staff reviewed the intelligence and found that it did not support the administration position. U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Staff Report: U.S. Intelligence Performance on Central America: Achievements and Selected Instances of Concern, 97th Cong., 2d sess., September 1982, pp. 5-7.

opening of intelligence to democratic debate.³¹ If the O/B controversy could have remained hidden from public view, the political dynamite latent in the analytical problem might have been handled by turning the estimate into a carefully refereed debate, where contention makes clear what assertions are known for sure to be true, which are deduced, and which are simply assumed. All points of view can hold each others' feet to the fire and highlight the reasons for differing judgments, rather than trying to provide "the answer" when the answer had to carry so much political freight. Biases may not be purged by making the exercise a debate, but the biases can compete on a level playing field. This solution is intellectually attractive, and is sometimes necessary in practice, although mostly for mid-level consumers or other readers in the intelligence community. Policymakers, however, will most often consider such exercises academic and unhelpful to them. Harried authorities at the top lack the time to digest and ponder long and complicated studies.

In most instances policymakers want analysis that gives them the consensus, or best single estimate, of the intelligence community. The way to keep a single best estimate depoliticized, however, is to split differences and reduce judgments to lowest common denominators -- which transmutes analysis into mush. This renders the product useless, and is a form of distortion in its own right -- just one that is politically neutral. If there is to be a single best estimate, and it is not to be soporific and spineless, there will be competition to dominate the choice of what is to represent the institutional view.³² That maneuvering, and the victory of one group over another, can politicize

³¹ Glenn P. Hastedt, "The New Context of Intelligence Estimating," in Cimbala, ed., Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society, pp. 49-50, 56, 59-60, 64.

³² "We frequently fall into what I call the institutional view syndrome. For a long time in my career, we did not in actual practice foster a tradition of careful treatment of alternatives.... Rather than trying to lay out the threatening situation to the reader...we routinely got bogged down in an internal contest as to whose views would win the institutional place." Douglas MacEachin testimony, in U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearings: Nomination of Robert M. Gates, 102d Cong., 1st sess., September-October 1991 (hereafter cited as Gates Hearings), vol. II, p. 271.

the result in effect. That is what happened in the O/B controversy.

The one adjustment that could and should have been made to minimize manipulation would have been to highlight the disagreement in the "Conclusions" section of the estimate that everyone reads, rather than relegating the discussion to the main text, which high-level consumers ignore. This would have made the exercise more of a competitive analysis, rather than a single best estimate. But on a matter of such priority, so fraught with high political stakes, it is an illusion to believe a single best estimate is meaningful when there is not actual consensus among analysts, and equally illusory to believe that a completely depoliticized estimate was realistically possible.

Balanced Politicization? Team B and NIE 11-3/8

In 1976, at the behest of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Director of Central Intelligence undertook an explicit exercise in competitive analysis, doing something closer to what should have been done in the 1967 Vietnam O/B dispute. Two separate estimates reflecting different assumptions were to be arrayed together. Like the O/B controversy, this case too concerned the issue that was the highest priority in U.S. foreign policy at the time -- in this case, assessment of Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives. In addition to the regular drafting of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-3/8 on Soviet nuclear capabilities, three parallel studies were commissioned to be done by a prestigious panel of outsiders -- "Team B" -- under the leadership of Harvard historian Richard Pipes. Team B was deliberately selected from among those known to have views on the subject more hawkish than what the PFIAB considered the general orientation of the regular NIE. In effect this turned out to be a sort of open and balanced politicization

-- giving two fundamental attitudes toward the nature and extent of the Soviet threat a chance to make their best case.

