Accounting for Earnings and Wealth Inequality
August 2002 version. Joint with Ana Casta~neda and Javier
Diaz-Gimenez. JPE. We show that a theory of earnings and
wealth inequality based on the optimal choices of ex-ante
identical households who face uninsured idiosyncratic shocks
to their endowments of e.ciency labor units accounts for the
U.S. earnings and wealth inequality almost exactly. Relative
to previous work, we make three major changes to the way in
which this basic theory is implemented: (i) we mix the main
features of the dynastic and the life-cycle abstractions, that
is, we assume that our households are altruistic, and that
they go through the life-cycle stages of working-age and of
retirement; (ii) we model explicitly some of the quantitative
properties of the U.S. social security system; and (iii) we
calibrate our model economies to the Lorenz curves of
U.S. earnings and wealth as reported by the 1992 Survey of
Consumer Finances. Furthermore, our theory succeeds in
accounting for the observed earnings and wealth inequality in
spite of the disincentives created by the mildly progressive
U.S. income and estate tax systems, that are additional
explicit features of our model economies.
There is also an older version of the paper that assessed
the implications of a change of
taxes.
Earnings and Wealth Inequality and Income Taxation: Quantifying the
Trade-Off's of Switching to a Proportional Income Tax in
the U.S.