The emphasis here is on "in effect." The regular estimators (Team A) did not initially consider the exercise to be adversarial, nor did they realize the extent to which it had been consciously organized to criticize and counter past NIEs. In the end, the Team B report presented a sharp contrast in tone and content to the NIEs of the previous decade, and the whole exercise involved reciprocal charges of bad judgment and unsupported assertion. Defenders of the regular NIEs charged Team B with setting out to support preconceived conclusions and to use the study to undermine detente.³³ The leader of Team B charged that the problem with earlier NIE 11-3/8s was that "politicized scientists and uncritical devotees of arms control had misconstrued the Soviet strategic threat."³⁴

In the initial stage of the exercise some objected to including the non-technical subject of Soviet objectives.³⁵ (The latter is what dominated public reports and controversy about the Team B report, although much of the entire project consisted of technical panels on Soviet programs such as air defense.) Pipes refuted objections by arguing that "it is not possible completely to divorce an assessment of capabilities from the judgment of intention: the significance of a person's purchasing a knife is different if he is a professional chef or the leader of a street gang, although the technical

³³ U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Collection, Production, and Quality, Staff Report: The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives, February 1978; Anne Hessing Cahn, Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 1998), *passim*.

³⁴ Richard Pipes, "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth," Commentary (October 1986), p. 40.

³⁵ Cahn, Killing Detente, p. 127.

'capability' which the knife provides is the same in each case."³⁶

After the Team B report the drafters of NIE 11-3/8 revised the final estimate in a manner that made statements about Soviet intentions more consistent with Team B's views. The changes were mainly deletions of statements not based on hard evidence.³⁷ The Team B report on Soviet objectives, however, focused primarily on criticism of "mirror imaging" and underestimation of offensive aims, rather than adducing evidence to justify its own assumptions about Soviet motives. Team B's interpretation was essentially an essay asserting the difference in Soviet world view and the quest for military superiority as the driving force in Soviet programs and diplomacy.³⁸

In a public article that was in effect an unclassified version of Team B's report on Soviet objectives, Pipes did cite a number of sources for his interpretation, including articles in the classified Soviet journal, Soviet Military Thought.³⁹ Soon thereafter Raymond Garthoff published an article drawing on the same sorts of Soviet sources -- but citing different passages -- which refuted the view propounded by Pipes. Garthoff's article was implicitly a defense of the record of

³⁶ Pipes, "Team B," p. 29. Although Pipes' application of this insight was in many respects questionable, he is right in principle. Intelligence officers sometimes fail "to realize that facts and theory are not separable." Captain Robert Bovey, USN, "The Quality of Intelligence Analysis," American Intelligence Journal 3, no. 3 (Winter 1980-81), p. 4 of re-paginated Pentagon "Current News" reprint. Or as E.H. Carr made the point: "The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides which facts to give the floor, and in what context.... It is the historian who has decided for his own reasons that Caesar's crossing of that petty stream, the Rubicon, is a fact of history, whereas the crossing of the Rubicon by millions of other people before or since interests nobody at all." What Is History? (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 9.

³⁷ Howard Stoertz, cited in Cahn, Killing Detente, p. 174.

³⁸ The report itself is Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis: Soviet Strategic Objectives, an Alternate View: Report of Team B, December 1976 (sanitized declassified copy from the National Security Archive); see especially pp. 9-16, 41-48.

³⁹ Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary 64, no. 1 (July 1977).

estimates attacked by Team B.⁴⁰

Part of the problem was a confusion about which level of analysis was at issue -- an implicit elision of Soviet policy and strategy. At the level of what might be called strategic intent (how to approach war if it came), Soviet military doctrine was indeed clearly offensive and aimed at securing maximum military advantage. Hardly anyone challenged this point. Team B and Pipes focused on this, but did not distinguish the orientation clearly from political intent (objectives to be achieved), on which there were many more indications of Soviet orientation to avoiding nuclear war at nearly all costs. Team A and Garthoff focused on the latter point. Pipes compared apples and oranges -- American policy intent with Soviet strategic intent.⁴¹ Neither side clarified sufficiently that apples and oranges were being intermingled in the estimates and the dispute between the two camps.

The confrontation of interpretations in Teams A and B only reflected the essential debate of the 1970s between hawks and moderates over the nature and extent of the Soviet threat. (Doves were not represented in the exercise; that would have required a Team C staffed by Soviet apologists.) The real driving force was the question of Soviet policy intent -- whether Moscow aimed for peaceful coexistence or military aggression -- a question of high politics (and for most in the policy world, articles of faith) on which it would have been utterly futile to attempt a single best intelligence estimate. Once the issue for assessment was cast in terms of Soviet capabilities and

⁴⁰ Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," International Security 3, no. 1 (Summer 1978). For the later and definitive version of Garthoff's research and interpretation see his Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990).

⁴¹ The salience of the difference between policy intent and strategic intent is my own view, not one emphasized explicitly by partisans in the debates of the Cold War. Pipes criticized American acceptance of assumptions about mutual deterrence, which were articulated at the policy level, but failed to note that in operational planning at the strategic level, the U.S. military engaged in counterforce targeting and developed options for preemptive launch of offensive forces. He mistook the evolutionary change in PD-59 (President Carter's 1980 directive to emphasize planning for counterforce targeting, prolonged nuclear war, and attacks on command and control structures) for a revolutionary shift.

objectives, and arms control negotiations had energized hawks, moderates, and doves to focus on indices of power and policy that would support their views, there was no way to keep such assessments free of policy predispositions. Complexity of data meant that any selectivity in presentation of evidence, any emphasis, could be seen as manipulation to support policy preferences. Data could not help but be political ammunition, and attitudes toward data analysis naturally paralleled attitudes on the high politics of U.S.-Soviet relations. Indeed, as Jim Klurfield concluded, when Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter, "Team B, in essence, became Team A."⁴²

Unconscious Politicization? The Gates Revolution and Reaction

Allegations of politicization come up periodically, but they grew especially prominent in the Reagan and Elder Bush administrations. At the end of the Cold War grumblings inside the intelligence community burst into public view in the confirmation hearings for the nomination of Robert Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence. One major long-serving analyst charged that as head of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) under DCI William Casey, Gates had politicized intelligence to support the extreme anti-Soviet policies of the administration, by:

...the imposition of intelligence judgments, often over the protests of the consensus in the Directorate of Intelligence to slant intelligence.... suppression of intelligence that didn't support the Casey agenda.... use of the Directorate of Operations to slant intelligence of the Directorate of Intelligence.... manipulation of the intelligence process that existed for forty years to protect dissent, to protect difference of opinion.... manipulation of personnel or what I call judge-shopping in the courthouse, finding someone to do your bidding...to reach your

⁴² Quoted in Pipes, "Team B," p. 40n.

conclusions.⁴³

Other junior and senior analysts testified in a similar vein. Views of this sort made some conclude that "never before in the history of the CIA was the intelligence process so systematically corrupted" as in the Reagan-Casey-Gates era.⁴⁴ Allegations against Gates were countered by testimony that denied the charges and interpreted acts in dispute differently. The differences in view depended to some extent on whose ox was being gored ideologically. As Mark Lowenthal notes, some who charge politicization are simply the "'losers' in the bureaucratic battles."⁴⁵

Where analysts saw corruption of the process, Gates and other leaders of the intelligence bureaucracy in the 1980s believed they were using managerial discretion to improve the rigor and relevance of analytical products. Their concern was not just about their responsibility for the corporate imprimatur, but also with the biases of analysts themselves. Politicization, as noted earlier, is not just a top-down phenomenon. It can operate unconsciously from the bottom up, if analysts let their own policy biases contaminate their writing. Indeed, the fear of some policymakers that professional analysts share a common bias and politicize their conclusions to undermine alternative policies had been the reason behind the Team B exercise. When National Intelligence Officer (NIO) Graham Fuller defended Gates in the 1991 confirmation hearings he raised counter-charges, in effect, of unconscious politicization or simple naivete among the analysts attacking Gates, analysts who came primarily from the Office of Soviet Affairs (SOVA) in the Directorate of

⁴³ Melvin Goodman, testimony in Gates Hearings, vol. II, p. 143. See also testimony against Gates by Jennifer Glademans and Harold Ford.

⁴⁴ Bar-Joseph, Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States, p. 33.

⁴⁵ Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000), p. 91.

Intelligence (DI):

Because of the strongly felt Casey position, I am afraid a counterculture seems to have sprung up among SOVA analysts.... SOVA seemed to bend over backwards to compensate.... in my own personal observation [SOVA]seemed inclined towards, yes, a highly benign view of Soviet intentions and goals.... SOVA analysts may perhaps have been expert on the Third World...but few of them had gotten their feet dirty, so to speak, in the dust of the Third World, and had not watched Soviet embassies work abroad.⁴⁶

How does one know where the line lies between editing and distortion, when both original analysis and revision by editors involves decisions about proper scope, emphasis, and selection of relevant data? When evidence is mixed, as it always is on difficult issues, choices about emphasis are political choices -- whether made by dovish analysts or hawkish managers. One charge against Gates was that in 1981 he and NIO Jeremy Azrael rewrote the Key Judgments of a study "to suggest greater Soviet support for terrorism, and the text was altered by pulling up from the annex reports that overstated Soviet involvement."⁴⁷ Who should decide what information should go in main text or annex, or which data overstates or understates evidence?

Initial versions of the latter study concluded that there was scant support for the view that Moscow was a major instigator of terrorism. In a subsequent redraft by a member of the DCI's Senior Review Panel, Lincoln Gordon, the scope of the study was broadened to include

⁴⁶ Graham Fuller, testimony in Gates Hearings, vol. II, p. 161. See also testimony in support of Gates by Charles Allen, Douglas MacEachin, Lawrence Gershwin, and Kay Oliver. Earlier, Jimmy Carter's DCI, Admiral Turner, recounted instances of analysts who considered his editorial revisions of their work to be politicization, while he believed he was simply correcting misleading methods in comparison on a subject about which he was more expert than the analysts -- naval capabilities. Turner also dealt with the case of David Sullivan, an analyst who leaked his own work to anti-Soviet Senate staff because he feared that it would be suppressed by detentist leadership at CIA. Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), pp. 122-123.

⁴⁷ Memorandum by Carolyn Ekedahl, reprinted in Gates Hearings, vol. III, p. 84.

revolutionary war, which led to more evidence of Soviet support. One of the analysts involved considered this politicization because it allowed the paper to "avoid definitions of terrorism" and to suggest "that the Soviet Union, by providing support for revolutionary violence, supported international terrorism."⁴⁸ This exemplifies the problem that the very terms of reference for an analysis can be heavily freighted with political bias. There has never been a consensus on how to define terrorism, primarily because it is a highly pejorative and politically loaded term. Narrow definitions are favored by those who wish to exclude actions by groups whose cause they approve, and broad definitions by those who wish to tar groups whose cause they abhor.⁴⁹

Another example of difficulty in disentangling editing from politicization was an estimate on Mexico produced in the mid-1980s. The NIO for Latin America, John Horton, believed that the Reagan administration was exerting pressure to produce an estimate emphasizing instability in the country. His superior, Herbert Meyer, maintained that Horton revised the draft done by a CIA Mexico expert, and Meyer in turn revised Horton's revisions to reinstate the other analyst's conclusions. Horton charged that the estimate that emerged from Meyer's action "was full of unsubstantiated allegations. What Meyer was doing was putting in what Casey wanted."⁵⁰ When a

⁴⁸ Ekedahl memorandum, in Gates Hearings Part III, p. 186. This study has been the subject of another story about policy contamination of intelligence, via blowback from covert action. The story I have heard verbally several times is that Casey was energized to prove that the Soviets supported terrorism because of claims to that effect in Claire Sterling's book, The Terror Network, and that he discovered only later that Sterling's information had come from a disinformation operation by the CIA's own Directorate of Operations. The only account of this that I have seen in print says that according to Lincoln Gordon "a small part" of the Sterling information had come from such blowback. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp. 124-129.

⁴⁹ Richard K. Betts, "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror," Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 19-20.

⁵⁰ Quoted in David C. Morrison, "Tilting With Intelligence," National Journal, May 9, 1987, p. 1115. See also John Horton, "Mexico, the Way of Iran?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 1, no. 2 (1986), and Horton, "The Real Intelligence Failure," Foreign Service Journal 62, no. 2 (February 1985).

higher manager supports an analyst against a lower manager, who is winning -- autonomous analysts or coercive management? Did this episode demonstrate editorial disagreements or dueling politicization?

Navigating the Thin Lines

The challenge remains to make intelligence relevant without making it dishonest by pulling punches in a way that lets policymakers believe what they want. In practical terms, if intelligence is to be useful, politicization will be a continuum from more to less, with the least being the aim for which intelligence professionals strive, but zero being unattainable without denuding analysis of all connection with political reality. Minimal political contamination, or open and balanced competition between analysis from different predispositions, must be the norm, but enforcing the norm may generate as many charges of politicization as it averts. Much depends on artful straddling of thin lines by intelligence managers -- something not easily done -- or signals sent in the choice of managers.⁵¹

There was less concern that intelligence was politicized in the first half of the Cold War, mostly because of the greater policy consensus among the players, but also because of the care given to symbolic protections such as the appointment of professionals unassociated with political parties to the top positions in the intelligence community. Until the post-Watergate era and the congressional investigations of the 1970s eight of ten DCIs were military officers (Sidney Souers, Hoyt Vandenberg, Roscoe Hillenkoetter, Walter Bedell Smith, William Raborn), career intelligence

⁵¹ Some of the points below echo Ransom, "The Politicization of Intelligence," and Hastedt, "The New Context of Intelligence Estimating," which I discovered just before making final revisions to my initial draft.

officers (Richard Helms, William Colby), or a member of the opposition party (Republican John McCone under Democrats Kennedy and Johnson). Only Allen Dulles and James Schlesinger were political appointees in the mold of cabinet members. In the period in which there have been more public controversies about politicization, however, leadership has been more typically political. Since Colby, only two of eight DCIs have been ostensibly nonpolitical (Stansfield Turner, William Webster). Two were as visibly partisan as one could possibly imagine (George Bush the Elder, who had been Chairman of the Republican National Committee, and William Casey, Ronald Reagan's campaign manager). The others were a former career intelligence officer (Gates) who made his reputation serving near the top of the White House and who had earlier been accused of trying to coopt the DI for the Reaganite worldview, and three standard cabinet-like political appointees from the President's own party (James Woolsey, John Deutch, George Tenet).⁵² Two other nominees who had to withdraw from confirmation battles were visible partisans of the President's party (Theodore Sorensen, Anthony Lake).

There is something to be said for the idea that it would be desirable for DCIs to be from the opposition party (or nonpolitical career professionals from the military or intelligence community itself) and also that DCI be a terminal office for elder statesmen who are not suspected of ambition for further advancement in the military or the policy world. At the least, these symbolic criteria would dull suspicions of politicization when intelligence seemed to support administration policy by providing prima facie reasons to believe that the DCI has no vested interest in pandering. This would complicate the process of choosing an effective DCI, however, because the most important criterion is to have rapport with the President. Otherwise, all the good intelligence in the world will

⁵² Tenet's continuation in office under Bush the Younger might be seen as a latter day equivalent of McCone's service.

have less entree to the decision than it could. More to the point, there is yet no constituency of any consequence for the norm of avoiding political appointment to the position of DCI.

Despite complaints from some analysts and intellectuals, moreover, the Gates model has continued to dominate in the management of intelligence analysis. Policymakers are scarcely bothered by the danger of politicization, and many in the foreign policy establishment genuflect to the danger of politicization yet endorse closer connections between intelligence and policy.⁵³ Indeed, George Tenet was called on at several junctures to function as a diplomat, brokering delicate elements of negotiation in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Some bad effects of the accentuated politicization that has come with increased publicity may be ameliorated by the natural dynamics of constitutional pluralism, which fosters dueling politicization and hence some rough balance. The institutionalization of oversight in Congress contributes to this. After the Team B exercise, for example, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued a staff report examining and criticizing it, essentially from the point of view of Team A. A Republican PFIAB countered alleged CIA bias with Team B, and Senate Democrats countered alleged Team B bias with their own assessment. In turning intelligence disputes into public controversies, intelligence may be damaged, but policy may be served by forcing fundamental issues onto the table. Protracted battles between intelligence and policy, as in the history of bleak estimates on the Vietnam War, are probably no longer possible, because congressional oversight would bring them “quickly to the surface and thus cause them to be

⁵³ For example, see [Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence](#), Report of an Independent Task Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), pp. 18-19, and [In From the Cold: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence](#) (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996), pp. 10-12.

resolved.”⁵⁴

Within the executive branch where the rubber meets road on a day to day basis, however, no formula has been found to square the circle. There is still a tension between objectivity and influence. As Lawrence Freedman puts the paradox, "there is a direct relationship between the potential importance of the estimates in critical policy debates, and the difficulty faced within the community in forging an agreed consensus and in preventing estimates being misused by the political masters."⁵⁵ In no small part, however, this is because of the struggle to produce a single best estimate on the most fundamentally controversial disputes -- indeed, they are in effect theological -- about threats to national security. Single best estimates can be useful, and often uncontroversial, on secondary matters, or ones in which leaders do not have well-formed views of their own already, and in which their convictions are not already invested. On matters of high politics, however, producing a consensus estimate is likely to be meaningless because it rests on negotiated mush, or else it will be bloodily contested. In the latter instance, politicization in some measure is virtually inevitable.

In those cases, futile attempts to combine quality and consensus make less sense than a conscious process for careful presentation of contrasting views. The organizational pluralism of the intelligence community is the best defense against deceptive and damaging politicization, and that defense may best be provided by unmasking and setting up a competition of predispositions rather

⁵⁴ Hans Heymann, "Intelligence/Policy Relationships," in Maurer, Tunstall, and Keagle, eds., Intelligence: Policy and Process, p. 63.

⁵⁵ Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, Second Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. xi-xii.

than letting biases sneak into products striving for ideal objectivity. SNIE 14.3-67 could have done this better on the O/B controversy, by giving equal time in the summary conclusions to the analyses that yielded higher strength figures for Communist forces. The Team B exercise was a more explicit step in the direction suggested, but an incomplete one -- and the incompleteness severely marred the result.

The best way to tell which cases warrant a single best estimate and which require casting the estimate as a debate is to find out whether a single best estimate can be obtained without splitting differences. If undiluted Key Judgments that are not obvious can be agreed with, say, no more than one major agency represented on the National Foreign Intelligence Board dissenting (or perhaps two of the minor ones), such a consensus can be useful. Otherwise, a lengthier product that lays out the alternatives may be unwelcome to policymakers, but it is better to make clear the limits of intelligence than to obscure them. This puts the ball in the consumers' court. It puts them on notice that intelligence cannot solve their problem, that they must either make the effort to look harder at the bases for disagreement among the experts, or forthrightly accept that they are operating on the basis of their own preferences or articles of faith rather than a complex reading of divided expert opinion.

If politicization includes all contamination of analysis by policy predispositions, it will never be fully purged from the process because every analyst's ideas and assumptions, and those of managers or competing analysts, will be politicizing forces, however muted or constrained professional standards of rigor may make them. Analysis that remains trenchant, rather than descending into negotiated mush, will never be free of political agendas. Bias can be minimized, however, by enforcement of rigorous standards of evidence and comparison, and the effects of bias

can be mitigated or made productive by organizing the confrontation of views in as systematic a manner as possible. All of this involves artful management, and walking dangerous lines. Robert Gates may have strayed too far and too energetically from the Kent model, but his message to analysts after the chastening of his confirmation hearings -- a message that he composed by drawing on competing drafts supplied by a variety of analysts -- charts the right course among pitfalls:

...a manager challenging assumptions should not be seen as a threat by analysts.... We must draw a line:

--Between producing a corporate product and suppressing different views.

--Between adjusting stylistic presentation to anticipate consumers' predilections, and changing the analysis to pander to them....

--Between viewing reporting critically and using evidence selectively...⁵⁶

Gates' message also noted that the main entrance to CIA headquarters is dominated by the chiseled inscription from the bible, "And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free."⁵⁷ To many cynical observers, especially those lay critics whose image of CIA derives from Hollywood or the history of dirty tricks by the Directorate of Operations, that inscription is ironic, paradoxical, or disingenuous. But for working analysts, intelligence managers, and policymakers who place any value on knowledge as a basis for making and implementing decisions, there can be no other rationale to give the enterprise meaning.

⁵⁶ "A Message to Analysts on 'Politicization'," pp. 9, 13.

⁵⁷ "A Message to Analysts on 'Politicization'," p. 1.